SEARCH RESULTS
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November 02, 1962
Telegram from Soviet Envoy G. Zhukov to CC CPSU
Soviet envoy to the UN, G. Zhukov, reports to the Soviet leadership on his discussion with US diplomat John McCloy. The US diplomat said that the US hoped the U2 spy plane pictures taken the day before will show that the withdrawal of Soviet Missiles was proceeding as agreed. Provided that progress was made on the issue of Cuba, further cooperation between the two superpowers was possible, including an agreement on an atmospheric test ban and on the militarization of the outer space.
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1963
Message, J.C. Ajmani, Deputy Secretary (DIS), 'Subject: Resolutions adopted by the 52nd Inter-Parliamentary Conference held in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) in September 1963'
The Indian government compares the final resolution to the draft resolution with which they agreed and states their position towards the final resolution
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August 02, 1963
Letter, Homi Bhabhi to Jawaharlal Nehru
Homi Bhabha writes to Prime Minister Nehru to convey that the Chinese nuclear test will be of no military significance and Chinese possession of a few bombs will not make any difference to the military situation. In order to counter the Chinese bomb’s psychological-political impact, Dr. Bhabha argues that India needs to be in a position to produce the bomb within few months.
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August 28, 1963
Research Memorandum REU-56 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Sweden Still Faces Question of Acquiring Nuclear Weapons'
Based on the evidence, mainly various statements made by leading politicians, diplomats, and policymakers, INR experts concluded that most of the countries surveyed (Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Greece) were “relatively satisfied,” while only West Germany was “restive” to the extent that some of its officials were interested in a NATO or European nuclear force
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September 05, 1963
Zhou Enlai’s Discussion with a Kenyan African National Federation Delegation (Excerpt)
Zhou Enlai criticizes the Three-Nation Treaty (Limited Test Ban Treaty) of 1963, arguing that it signifies an attempt by the US, UK, and USSR to monopolize nuclear weapons. Enlai warns that the agreement will allow larger nuclear countries to commit “nuclear blackmail” against smaller, non-nuclear countries.
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November, 1963
Ion Gheorghe Maurer, 'The Unshakeable Foundation of the Unity of the International Communist Movement' (excerpts)
Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer describes Romania's new policies and approach to relations with China and the Soviet Union at a time when Romania was increasingly attempting to distance itself from the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union's military control. Toward this end, Mauer proclaims a policy of military disengagement and disarmament, declaring that mediation and negotiation are the only legitimate way of resolving international tensions.
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December 20, 1963
Transcript of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Reporters in Cairo
Premier Zhou and Chen Yi answer questions from reporters in Cairo. Zhou and Chen were asked about issues such as their visit to Arab and African countries, China's support for national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the United Arab Republic (Egypt) and Sri Lanka's perspective of the Sino-Indian border conflict, the purpose of the Chinese delegation's visit to Arab and African countries, issues that will be discussed in potential second Bandung Conference, the Sino-Soviet split, and the Pakistani national movement. Zhou also explains why China opposed the ban on nuclear test treaty.
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January 01, 1964
Report by Shri S. Sinha, Director (EARC) – Ministry of External Affairs, 'Brief Analysis of the propagandist statements on disarmament and nuclear-free zone made by the Peoples Republic of China'
The Peoples Republic of China supports disarmament and a nuclear-free zone in the Asian and Pacific Regions strictly for tactical reasons
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April 10, 1964
Report by S. Bikram Shah, Ambassador, 'Annual Political and Economic Report for 1963'
Finland welcomed the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty at Moscow and was one of the first countries to sign it. However, there is reluctance on the part of other Scandinavian countries to accept the proposal
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November 03, 1964
Record of Zhou Enlai’s Discussion with British Minister President of the Board of Trade Douglas Jay
Having successfully executed a nuclear test explosion, Zhou Enlai describes the Chinese government’s motivation for pursuing atomic weapons capabilities. Zhou argues that the Three-Nation Treaty (Limited Test Ban Treaty) is insufficient, that the United States remains committed to nuclear proliferation despite the agreement, and that China seeks to end the monopoly that other nuclear powers have thus far exploited. Zhou also calls for the organization of a global, truly equal summit at which to discuss the issue of nuclear weapons testing and proliferation.
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December 16, 1966
United Nations Bureau, Japanese Foreign Ministry, 'Our Lobbying on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Draft)'
The Japanese Foreign Ministry plans to convey its views on the proposed nuclear non-prolfieration treaty to the United States, particularly its concerns about how it might affect the US-Japan security alliance and the balance between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states.
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October 31, 1974
Memorandum, Hungarian Foreign Ministry, on India's Policy on Nuclear Disarmament
An extended Hungarian Foreign Ministry memorandum explicating the development of India's policy on nuclear arms and disarmament from the 1960s as well as a discussion on the reasons that the socialist countries--including Hungary--have chosen not to condemn India for its May 1974 nuclear explosion.