August 03, 1960
Note from USSR Embassy to the USA Relayed by Gromyko to Khrushchev, 'John Fitzgerald Kennedy - Political Character Sketch'
Andrei Gromyko forwards to Premier Khrushchev a political profile, prepared by the USSR Embassy in Washington, of the recently-nominated Democratic presidential candidate, Senator John F. Kennedy.
March 15, 1961
Message by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate General for Political Affairs and Security (DGAP), 'American attitude toward NATO - President Kennedy's declarations'
Letter from the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs analyzing President Kennedy’s State of the Union Address. Despite stating his commitment to cooperating with NATO, the minister suspects that Kennedy has other priorities. The letter suggests that if the Kennedy expresses hesitancy in creating a nuclear force, European nations including Italy will move forward with or without American support.
April 01, 1961
Memorandum by Admiral Corrado Tagliamonte to the Minister of Defense, 'American attitude toward NATO. President Kennedy's declarations'
Report submitted to the Italian Minister of Defense regarding President Kennedy’s opinion that NATO should not construct a special nuclear force since the US has already developed a nuclear deterrent. According to the Kennedy, the creation of an additional deterrent would be useless and a waste of resources.
July 18, 1961
Telegram of Delo Balili, the Albanian ambassador to Cairo, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Balili reports that the Indian ambassador to Cairo had told him that President Nehru would participate personally in the conference of non-aligned countries because the main goal of the conference was to find a formula for rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the United States, and for disarmament in general. According to the Indian ambassador, the disappearance of the issues of colonialism and racial discrimination from the conference documents are not urgent problems. In November, Nehru would meet with Khrushchev and, later with Kennedy.
July 26, 1961
Report on the 1st conference of the non-aligned countries of September 1st, 1961 sent by Tahmaz Beqari, the Albanian ambassador in Belgrade, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania
The conference of non-aligned countries in Belgrade was organized when Indonesia and other countries of Asia and Africa were attempting to organize a Second Bandung Conference. Tito and Nehru, trying to minimize the influence of China in the Asian and African countries, initiated a conference that they called the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade. The document discusses the 24 participating countries, the agenda, the proceedings, the different groups among the delegation and the two main documents that the conference adopted: the manifesto and the declaration. The manifesto, titled “The Danger from the War and the Call for Peace,” according to the Albanian ambassador, was adopted in a revisionist spirit, calling on Khrushchev and Kennedy to maintain peace. Meanwhile, the declaration criticized colonialism and imperialism. The Belgrade conference did not decide on any specific issues and did not reach any important conclusions. In Albania, a week after the conference, the journal “Zeri i Popullit” (Voice of the People) wrote an article in which it identified Tito as an agent of imperialism and stated that Yugoslavia was not an non-aligned country as it participated in the Balkan Pact.
August 03, 1961
Walter Ulbricht's Speech at the Moscow Conference, 3-5 August 1961
Ulbricht speaks at the Moscow Conference of Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries for the Exchange of Opinions on Questions Concerning the Preparation and Conclusion of a German Peace Treaty.
October 23, 1962
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 60
Protocol 60 details the first meeting of the Communist Party during the crisis. As Khrushchev is awaiting the announcement by President Kennedy of the discovery of missiles in Cuba, he and some of his colleagues briefly considered using tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a US airborne assault. But, at the suggestion of Soviet defense minister Rodion Malinovsky, the Kremlin postponed its consideration of a nuclear response pending details of Kennedy’s speech.The Kremlin wasted no time in taking steps to reduce the risks of confrontation. It ordered some ships that were still in the Mediterranean to turn around. The Aleksandrovsk, the ship carrying the nuclear warheads for the IRBMs (the R-14s), was ordered to keep sailing, however, because it was close enough to Cuban shores to dock before the blockade went into effect.
October 28, 1962
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 63
According to Protocol 63, Khrushchev probably assumed that Kennedy’s patience was at an end and the Cuban Missile Crisis might either be resolved or spin out of control, and the Kremlin again considered how it might respond to a US attack. If anyone suggested a preemptive strike, or even a retaliatory strike, against a target outside of the Caribbean, Malin did not note it for the official record.
November 02, 1962
Telegram from Soviet Envoy G. Zhukov to CC CPSU
Soviet envoy to the UN, G. Zhukov, reports to the Soviet leadership on his discussion with US diplomat John McCloy. The US diplomat said that the US hoped the U2 spy plane pictures taken the day before will show that the withdrawal of Soviet Missiles was proceeding as agreed. Provided that progress was made on the issue of Cuba, further cooperation between the two superpowers was possible, including an agreement on an atmospheric test ban and on the militarization of the outer space.
November 11, 1962
Telegram from Nikita Khrushchev to Anastas Mikoyan
This telegram, written in Khrushchev's stream-of-consciousness style, outlines the rationale behind the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba that caused the crisis: It was much better to end the crisis by giving up planes that were already obsolete —to show that the Soviet Union and Cuba had fulfilled all the promises Khrushchev had given Kennedy—and consequently to expect, and demand, full compliance with the non-invasion pledge on the part of the United States, than to retain the planes and give the Americans a justification to violate their pledge. The telegram also spells out, in Khrushchev’s words, of the reasons why the weapons were deployed to Cuba in the first place.
November 16, 1962
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 66
Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.
June 07, 1963
Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'NATO Council in Ottawa and Visit to President Kennedy'
The Council of Ministers report on the NATO council meeting in Ottawa, which Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns and Minister of Defense Visser attended. Luns spoke privately with President Kennedy about the attitude of the French and the possibility of an independent German nuclear arsenal. Visser visited weapons centers in the United States and emphasizes the need to accept American leadership in the defense of Europe.
November 02, 1963
Telegram from Ambassador J.N. Khosla, 'Proposed Non-Aligned Conference' and 'Tito’s Tour of the Americas (Continued)'
Yugoslavia accepted a proposal for a second non-alignment conference, but was "not to keen" on it. Further details of Tito's tours through Bolivia, Mexico and the United States.
March 23, 1967
Bulgarian State Security Chairman Angel Solakov’s Report at a Bulgarian Communist Party Plenum
According to the State Security Committee chair, Angel Solakov, there has been a major shift in the policies of the West towards the Soviet bloc. While during the 1950s military face-off was often considered an option, in the late 1960s such possibility has been largely ruled out. Consequently the US and their allies in Western Europe are focusing their efforts on fighting socialism around the world through peaceful means, such as strengthening economic and cultural ties with the Soviet bloc countries. This calls for a change in the strategy of the State Security Committee intelligence operations. Solakov also reports on the anti-Soviet activities of the Chinese and Albanian intelligence services across Europe.
January 26, 1968
Fragments of the Intervention of Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
January 25-26, 1968. F. Castro speaks of relations with the US and Kennedy, friendship with the USSR, as well as placement of missiles, security issues as the US's imperialistic nature, while extolling the virtures of socialism, Cuba, and "The Revolution." Castro also stresses that Soviet withdrawal of weapons from Cuba is a blow to the international Communist movement.
January 10, 1994
Interview with Myer 'Mike' Feldman by Avner Cohen
Transcript of interview by Avner Cohen with senior Kennedy advisor Myer "Mike" Feldman. Myer Feldman, close aide to JFK and special liason to Israel, discusses the negotiations between the US and Israel regarding the Non-Proliferation treaty in this 1994 interview.