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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • October 23, 1962

    Roger Robert du Gardier, French Ambassador in Havana, to Maurice Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister, Telegram number 538-540

    A discussion of the public's reaction to the Cuban crisis and the propaganda and speeches concerning it.

  • October 25, 1962

    Political Letter from Ambassador Max Troendle

    Ambassador Max Troendle discusses the situation in the Soviet Union after the Cuban Missile Crisis in regards to the public opinion and press attacks now being much calmer. He also mentions Israel’s newly arrived ambassador, Joseph Tekoah, who is familiar with the conditions in Latin America from his own experience.

  • October 25, 1962

    Minutes of the Meeting of the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker’s and Peasant’s Government (Council of Ministers)

    The document includes Hungarian Council of Ministers meeting minutes from 25 October 1962. The minutes are dominated by János Kádár’s detailed overview of events leading up to the current international situation. The overview is preceded by the Council of Ministers approving the government’s public statement on the Cuban Missille Crisis. During the session Kádár summarizes US provocation, Cuban and Soviet responses, and the military mobilization of different countries and military alliances, and Hungary’s political campaign in support of Cuba. Kádár notes negotiations between Cuba, the US, and Soviet Union initiate the day before. The minutes also include exchanges between Kádár and other Council of Ministers representatives.

  • October 26, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 26 October 1962

    According to Drozniak, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk has allegedly reported that the latest statements of journalists claiming the relaxation of tensions in the Cuban Missile Crisis do not correspond to the reality of serious tensions between the US and USSR.

  • October 26, 1962

    Report on “Extraordinary Measures” Regarding Czechoslovak Organizations

    This concerns the status of Czechoslovak domestic organizations at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Included in the report are the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, Central Council of Labor Unions, Czechoslovak Union of Youth, and the National Front.

  • October 31, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    The Yugoslav Embassy in Havana and Ambassador Vidakovic tell the Foreign Ministry that Yugoslavia has been mentioned in Cuban press articles for their involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis. He also discusses other popular headlines about the crisis situation.

  • October 31, 1962

    Cable no. 338 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Pavlicek reports to Prague that the public situation in Cuba is still uncertain and confused. Castro is expected to give a speech the coming Thursday which would resolve the situation and clarify the position of the Soviet Union. There is a lack of depth in evaluation, and much needs to be explained to the Cuban population by the Soviet Union, as all fear aggressive action by the United States.

  • November 01, 1962

    Cable no. 340 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Public opinion in Havana has soured after the actions of the Soviet Union to resolve the crisis. The press and radio are preparing the ground for Fidel Castro's speech that day, accompanied by a spike in Cuban nationalism. Castro visited a university where he expressed hope of a resolution to the crisis that would not negatively affect Cuba's security.

  • November 01, 1962

    Cable no. 341 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Pavlicek relays to Prague the results of the meeting between Cuban foreign minister Raul Roa and UN Secretary General U Thant. Thant expressed sympathy for the Cuban people and acknowledged the right for Cuba to submit their considerations for the resolution to the crisis. The Cuban requests included lifting the American blockade, fulfilling Castro's 5 Points, and no UN inspection of the missile bases. Besides the meeting with the Secretary General, Pavlicek also recounts the meeting of a Latin American delegation including representatives from Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay and Mexico. All nations but Mexico refused to give in to U.S. pressures, and stood in support of Cuba. Pavlicek then moves on to cover the possible subjects of Castro's speech on 1 November, including the Cuban detention of anticommunist groups in country and the results of the negotiations with U Thant. In the meantime, the Cuban government is concerned with curtailing the actions of anti-Soviet groups which have sown confusion and discontent among the population.

  • November 02, 1962

    Cable no. 346 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Pavlicek's primary focus in this cable is the effect of the crisis on the national media. The Cuban media is stressing Castro's 5 Points, and some journalists are hesitant to report anything else. There is a slight thread of anticommunism and anti-Soviet sentiment breeding among the media, but these feelings are not widespread, according to Pavlicek. The press is holding off on coverage of all other events such as the Sino-Indian border conflict and Chinese support for Castro's 5 points until after his speech.

  • November 02, 1962

    Cable no. 348 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Fidel Castro's speech is the centerpiece of this cable from Pavlicek. Castro's rhetoric touched on the unity of the Cuban people, and their refusal to an "undignified agreement." Pavlicek predicts his speech will foster a great response both internally and externally. Castro also acknowledged the help provided by the Soviet Union and the anti-Soviet campaign mounted by counterrevolutionaries. Pavlicek's only complaint was a lack of emphasis on the "critical role" the Soviet Union has played in the negotiations to resolve the crisis. However, the reaction to Fidel's speech is one of calming the situation and a clear orientation for the Cubans.

