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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • April 27, 1965

    Airgram A-163 from the Department of State to the US Embassy in Argentina on the Argentine Sale of Uranium Oxide to Israel

    In response to a request for further instructions, the Dept. of State informed the Embassy that Washington was looking to establish a common policy on the mandatory application of IAEA safeguards. Until they were closer to agreement, the Embassy should request that the Argentine government apply safeguards to future deals.

  • June 03, 1965

    Cable 7659 from the Department of State to the US Embassy in the United Kingdom

    In a conversation with one or two State Department officials, a British Embassy officer notes that reports available to both governments estimate Israel's purchases of uranium to add up to 190 tons and proposed a joint US-British approach to Argentina on safeguards.

  • May 26, 1966

    Cable 1776 from the US Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State, 'Israeli Purchase of Argentine Uranium'

    The Embassy did not believe it was advisable to inform the Argentine government of US plans to ask the Israeli government about the location of the uranium.

  • 1977

    Brazil Scope Paper: Implications of the Argentine Visit

    Cyrus Vance - apparently unintentionally - left behind this document while meeting with Brazilian President Geisel. It lays out US negotiations with Argentina to ratify the Treaty of Tlateloco, to accept full scope safeguards and to delay the construction of a reprocessing facility in exchange for US nuclear assistance and Brazil’s acceptance of a moratorium on the construction of a reprocessing facility.

  • November 30, 1977

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information to the President, 'Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's Visit'

    According to a US document left behind by Cyrus Vance, Argentina had agreed to ratify the Treaty of Tlateloco, to accept full scope safeguards and to delay the construction of a reprocessing facility in exchange for US nuclear assistance and Brazil’s acceptance of a moratorium on the construction of a reprocessing facility. Commenting the paper, Foreign Minister Silveira defines US strategy as “irresponsible” and considers it as an encouragement to the rivalry and confrontation between Argentina and Brazil.

  • January 10, 1978

    National Intelligence Daily Cable, NIDC 78/007C, 'Argentina: No Treaty Ratification'

    This CIA bulletin notes the failure of U.S.-Argentine nuclear negotiations after Cyrus Vance’s visit to Argentina in December 1977. The U.S. proposed to supply highly enriched uranium for Argentina’s reactor exported to Peru, as well as to approve of a heavy water plant from Canada and asked in exchange for the Argentine ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty as well as the deferral of their spent-fuel reprocessing plans.

  • April 05, 1978

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires to the Foreign Ministry, 'External Policy. Argentina. Nuclear non-proliferation. Issue no. 132.'

    This telegram made by the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, verifies U.S. pressure on Argentina’s nuclear program, especially through Canada, with whom Argentina had a strategic partnership in the nuclear field. The telegram goes into depth on factors that underlie Argentina's decision not to sign the NPT, and its efforts to import the materials necessary for its nuclear program.

  • January 28, 1980

    Cable on Meeting Between CNEA President Carlos Madero and Brazilian Ambassador Carlos F. Duarte

    A cable received from the Brazilian embassy in Buenos Aires, regarding the visit of Admiral Castro Madero, the president of the National Atomic Energy Commission, to Brazil. Ambassador Duarte and Madero discussed nuclear energy and the importance of an eventual cooperation agreement between Brazil and Argentina.

  • April 09, 1981

    Special Assistant for NPI, NFAC, CIA, to Resource Management Staff, Office of Program Assessment et al, 'Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation'

    Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.