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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • October 10, 1962

    Speech by Senator Keating, "Cuba"

    Keating alleges that there are six IRBM bases being constructed by the Soviet Union in Cuba.

  • October 23, 1962

    Roger Robert du Gardier, French Ambassador in Havana, to Maurice Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister, Telegram number 538-540

    A discussion of the public's reaction to the Cuban crisis and the propaganda and speeches concerning it.

  • October 24, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Instructions on Issuing a Statement to Support Cuba'

    A plan from the Chinese Foreign Ministry office to distribute a postition statement to various press outlets regarding the situation of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

  • October 25, 1962

    Cable from Japanese Embassy in Havana to Tokyo

    A description of the Cuban reaction to the announcement of the US blockade. The Cuban press reports that President Kennedy's announcement is an act of unreasonable aggression by U.S. imperialists, and overall there is intense dissatisfaction about the situation among the revolutionary government and Castro

  • October 25, 1962

    Political Letter from Ambassador Max Troendle

    Ambassador Max Troendle discusses the situation in the Soviet Union after the Cuban Missile Crisis in regards to the public opinion and press attacks now being much calmer. He also mentions Israel’s newly arrived ambassador, Joseph Tekoah, who is familiar with the conditions in Latin America from his own experience.

  • October 26, 1962

    Cable from Japanese Embassy in Havana to Tokyo

    A description of the situation in Cuba due to the US blockade. The Japanese Embassy officials are discussing Cuban reactions as well as expectations of Soviet involvement.

  • October 26, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 26 October 1962

    According to Drozniak, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk has allegedly reported that the latest statements of journalists claiming the relaxation of tensions in the Cuban Missile Crisis do not correspond to the reality of serious tensions between the US and USSR.

  • October 26, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 26 October 1962

    Drozniak makes an assessment of the Cuban Missile Crisis situation, based on his conversations with foreign diplomats and respected journalists. Among other topics, he includes his opinion that "The operation of installing the [Soviet] missiles in Cuba was carried out in great hurry, without special adherence to secrecy, and perhaps even with the awareness that the missiles would be discovered relatively quickly. This [fact] has been interpreted [by the Americans] as [a possible] attempt by the USSR to test Kennedy’s “the will and readiness to fight.” [Soviet leader Nikita S.] Khrushchev chose Cuba, because he considered Berlin to be too dangerous."

  • October 26, 1962

    Report on “Extraordinary Measures” Regarding Czechoslovak Organizations

    This concerns the status of Czechoslovak domestic organizations at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Included in the report are the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, Central Council of Labor Unions, Czechoslovak Union of Youth, and the National Front.

  • October 27, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 27 October 1962

    Drozniak reports on his conversation with American journalist and syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop about the Cuban Missile Crisis.

  • October 28, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 28 October 1962

    Jelen discusses the various diplomatic communication channels that are taking place during the Cuban Missile Crisis through speeches, letters, phone conversations, etc., mostly between the leaders of the US, the USSR and Cuba.

  • October 30, 1962

    Cable no. 336 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Cable 336 reinforces the notion by Pavlicek that the press is inadequately reporting on the Soviet Union's side of the crisis. The newspaper Revolucion in particular has poor coverage, which has sparked outrage among the Cuban population. The purported reason is preoccupation with other stories and a lack of adequate understanding of the entire crisis.

  • October 30, 1962

    Cable no. 337 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    In Cuba, Castro's 5 Points speech has caused discontent among the populace. According to Pavlicek, this is because the Cuban people and leadership do not understand the steps taken by the Soviet Union and instead believe the Soviets have "backed away" from the USA, resulting in the weakening of Cuban defenses. The perspective the Cuban people are taking is not a global one but a nationalistic one. There is a great sense in unease at the Czechoslovak Embassy as a result of this discontent.

  • October 30, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 30 October 1962

    Drozniak reports on information about the Cuban Missile Crisis - the US administration's opinion on Soviet missiles in Cuba, liquidating Guantanamo Base and missiles in Turkey.

  • October 31, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    The Yugoslav Embassy in Havana and Ambassador Vidakovic tell the Foreign Ministry that Yugoslavia has been mentioned in Cuban press articles for their involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis. He also discusses other popular headlines about the crisis situation.

  • November 01, 1962

    Cable no. 340 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Public opinion in Havana has soured after the actions of the Soviet Union to resolve the crisis. The press and radio are preparing the ground for Fidel Castro's speech that day, accompanied by a spike in Cuban nationalism. Castro visited a university where he expressed hope of a resolution to the crisis that would not negatively affect Cuba's security.

  • November 01, 1962

    Cable no. 341 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Pavlicek relays to Prague the results of the meeting between Cuban foreign minister Raul Roa and UN Secretary General U Thant. Thant expressed sympathy for the Cuban people and acknowledged the right for Cuba to submit their considerations for the resolution to the crisis. The Cuban requests included lifting the American blockade, fulfilling Castro's 5 Points, and no UN inspection of the missile bases. Besides the meeting with the Secretary General, Pavlicek also recounts the meeting of a Latin American delegation including representatives from Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay and Mexico. All nations but Mexico refused to give in to U.S. pressures, and stood in support of Cuba. Pavlicek then moves on to cover the possible subjects of Castro's speech on 1 November, including the Cuban detention of anticommunist groups in country and the results of the negotiations with U Thant. In the meantime, the Cuban government is concerned with curtailing the actions of anti-Soviet groups which have sown confusion and discontent among the population.

  • November 02, 1962

    Cable no. 346 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Pavlicek's primary focus in this cable is the effect of the crisis on the national media. The Cuban media is stressing Castro's 5 Points, and some journalists are hesitant to report anything else. There is a slight thread of anticommunism and anti-Soviet sentiment breeding among the media, but these feelings are not widespread, according to Pavlicek. The press is holding off on coverage of all other events such as the Sino-Indian border conflict and Chinese support for Castro's 5 points until after his speech.

  • November 02, 1962

    Cable no. 348 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Fidel Castro's speech is the centerpiece of this cable from Pavlicek. Castro's rhetoric touched on the unity of the Cuban people, and their refusal to an "undignified agreement." Pavlicek predicts his speech will foster a great response both internally and externally. Castro also acknowledged the help provided by the Soviet Union and the anti-Soviet campaign mounted by counterrevolutionaries. Pavlicek's only complaint was a lack of emphasis on the "critical role" the Soviet Union has played in the negotiations to resolve the crisis. However, the reaction to Fidel's speech is one of calming the situation and a clear orientation for the Cubans.

  • November 02, 1962

    Ciphered Telegram from Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to the Central Committee for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

    The telegram bears on the circumstances surrounding Fidel Castro's controversial 27 October letter to Khrushchev. Alekseev describes Castro's demeanor as being irritated and paranoid at the time of writing the letter. He provides background on Castro's actions and attitudes at the peak of the crisis, and especially his nocturnal visit to the Soviet embassy and preparation of his letter to Khrushchev on the night of 26-27 October. He advises Moscow on how to handle the Cuban leader, and offers analysis into the emotions and overall mood of Castro and his associates at that moment in the crisis.