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January 31, 1961
Record of Conversation from Premier Zhou Enlai’s Reception of Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh
A brief conversation concerning a North Vietnamese request for Chinese assistance with an aerial survey. Zhou and Nguyen Duy Trinh also discuss Chinese and Polish economic aid to the DRV.
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March 11, 1963
Secret Telegram from Maneli (Hanoi) to Spasowski-Morski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 3175]
Cable from Polish Ambassador in Hanoi Maneli to Warsaw, describing a conversation he had with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and Soviet Ambassador Tovmassian. They discuss the idea of neutralization in Vietnam, and the possibility of the United States pulling forces out. Tovmassian adds that the PRC pressured the DRV to start incidents in the demilitarized zone.
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April 04, 1963
Secret Telegram from Michałowski (Warsaw) to Jaszczuk (Moscow)
Cable from Jerzy Michalowski in Warsaw to Boleslaw Jaszczuk in Moscow, informing him of information from the DRV ambassador to Poland. The ambassador relayed that the VWP does not think that the situation in South Vietnam is not yet favorable, but that once it is they will seek a solution to hostilities at an international peace conference. They state that they will continue to ascertain the true intentions of the United States, particularly the provision for a ceasefire.
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September 02, 1963
Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw)[Ciphergram No. 11289]
Cable from Polish official in Saigon, Maneli, notifying Warsaw that the coup d'etat against Diem and installation of the American military junta is to be executed soon. Notes the inclinations of Diem and Nhu.
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September 04, 1963
Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 11424]
Summary of Commissioner Maneli's meeting with Ngo Dinh Nhu. Nhu expresses a desire to establish a ceasefire, but notes his inability to make a concrete statement because of the United States. Maneli writes that Nhu's goal is an independent, neutral country, but that he is hindered by his tense, but still existent relations with the United States.
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October 03, 1963
Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 12768]
Report by Polish official in Saigon, Maneli, on his meeting with the North Vietnamese delegation. The North Vietnamese outline their stance toward South Vietnam and the United States, looking to exploit the tension between the latter and Ngo Dinh Diem and a refusal to cease fighting until the US allows for negotiations and the formation of government in South Vietnam. They also want to establish contact between the International Control Commission and the NLF.
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November 25, 1963
Secret Telegram from Chodorek (Hanoi) to Morski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 15053]
Record of Ha Van Lau's discussion of the Internatinonal Control Commission in Vietnam, sent by Polish official in Hanoi, Chodorek, to Warsaw. He states that the Commission has repeatedly violated the Geneva Accords and, through its Indian delegate, operated under the orders of the US.
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January 05, 1966
Letter from the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party to Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party
This letter sent from Wladislaw Gomulka to Nicolae Ceausescu requests Romanian support in the effort to unite the socialist countries of Asia and the Warsaw Pact, through relations with China, to counter United States' aggression in Vietnam in solidarity with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
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January 07, 1966
Transcript of the Discussions on the Occasion of the Reception by Comrade N. Ceausescu of I. Czesak, Member of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party (P.U.W.P.)
This transcript is of the discussion between Nicolae Ceausescu and I. Czesak at the reception of the Polish official in Romania, in which they discuss the possibility of uniting the socialist countries of Europe and Asia, and the recent visit of an American envoy to Warsaw in order to discuss the situation in Vietnam.