June 10, 1954
Thomas W. Braden, 'Operation VETO' [Approved for Release May 6, 2019]
CIA official Thomas Braden assures the State Department that RFE broadcasts which took sides in Czechoslovak factory council elections, as envisaged in FEC Czechoslovak Guidance No. 13, have ended. (The Guidance and the cited FEC telegram are available in the Hoover Archives and the Blinken Open Society Archives as FEC teletype NYC 29, June 8, 1954.)
August 15, 1957
Voice of America Broadcasting Policy for Czechoslovakia
Voice of America (VOA) country policy guidelines for Czechoslovakia, endorsed by the Committee on Radio Broadcasting Policy (CRBP), one of a series of East European country guidelines for VOA complementing country guidelines for Radio Free Europe (RFE).
February 09, 1967
Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Prague
The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemns Chinese authorities responsible for threats to the Czech Embassy in Peking, including the forceful holding of the ambassador of the CSSR and other officials and the tearing of the flag.
July 10, 1968
Memorandum from P. Shelest to CPSU CC
First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Shelest reports on a conversation between the Ukrainian secretary of the Transcarpathian Oblast with the first secretary of Czechoslovakia's East Slovakia regional committee. They discussed possible changes to Czechoslovakia's federal structure and Soviet concerns about the ongoing Prague Spring.
September 05, 1968
Yurii Andropov, Nikolai Shchelokov, and Mikhail Malyarov to the CPSU CC
This memorandum, signed by Yurii Andropov, the chairman of the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB); Nikolai Shchelokov, the Minister of Public Order (whose ministry was renamed the Ministry of Internal Affairs in late November 1968); and Mikhail Molyarov, the Procurator of the USSR, was sent to the ruling Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) eleven days after the demonstration in Red Square against the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. The document lays out the basic facts of the case as viewed by the KGB and the CPSU. The document mentions the names of the eight activists who were in Red Square as well as two who helped with planning but were not actually in Red Square, Inna Korkhova and Maiya Rusakovskaya. Natal’ya Gorbanevskaya, one of the eight, was detained but released because she had recently given birth. However, a year later she was arrested in connection with her involvement and sentenced to a harsh term in a psychiatric prison.
September 20, 1968
Yu. Andropov to the CPSU CC
This memorandum from KGB Chairman Andropov to the CPSU Politburo follows up on the initial report from Andropov, Shchelokov, and Malyarov. The document highlights the “malevolent views” of the group that held an unauthorized demonstration in Red Square on 25 August 1968, singling out Pavel Litvinov, Larisa Bogoraz, Viktor Fainberg, and Vadim Delaunay for particular opprobrium. Andropov stresses that the KGB will intensify its crackdown on opposition figures who try to “spread defamatory information about Soviet reality.”
June 08, 1989
Assessment Paper by the Austrian Foreign Ministry, '[Excerpt] Eastern Europe; Current Assessment'
The paper addresses the change in economics, politics, and social structures in the Soviet bloc (Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the GDR) as a result of the USSR loosening up regulations.
November 08, 1989
Summary of Visit by Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jaromír Johanes to China
This report includes information on economic cooperation projects between Czechoslovakia and China and on the political situation in both countries. While the Czechoslovak side focuses on the democratization of the country, China points to its consolidated Socialist system. Also attached are records of conversations between Jaromír Johanes, Li Peng, and Jiang Zemin.
November 24, 1989
Speech by Premier Ladislav Adamec at the Extraordinary Session of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee
This transcript shows the Czech party elites choosing against violent repression of the mass protests in Wenceslas Square. More clearly than in almost any other Party document, the reasons for nonviolence are spelled out: such a solution would only temporarily "return calm," it would radicalize the youth, "the international support of the socialist countries can no longer be counted on," and "the capitalist states" might react with a "political and economic boycott."