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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • September 28, 1942

    Decree No. 2352 cc of Ukrainian State Committee of Defence

    This famous, de-classified document officially started the Soviet atomic project aimed at producing the nuclear bomb. The second point of this document orders the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences to establish a plan for the project of Uranium enrichment. F. Lange, a scientist from the Ukraine Institute of Physics and Technology, was appointed as head of this project because he worked previously on theoretical aspects of Uranium enrichment.

  • 1958

    Information about Conducting in Ukraine of Month’s Campaign of Joint Actions of the People against the Nuclear Weapon and for Universal Prohibiting of the Nuclear Tests for Ever and Ever

    This document describes the monthly anti-nuclear campaign held in Ukraine from September to October, 1958. During this campaign, a number of mass meetings were organized. In this meetings, scientists lectured on the damage of nuclear tests and danger of nuclear war. The lecturers argued that only western states were responsible for conducting nuclear tests and initiating the nuclear arms race, and that the Soviet Union was forced to develop its nuclear capabilities to protect socialist countries, even though the Soviets support the idea of prohibiting the nuclear weapon.

  • May 15, 1961

    Telegram by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate General for Political Affairs and Security (DGAP) to Minister of Defense, 'Opinion sharing between Brosio-Acheson on NATO nuclear weaponry '

    This document is related to Brosi's discussion with Acherson on NATO nuclear weaponry and strategy. Brosio underlines how the American nuclear strategy is rejected by European countries. Most of them are skeptical and take distance from Americans' willingness to use nuclear weapon against their enemies. In this sense, Acherson as representative of the American government, is ready to discuss the topic at a multilateral level.

  • September 06, 1961

    National Security Council Guidance on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Broadcasting

    Approval of “low key” Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty broadcasts on issues of nuclear warfare [a rare case of NSC-level involvement in broadcast policy]

  • January 31, 1962

    Research Memorandum REU-25 from Roger Hilsman to Mr. Kohler, 'European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability'

    Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

  • May 19, 1962

    Memorandum by Chief of Defense Staff Aldo Ross to Minister of Defense Andreotti

    Discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting the terms of nuclear warfare proposed at a NATO meeting in Athens. Whether or not to respond to a Soviet nuclear attack with an atomic weapon of equal strength was debated at the meeting, as well as the role that conventional weapons would play in such a conflict.

  • October 31, 1962

    Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to USSR Ambassador to Cuba A. I. Alekseev

    Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko cables the Soviet Embassy in Havana that the Soviet leadership had decided to allow UNSG U Thant and his representatives to visit Soviet launchers sites in Cuba and verify that the launchers are being dismantled.

  • November 02, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Envoy G. Zhukov to CC CPSU

    Soviet envoy to the UN, G. Zhukov, reports to the Soviet leadership on his discussion with US diplomat John McCloy. The US diplomat said that the US hoped the U2 spy plane pictures taken the day before will show that the withdrawal of Soviet Missiles was proceeding as agreed. Provided that progress was made on the issue of Cuba, further cooperation between the two superpowers was possible, including an agreement on an atmospheric test ban and on the militarization of the outer space.

  • October 14, 1963

    Discussion between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasilii Kuznetsov and the SED Politburo (Fragment)

    Excerpts of the meeting between Marshal V.V. Kuznetzov, Commander of the Warsaw Pact Forces, and the GDR politburo on issues of nuclear proliferation in Europe and Warsaw Pact planning.

  • October 23, 1963

    Letter from Ducci to Quaroni on Nuclear War

    Letter from ambassador R. Ducci on prospective consequences for Europe of controlled response strategy in light of Herman Kahn's analysis in the paper Escalation and its strategic context

  • October 11, 1964

    Plan of Action of the Czechoslovak People’s Army for War Period

    A detailed strategic miltiary plan the Czechoslovak People’s Army for war period.

