Search in
ADD SEARCH FILTER CANCEL SEARCH FILTER

Digital Archive International History Declassified

SEARCH RESULTS

  • July 13, 1979

    Report on the Italian "nuclear supplies" to Iraq

    In July 1979, U.S. diplomats told their Italian counterparts that it was an “American strong belief” that Iraq was pursuing nuclear capability, and they requested the Italian government to provide information on the nature of the “nuclear supplies” to Iraq. Italy dutifully complied with the United States’ demand for information and assured the US government that all supplies to Iraq were provided in compliance with the "NPT, the London agreements, and the other international regulations”

  • December 01, 1980

    Recommendation for the Reagan Administration Nonproliferation Policy

    Following Reagan’s election in November 1980, his transition team in charge of nuclear matters called for a clean, dramatic break from the policies of the outgoing Carter administration. As for relations with the IAEA, a vital component of the policy, the ACDA paper argued that Washington should employ the agency as an agent to achieve its nonproliferation goals. The IAEA and the NPT were to be “further strengthened and given greater U.S. support.” To reinforce U.S. influence over the agency, it was recommended that “support to the IAEA in the form of financial contribution, manpower and technical advice should be increased significantly.

  • June 07, 1981

    NSC Discussion Paper: Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Cooperation

    On 7 June 1981, the day of the Osirak raid, a policy paper composed by the ‘Senior Interagency Group on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Cooperation’ (SIG) was submitted to the NSC. The discussion paper crowned the administration’s nonproliferation efforts as a “key foreign policy objective” and called to revise the 1978 NNPA.

  • June 07, 1981

    "Attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Research Centre"

    After the raid Israel initiated a PR campaign, explaining its reasoning behind the attack. Following this campaign, the second causality of the raid, in addition to Iraq’s reactor, was the credibility of the IAEA. And its officials staged their own counter campaign.

  • June 09, 1981

    Immediate cable from Tel Aviv Embassy to Secrety of State about Iraq (Israel strike on Iraqi nuclear facility)

    While starting to construct the political strategy of response to the raid, the administration came face to face with what U.S. ambassador to Israel, Sam Lewis called in his cable to Washington a “gap” in the administration’s “institutional memory”, as assessments regarding Israel’s intention to launch a strike were not passed on from the Carter administration.

  • June 09, 1981

    Memo to Richard V. Allen from Raymond Tanter, Subject: Israel's air strike on Iraq's nuclear facility

    The NSC’s Raymond Tanter recommended a “middle course of action,” one which would distance Washington from the strike “while avoiding extreme measures designed to punish Israel.”

  • June 09, 1981

    Memo for Richard V. Allen from Douglas J. Feith subject the Israeli raid on Iraqi nuclear facility

    NSC staffer Douglas J. Feith took the internal debate on the legitimacy of the raid a step further, stating that “no rebuke of Israel’s raid against Iraq should be issued without an equally emphatic rebuke of Iraq.” Feith’s argument was based on the fact that Iraq had continuously refused to acknowledge Israel’s existence and was officially at war with it.

  • June 09, 1981

    Telegram from Washington Embassay to Foreign Office, Subject: administration response

    Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who maintained close ties with the Israeli diplomats, told the Israeli ambassador in a phone conversation on 9 June 1981 that Israel’s action in Baghdad caused a serious complication for the U.S., reiterating that “President Reagan thinks the same”.

  • June 10, 1981

    Telegram from Washington embassy to Foreign Office

    The Israeli embassy in Washington learned from Haig as well as from another contact that Secretary of Defense Weinberger supports a tough approach to Israel, including a a UNSC resolution that would demand Israel to open the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona for inspection and a call for Israel to join the NPT.

  • June 10, 1981

    Telegram from Washington embassy to Foreign Office, Subject: Evron-Haig

    The Israeli embassy in Washington learned from Haig as well as from another contact that Secretary of Defense Weinberger supports a tough approach to Israel, including a UNSC resolution that would demand Israel to open the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona for inspection and a call for Israel to join the NPT.

  • June 11, 1981

    Memorandum for Richard V. Allen from Robert M Kimmitt, Subject: Israeli Strike -- Legal Aspects

    This NSC memo examines some of the legal aspects of the raid. It states that the administration should determine “[W]hether a substantial violation has occurred”, as this would reflect on the delivery of Israel’s F-16 jets.

  • June 11, 1981

    Cable from Embassy Baghdad to Foreign Ministry in Delhi on United States-West Asia relations

    Indian diplomats speculated at the time that the suspension of the delivery of the F-16 jets was potentially a U.S. gesture of goodwill toward Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, aimed at appeasing him and keeping the embryonic peace process with Israel alive.

  • June 11, 1981

    Memo from Eugene Rostow to National Security Council meeting, Subject: Additional comment on NSC discussion paper: Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Cooperation

    ACDA Director-Designate Eugene Rostow explains his pro-Israel stance, and argues that Israel should be given an exemption from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.

  • June 11, 1981

    Telegram from Washington embassy to Foreign Office, Subject: Evron -- the President

    The Israelis were concerned and disappointed by the administration’s initial response to the raid, which consisted of a freeze on the shipment of F-16 jets to Israel until a legal review was conducted. The Israeli ambassador to Washington conveyed this sentiment to President Reagan in a meeting on 11 June 1980 in this telegram.

  • June 12, 1981

    Memo fron Walter J. Stoessel Jr to the President "Subject: U.S. strategy for UN Security Councul Meeting on the Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Nuclear Facility"

    This document outlines Haig's proposed political strategy, which was approved by Reagan on 12 June, and was constructed around the notion of red lines: Washington would harshly condemn Israel but would also “draw the line on punishment” by Israel.

  • June 15, 1981

    Memo from Richard V Allen to the U.S. President, Subject: Political strategy for responding to Israeli attack

    National Security Advisor Richard V. Allen informed Reagan that the administration was “not required to make a legal determination on whether Israel violated U.S. law” and commented that the issue of the raid was “to be treated as a political rather than a legal question.”

  • June 15, 1981

    Memo from Walter J. Stoessel, Subject: Political Strategy for Responding to Israeli attack

    Following Lewis’ cable, and the realization that the raid should have been at least somewhat anticipated, the administration opted to develop a more restrained, sober approach towards Israel, constructing what was termed a “political strategy for responding to Israeli attack”.

  • September 15, 1981

    Memorandum for the president from Alexander M. Haig, "Subject: Secretary Haig's Evening Report"

    Instructions for the U.S. delegation to the IAEA's annual General Conference (GC) which told them to anticipate a “severe attack” against Israel by objecting “vigorously [to] suspension of technical aid.” Later on, this instruction would change, and the delegation would be instructed to leave the building should the Israeli credentials be rejected.

  • January 08, 1982

    Memorandum for the President; Secretary Weinberger's Weekly Report

    In a memorandum for the president from January 1982, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger expressed his criticism of Israel’s Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon and his tendency of “going public whenever it suits him”.

  • August 13, 1982

    Memorandum for the President; Secretary Weinberger's Weekly Report

    Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger openly conveyed his dismay toward the Israeli leadership, expressing his support for the opposition, led by Shimon Peres.