March 24, 1959
Resolution of the 42nd Meeting of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Politburo, Regarding Talks with Representatives of the People’s Socialist Party of Cuba
This presents evidence of Czechoslovak-Cuban relations forming in 1959, which includes the somewhat sensitive issue of Prague’s attempting to grasp the relationship and balance of power within Havana’s rulers between Fidel Castro’s “July 26th” movement and the traditional, pro-Moscow communist party, the People’s Socialist Party (PSP).
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) Politburo Resolution (with enclosures) on Arms Transfers to Cuba, September 1959
Czech government decision in late September 1959, to approve sending what was euphemistically described as “special technical supplies” or “special technology” (but in truth were weapons, specifically 50,000 submachine guns and ammunition) to Havana, using a neutral Swiss firm as a cut-out to conceal the transaction, especially from American eyes.
April 30, 1961
Czechoslovak Intelligence Reports Correspondence with Czechoslovak Embassy, Havana, Regarding Purported Assassination Plot against Fidel Castro and Coup Plot against Cuban Government
Czechoslovak Intelligence reports on a possible assassination plot against Castro and a possible coup against the Revolutionary Government in Havana. The document details the plot being planned by individuals in Havana including smuggling explosives into a public celebration for 1 May. Microfilms containing information on the plot including the organizers and place of action. It is obvious from this correspondence that the planned assassination and coup against Castro are part of the Bay of Pigs Invasion.
June 09, 1961
From the Journal of S.M. Kudryavtsev, 'Record of a Conversation with Prime Minister of the Republic of Cuba Fidel Castro Ruz, 28 April 1961'
Fidel Castro expresses his desire for Cuba--US diplomatic relations to resume and asks Kudryavtsev for Soviet support at the UN Security Council in countering American aggression. Castro asks Kuydryavstev to ascertain the Soviet opinion on Cuba's participation in a conference of neutral countries organized by Yugoslavia and the UAR.
December 14, 1961
Polish Notes from Miami Regarding Situation in Cuba
Notes on news stories collected from various Spanish-language newspapers in Miami. Topics cover the growing tension between Cuba and the US, efforts to recruit Cubans to US army, skepticism over whether the US could have any influence over Castro's revolution, and worries that US military involvement in Cuba could escalate into another big war.
January 18, 1962
Report from Cultural Attaché at the Israeli Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, Smeul Benizi, 18 January 1962, Subject: 'Brazil – Cuban-Latin American Relations'
Cultural Attaché at the Israeli Embassy in Rio de Janeiro, Smeul Benizi, discusses the proposal from Brazil to the Organization of American States (OAS) suggesting that Cuba become a neutral country, like Finland.
April 02, 1962
Message from the Italian Communist Party to the Cuban Leadership
The Italian Communist Party sends a message to the Cuban government expressing their hope that the Organization of American States (OAS) will begin to see the Cuban perspective and that "the decisions of the OAS cannot suspend the Cuban truth from the American continent."
October 18, 1962
Resolutions by Bulgarian Communist Party Organizations in Havana
The resolution includes a summary of the annual survey and election meeting of Bulgarian Communist Party organizations in Cuba. The resolution documents the meeting agenda and statements by Bulgarian officials Michev and Hubenov. In his comments, Michev summarizes the international climate in which Bulgarian organizations assisted Cuba. Hubenov’s comments follow. He discusses the political atmosphere in Cuba and disagrees with Michev’s comments on developments of political unity in Cuba. (Michev's comments are not included in the translation.) Hubenov also argues that the Bulgarian government is uninformed of the political situation in Cuba—its invitation for Fidel Castro to visit Bulgaria exemplifies the problem. Hubenov reviews the international impact of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the resulting isolation of Cuba in Latin America, and Castro’s inability to leave Cuba when the revolution’s success is threatened.
October 27, 1962
Telegram from Swiss Foreign Ministry to Swiss Embassy in Havana (Stadelhofer)
The Swiss Foreign Ministry in Berne and the Swiss Embassy, Havana (Stadelhofer) discuss Cuba's actions in regards to negotiations in the Organization of American States (OAS). He says, "In this superpower confrontation, Cuba has more and more lost its right of self-determination."