  • November 24, 1964

    Rajya Sabha Debate on Nuclear Prohibition

    Debate among members of the Rajya Sabha on attendance to a Chinese hosted Summit Conference on Nuclear Weapons.

  • December 01, 1965

    Report, 'Use of nuclear weapons'

    The document is a detailed analysis about the possible use of NATO's nuclear weapons, in preparation for the Atlantic Council's December session. The French participation in the Council and the French opposition to any nuclear integration will probably leave this issue without a solution. From their point of view, the US and the Select Committee recently proposed by them should try to overcome the hindrance represented by France, at the same time without jeopardizing the cohesion of the Alliance.

  • March 03, 1967

    Research Memorandum REU-14 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'How Major NATO Countries View the Prospect of an ABM Deployment'

    Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

  • June 27, 1973

    Telegram by Ambassador in Brussels Pignatti to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Soviet-American agreement on preventing nuclear war'

    Summarizes the first comments from Min. Foreign Affairs on the agreement Soviet-American for the Prevention of Nuclear War. It is said that the philosophy of this agreement appears to have contradictions with regard to the classic strategy of NATO and diminish the credibility of the latter. Conceptions NATO military will have to be updated in light of recent agreements and ongoing trends around the Russian-American bipolarity. Just because you are at a "secondary" compared to the two supergrandi, Europeans should take the opportunity arising from this new trend to seriously address the issue of their defense. The prospect more desirable at this stage is an acceleration of proesso European unification, including the appearance of its "independent" defense.

  • March, 1975

    Task for the Operational Command Staff Exercise Soyuz-75 for the 4th Army

    This document outlines the politico-military situation in advance of a 17-25 March 1975 operational command staff exercise. The exercise scenario begins with a conventional offensive initiated by the 'Westerners' at 0600 on 17 March which escalated to a theater nuclear war by 19 March. This briefing document for exercise participants describes the military situation as of the morning of 19 March, including the tactical information on the geographic disposition, activities, and status of Warsaw Pact and 'Western' forces, air defense, communications, electronic warfare, and the situation in the rear. Appendices (included as a .pdf) contain detailed information on: The order of battle of the troops of the 4th Army, The availability of nuclear warheads and surface-to-air missiles [SAMs] in the 4th Army, Information about the nuclear strikes of the "Westerners," Information about the nuclear strikes by the "Easterners" on troops and objectives in the "Westerners" rear, Information about the engineer troops of the 4th Army, Information about the chemical troops of the 4th Army, Information about the signal troops of the 4th Army, Information about the rear of the 4th Army, The order of battle and the identified numbering of the formations and units of the "Westerners."

  • October 28, 1983

    Memorandum on the Ottawa meeting of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group

    Some reflections on the outcome of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Ottawa. The Italian government praised the NATO resolution to keep the INF at a minimum level of deterrence, while critiquing the Soviet refusal to compromise.

  • August 24, 1984

    Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984

    Memorandum summarizing consultations between the Stasi and KGB over RYAN (Raketno-Yadernoe Napadenie, or “nuclear weapon attack”), an intelligence program initiated by the KGB to collect indicators of a potential nuclear first-strike by the US. The KGB had developed a new system for the early detection of war preparations for a first-strike attack, which should provide evidence of such preparations on the basis of “objective” indicators that would be hard to manipulate.

  • November 14, 1984

    Protocol resulting from discussions between the Interior Ministry of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the KGB of the Soviet Union

    Both parties discuss the detection of and preparation for a surprise nuclear rocket attack by the USA on socialist countries, the intentions of the main hostile countries- the USA, other NATO countries, the People’s Republic of China- and cooperation to fight ideological diversion from hostile countries and emigrant populations. The two also agree to economic, tourism and cultural exchanges.

  • April 24, 1985

    Address by Willy Brandt before the Council on Foreign Relations

    Willy Brandt speaks about East-West relations, specifically focusing on what he views as U.S. misconceptions about nuclear arms, and the concept of Common Security.