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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • September, 1939

    Secret Supplementary Protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact, 1939

    Secret Texts of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact, 1939

  • June 04, 1945

    Notes by Wilhelm Pieck on a Consultation with Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov

    Meeting notes on the situation in Germany.

  • June 08, 1953

    Telegram No. 362 from F. Molochkov to V. M. Molotov

    The correspondence from Molochkov at the USSR Mission in Switzerland to USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov addresses the growing concern of the representation of East and West Germany as two independent states in international organizations.

  • September 19, 1989

    Analysis by Envoy Thomas Nowotny, 'The Specter of German Reunification'

    The report discusses the conflicting views from countries such as the US and USSR surrounding German Reunification. It later explains predicted demographics, economics, and military prowess of a unified Germany.

  • July 18, 1990

    Johann Plattner, Austrian Foreign Ministry, 'German Unity; State of Affairs in mid-July 1990'

    The report assesses German unity in three parts. The first regards internal factors of integration such as integrating monetary systems and elections. The next portion regards external factors, focusing mainly on the USSR's parameters for reunification regarding NATO and Poland's western border. Finally, the report assesses German reunification and predicts the process will be complete by the end of the year (1990). In addition, it discusses the positive prospects for European Unity and emphasizes Austria's role in binding a newly united Germany to Western Europe.

  • July 19, 1990

    Sucharipa, Austrian Foreign Ministry, 'German Unification, Soviet Position'

    The document discusses the Soviet position on German unification in six separate parts. The first deals with confusion over Gorbachev's better than expected consent to unification. Second are the potential domestic and foreign policy reasons the USSR consented so readily to unification, followed by the third part which outlines potential Soviet benefits from the process. The fourth section discusses the autonomy of the new German government, which is backed up with the fifth section discussing public sentiment. The final portion discusses the fine line for both the Soviet Union and the West between being overbearing on Germany's new independence and not helping enough.