  • November 02, 1962

    Ciphered Telegram from Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to the Central Committee for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

    The telegram bears on the circumstances surrounding Fidel Castro's controversial 27 October letter to Khrushchev. Alekseev describes Castro's demeanor as being irritated and paranoid at the time of writing the letter. He provides background on Castro's actions and attitudes at the peak of the crisis, and especially his nocturnal visit to the Soviet embassy and preparation of his letter to Khrushchev on the night of 26-27 October. He advises Moscow on how to handle the Cuban leader, and offers analysis into the emotions and overall mood of Castro and his associates at that moment in the crisis.

  • November 09, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 9 November 1962

    Jelen reports on several points of public opinion regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis situation.

  • November 15, 1962

    Roger Robert du Gardier, French Ambassador in Havana, to Maurice Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister, Telegram number 610-611

    Roger Robert du Gardier discusses his impressions of the effects of the Cuban Missile Crisis (on military activities, public sentiments, etc.).

  • November 27, 1962

    Minutes of Conversation with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, President of the INRA

    Unger and Rodriguez discuss a plethora of topics regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis.

  • November 29, 1962

    Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Beck), Report on Soviet-Cuban Divergence

    Hungarian Ambassador to Cuba János Beck reports on the Soviet-Cuban divergence after the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Provided with information by the Polish ambassador, Beck believes that the Cubans and Soviets had a strategic plan in placing missiles in Cuba, but the US reaction was more drastic than expected. Beck summarized facts about the crisis from 27-28 October and explains that the Cubans feel betrayed by the Soviet Union and their negotiations with the US.

  • January 24, 1963

    Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Beck), Report on Soviet-Cuban Conflicts

    Hungarian Ambassador to Cuba János Beck reports on post-Cuban-Missile-Crisis conflict between Cuba and the Soviet Union. Beck highlights Cuba’s tendency to act independent of socialist country opinion. He also mentions the negative influence of nationalism on the Cuban government, which has a direct influence on Soviet-Cuban relations. The Soviets believe Cubans do not understand that Soviet negotiations with the US secured Cuba from a future US invasion. The Cuban Missile Crisis also is evidence that neither the US or Soviet Union want to start a nuclear war.

  • February 01, 1963

    Memorandum of Conversation between the Delegates from the Society for Soviet-Chinese Friendship (OKSD), Li Xigeng and Li Zhanwu, with the Society's General Secretariat, 18 November 1962

    A Soviet delegation visiting China meets with local representatives of the Society for Soviet-Chinese Friendship (OKSD) and the two groups have a tense conversation about the Soviet handling of the recent Cuban Missile Crisis.

  • March 20, 1965

    Minutes of Conversation between Cuban Defense Minister Raúl Castro and Polish Leader Władysław Gomułka, Warsaw, 20 March 1965

    During his visit in Poland, Castro relates Cuba's position on a conversation taken place in Moscow and why it may be of interest to the Cubans. Gomulka raises the issue of the missiles. In Gomulka's opinion two factors were decisive: contradictions which arose within the socialist camp and the policy which was conducted by Khrushchev. Gomulka is assured that US is capable of conducting a war with Cuba by way of conventional weapons, it does not have to use nuclear weapons. It is clear that the socialist camp and the USSR cannot defend Cuba in any other way but by using nuclear weapons. If a conflict is meant to be, then it will be a nuclear conflict, there is no other way. Gomulka further raises a question whether to go into a nuclear war or not. Castro disagrees with a manner nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Cuba by Soviets. Khruchshev explained that he did not have time. Per Gomulka, Khrushchev conducted a policy which was not thought-out and which was all-out. Gomulka further discusses his talks with Chinese and Vietnamese comrades re: nuclear weapons issue.

  • March 22, 1965

    Conversation between Raul Castro Ruz, and a member of the Polish Politburo, Cde. Zenon Kliszko

    During a trip from Orneta to Katowice, Raul Castro and Zenon Kliszko had conversation on the following topics: (1) assessment of the position of the Italian Communist Party, (2)assessment of the position of the Romanian Workers’ Party, (3) the UPSR and other Communist Parties in Asia, and (4) the Matter of a Former Member of the National Leadership UPSR – J. Ordoqui. For the Polish side, the program of the Italian Communist Party is not clear, particularly with regard to the question of establishing a uniform workers’ party.