October 30, 1962
Polish Embassy, Rio de Janeiro (Chabasinski), to Polish Foreign Ministry
Telegram describing conversation between Ambassador Chabasinski and former Brazilian president Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira. They discussed their dissatisfaction with the US's "Alliance for Progress" and recent US diplomatic efforts, among other topics.
November 06, 1962
Report on Visit to Prague by Cuban Communist Party Leader Blas Roca Calderio
Calderio's visit to Prague in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis served to solidify the ties between Cuba and Czechoslovakia, relations that would persist until the end of the Cold War. Among the activities of Calderio's visit included attendance of 12th Party Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, meeting with Cuban ambassadors to China, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and a promise to attend the meeting of the Bulgarian Communist Party.
November 07, 1962
Cable no. 355 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)
The cable reveals serious misgivings by the Cubans with regard to Soviet handling of the crisis. Roy Inchaustegui was criticized by Castro for discussing the question of document authenticity about the missile bases instead of discussing Cuba's right to defense at the UN Security Council. Pavlicek reports the Council asked on Czechoslovakia's stance towards Castro's 5 Points. While responding with support, he still asked for an official viewpoint from the Czechoslovak government in Prague.
November 09, 1962
Cable no. 358 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)
Mikoyan's talks with the Cubans appears to be stalling, according to Pavlicek. The Cuban delegation is adamant about Castro's 5 points, stubbornly refusing any inspection of the missile bases, especially by the UN. Pavlicek also reports on a reception held the previous day at the Soviet Embassy in Havana. It drew a large crowd, and was marked by "warm feelings and openness," but discussions of the Soviet Union's handling of the crisis remain in doubt.
November 16, 1962
Cable no. 365 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)
The cable relays an important development in regards to press coverage of the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. There are strict controls and reviews to be placed on news from the Soviet Union, and there is to be no publications by Presna Latina about peaceful coexistence or solidarity with the Soviet Union, about export of arms, etc. until a resolution has been reached. Khrushchev's name is not to be mentioned anywhere. There are also strict limitations placed on foreign correspondents and journalists.
November 26, 1962
Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 26 November 1962
The short cable concerns a farewell speech given by Anastas Mikoyan, which was, in the words of Boissevain, a "pep talk" to Castro. The speech failed to gain any further concessions from Fidel Castro beyond what Mikoyan could initially get Castro to agree to.
November 29, 1962
Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United States (Dr. Miloslav Ruzek), Report on Anastas Mikoyan’s Conversations in Washington
The report details Mikoyan's talks with President John F. Kennedy in Washington D.C. Among the topics of discussion were questions of hemispheres of influence, whether the Soviet Union promoted a revolution against the USA in Cuba, and whether Castro was made an enemy of the USA or was one from the beginning. Conduct of both nations with regards to the Cuban question is discussed at length, ranging from whether U.S. was correct in acting against a perceived threat to security, the conduct of the Cuban people, the extent of Soviet involvement in Cuba, and what military hardware would be left in Cuba after the removal of the nuclear missile bases.
December 03, 1962
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 71
Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”
December 14, 1962
Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 14 December 1962
The cable from van Roijen concerns a conversation between him and Director of UN Political Affairs at the U.S. Department of State Joseph Sisco. Sisco informs van Roijen that the Kennedy Administration has decided to let the Cuban issue quietly die, boiling down to the United States and the Soviet Union "agreeing to disagree." The State Department does not think there should be further debate on the issue in the UN Security Council because the U.S. is not willing to make further concessions while there have been no UN inspections. Sisco also reports that the Soviets have made a commitment to withdraw all combat troops from Cuba.
December 27, 1962
Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 27 December 1962
Van Roijen continues on the conversation he had with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk from the last cable. Rusk believes Cuba may be aligning more with China and is factoring in Chinese interests in Cuba. However, Rusk also saw Chinese initiatives in North Korea and North Vietnam. The relationship with China is, in his words, "not a long-term worry like Moscow but a short-term worry."