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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • April 01, 1961

    Memorandum by Admiral Corrado Tagliamonte to the Minister of Defense, 'American attitude toward NATO. President Kennedy's declarations'

    Report submitted to the Italian Minister of Defense regarding President Kennedy’s opinion that NATO should not construct a special nuclear force since the US has already developed a nuclear deterrent. According to the Kennedy, the creation of an additional deterrent would be useless and a waste of resources.

  • May 02, 1961

    Memorandum by General Staff of Defense (SMD) for Minister of Defense Andreotti

    Document announcing the official abandonment of the policy of massive retaliation as a "deterrence" strategy. Opinion of the Italian senior minister of defense regarding the need for a more flexible NATO defense strategy in order to respond to any type of act of aggression is also presented.

  • January 31, 1962

    Research Memorandum REU-25 from Roger Hilsman to Mr. Kohler, 'European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability'

    Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

  • January 15, 1963

    MAE Cable Report on NATO and Nuclear Forces

    Note by ambassador to the UK Pietro Quaroni on NATO US leadership, nuclear balance, european nuclear deterrent, conventional armaments and bilateral relations between European countries and the US.

  • March 12, 1965

    Report by Permanent Representative to NATO Alessandrini

    The report examines the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance and the uncertainty of the current phase, which consists of forces not always appropriate to its cohesion. Alessandrini analyzes both the transformations in the international context and those inside NATO, the issue of political, economic and military consultation, the debate about the multilateral force and ANF. The conclusion underlines - despite all the current problems - the positive results of the history of NATO, an alliance that represents to date not only the deterrence against possible Soviet threats, but also the most important interlocutor in an eventual East-West dialogue.

  • August 07, 1965

    MD Note on US and UK positions on MLF

    Note on MLF project elaborated by Paris standing group. It focuses on US project, British point of view, objectives of te ANF proposal, issues with the MLF and national ways to the nuclear deterrent.

  • October 13, 1965

    Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Special committee proposed by MacNamara'

    The note is about MacNamara's proposal to establish a Special Committee in order to broaden Allies' participation in the strategic planning of US nuclear deterrent and to reach a more efficient process of political consultation. The document outlines some points related to Italy's position.

  • March 27, 1967

    Intelligence Note 242 from George C. Denney, Jr., to the Secretary, 'Peking May Have ICBMs in 1971'

    Years before Beijing actually deployed an ICBM in 1981, US intelligence estimated the possibility of the deployment of a “few operable, though probably relatively inefficient missiles” as early as 1971.

  • February 15, 1983

    Report by Permanent Representative to NATO Tornetta to Minster of Foreign Affairs Colombo, 'Perspectives about Atlantic defense for the 1980s'

    Italy's pemanent representative to NATO, Vincenzo Tornetta, reports to foreign minister Colombo about the prospects of NATO's 1980s defence strategy. He offers an overview of the developments of the Alliance, and discusses topical questions including euromissiles and anti-war movements in Europe, and calls for increased openness and willingness to negotiate with the East.

  • May 17, 1983

    MAE DAP Memo on INF

    MAE DAP memo on resumption of negotiations on INF. Observations on Allied negotiating position regarding an intermediate solution. Discussion of the Soviet position (press conference by Foreign Minister Gromyko, statements by Secretary-General PCUS Andropov): The paper also discusses the issue of French and British national nuclear deterrents, deployment of Euro-missiles and Soviet SS-20, comments Allied countries and perspectives on the negotiations.

  • December 13, 1986

    Telegram by Permanent Representative to NATO Fulci to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Ministerial Session of the Atlantic Council - Point II of the agenda. Speech of US Secretary of State Shultz about the prospects of post-Reykjavik scenario'

    Secretary of State, George P. Schultz analyzes US position following the collapse of the US-Soviet talks in Reykjavik. He discusses credibility of nuclear deterrence, US commitment to Europe and increasing conventional forces.

  • December 13, 1986

    Telegram by Permanent Representative to NATO Fulci, 'Ministerial Session of the Atlantic Council - Point II of the agenda. Discussion in restricted session about the prospects on East-West relations in the post-Reykjavik scenario'

    The document discusses the internal debate caused by Schultz's address at the Atlantic Council of Ministers. NATO countries are divided into two camps regarding the strategy and pace of nuclear disarmament and reduction talks.

  • May 09, 1987

    Telegram by Permanent Representative to NATO Fulci to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'General Rogers' position on US-USSR negotiations for nuclear arms control (LRINF and SRINF)'

    Telegram from Italy's permanent representative to NATO re-caps the controversial position presented by the Supreme Allied Commander Rogers. General Rogers criticizes the Reagan administration's strategy and expresses concern over the disparity between NATO capabilities and those of the Warsaw Pact.

  • November 06, 1987

    Telegram by Permanent Representative to NATO Fulci to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'NPG, Point II-A of the agenda (implementation of the decision of 12th December 1979: State of deployments)'

    The telegram compiles updates from Defence Ministers (UK, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy) on the status of deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles decided in December 1979.

  • March 10, 1989

    Letter by Permanent Representative to NATO Fulci to Minister of Foreign Affairs Andreotti

    Italy's permanent representative to NATO, Fulci, writes to foreign minister Andreotti following NATO's 1989 Wintex-Cimex exercise. His analysis suggests that the exercise revealed inefficincies in NATO's deterrence and flexible response strategy,

  • May 02, 1989

    Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'The Wintex-Cimex '89 Exercise in its nuclear aspects. Evolution, peculiarities and implications'

    NATO's Deputy Secretary General Marcello Guidi writes to Foreign Minister Andreotti at the end of his term volunteering his rather optimistic views on the developments in East-West relations and NATO during the past three years. Key topics include disarmament, the German question, and the future role of NATO.