In a memo to President Figueiredo, Minister Saraiva Guerreiro advises that Brazil should demonstrate receptivity to Iraq’s proposal but avoid a formal commitment, especially in “sensitive” areas that relate to the Germany-Brazil Agreement. Supply of uranium should be admitted as a possibility if mentioned by the Iraqis. The document emphasizes that the cooperation should be made public and become subject to all international safeguard agreements and regimes.

This report found “no hard evidence” that Iraq was intent on a nuclear weapons capability. Nevertheless, considering the scope of Iraq’s “ambitious” nuclear program, intelligence analysts concluded that the Baath regime was covertly seeking a weapons capability to support its pursuit of regional hegemony and to match the perceived Israeli nuclear threat.

Chief of Staff of Israel Defense Forces, General Rafael Eitan writes to South African Minister of Defence Magnus Malan shortly after Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. In this candid letter, Eitan states that Israel’s “iron determination” would not “allow these crazy Arabs to possess nuclear weapons," adding that "anyone who tries to say that the nuclear reactor in Iraq was only for research purposes is wicked, cynical and oil, not human blood, flows in his veins."

This report by the Hungarian Embassy in Egypt describes the Egyptian government's surprise at the Israeli bombing of the Osirak nuclear site in Iraq in 1981 and concludes that peace in the region must come through international cooperation and conferences.

Saddam Hussein discusses the Israeli air strike against the Iraqi reactor at Osirak, explaining why the attack was expected and his reasons for pursuing nuclear weapons development.

Meeting of top Iraqi officials to discuss the ongoing war with Iran and Israeli air strikes.

Saddam and his ministers discuss the reorganization and rebuilding of the Iraqi nuclear program.

This DIA article briefly describes Iraq’s effort to procure aluminum tubes from 1986 to 1991 and discusses the potential for their use for conventional military purposes.

Although the Department of Energy dissented against other Departments' opinions on the Iraqi aluminum tubes its intelligence office went along with the prevailing view that Iraq was trying to “rejuvenate” its nuclear program.