In this letter, physicist Igor V. Kurchatov, the scientific director of the Soviet nuclear project, writes to secret police chief Lavrenti Beria, whom Stalin had given principal responsibility for the atomic effort. Prodded by his own scientists and by intelligence reports of the secret Anglo-American atomic enterprise, Stalin had initiated a small-scale Soviet nuclear weapons program in late 1942-early 1943. But the level of support political leaders had given the project failed to satisfy Kurchatov, who pleaded with Beria for additional backing.

Excerpts from Igor V. Kurchatov's handwritten notes from a conversation with Stalin on the secret Soviet nuclear project, accompanied by Beria and Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov, at the Kremlin on the evening of 25 January 1946.

A series of notes from Dr. Bhabha detailing important requirements and recommendations for the development of India’s nuclear power capabilities.

A letter from S.S. Bhatnagar to Dr. Bhabha informing him of the creation of a Ministry of Scientific Research.

A historical note from Dr. Bhabha to the Prime Minister chronicling the history of the establishment and subsequent operation of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research. Also includes information about the Institute’s administrative functions and relations with the Atomic Energy Commission.

Turkish intelligence agents are trying to gather information on the uranium mining in southwest Bulgaria. They believe that the extracted deposits are shipped to the Soviet Union for further processing and production of nuclear bombs.

CIA report describing the construction process of ultra-centrifuges in the Soviet nuclear institute of Sinop and the personnel working there.

Summary of the Twenty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly's agenda on disarmament

This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57. Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the “Fourth Country” problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957, Secret

This memo details security controls established under the Euratom Treaty to guarantee that nuclear materials are not diverted for purposed other than those for which they are intended.

A Union Carbide Nuclear Company study to determine how quickly and easily foreign countries could develop and utilize gas centrifuges with the goal of creating nuclear weapon facilities. The study determines that, due to the cheap cost and relatively small size of the centrifuges, even un-industrialized countries such as Cuba could achieve this technology within 8 years if helped by a larger nation.

Kennedy's inaugural address, in which he discusses US foreign policy and relations with the rest of the world, especially the Eastern Bloc.

Ulbricht speaks at the Moscow Conference of Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries for the Exchange of Opinions on Questions Concerning the Preparation and Conclusion of a German Peace Treaty.

National Intelligence Estimate on Israel concluded that "Israel may have decided to undertake a nuclear weapons program. At a minimum, we believe it has decided to develop its nuclear facilities in such a way as to put it into a position to develop nuclear weapons promptly should it decide to do."

Heavily excised report to McGeorge Bundy from the CIA on the Israeli nuclear program and Dimona.

Jelen reports that the information he is getting from the Punta [del Este] is fragmentary. He also reports that Fidel decisively rejected the concept of “Finlandization” of Cuba.

Rapacki asks for more information on the rumor regarding equipping the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany) with atomic weapons.

Document memorandum by Soviet Ambassador to Poland Aristov regarding potential nonproliferation treaty

In this telegram, President Kennedy encourages Prime Minister Macmillan to take a positive interest in the MLF project, in which the British had little interest because of financial reasons and their doubts about the German role. Kennedy also expressed concern about the future of German nuclear efforts.

In this conversation, Soviet diplomat Georgi Kornienko and State Department official Ronald Spiers discussed the Soviet objections to MLF. Kornienko argued that it would expose West Germany to “the nuclear disease” on the "road to disaster", but Spiers maintained that it would forestall the Germans from pursuing new nuclear programs.