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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • September 20, 1947

    Report of Pham No Mach [Pham Ngoc Thach] to the Soviet Envoy in Switzerland, A. G. Kulazhenkov

    Report of a meeting with an emissary of the Viet Minh government who requested Soviet support for Vietnamese forces in their independence war against the French. Pham Ngoc Thach stresses the communist nature of the Republic of Vietnam's government, explaining that the Communist Party was only dissolved in 1945 "to avoid provoking a negative American reaction." Pham also discusses his meetings with the French Communist Party in Paris, and the situation in other Southeast Asian countries, including Malay, Indonesia and Thailand.

  • March 18, 1954

    Letter, Syngman Rhee to General James A. Van Fleet

    President Rhee discusses different tactics with General Van Fleet on how to convince President Eisenhower and the American public to build the ROK's armed forces.

  • May 31, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 7353]

    Report from Polish official in Saigon, Maneli, to Warsaw, on his meeting with Pham Van Dong. Dong describes plans for South Vietnam's future government and neutrality, along with North Vietnam's compliance with the Geneva Accords. Reports that Soviet Ambassador Tovmassian was surprised at the high degree of Chinese participation in Vietnam.

  • September 02, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw)[Ciphergram No. 11289]

    Cable from Polish official in Saigon, Maneli, notifying Warsaw that the coup d'etat against Diem and installation of the American military junta is to be executed soon. Notes the inclinations of Diem and Nhu.

  • September 04, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 11424]

    Summary of Commissioner Maneli's meeting with Ngo Dinh Nhu. Nhu expresses a desire to establish a ceasefire, but notes his inability to make a concrete statement because of the United States. Maneli writes that Nhu's goal is an independent, neutral country, but that he is hindered by his tense, but still existent relations with the United States.

  • September 25, 1963

    Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 12328]

    Cable from Polish official in Saigon, Maneli, to Warsaw, reporting his meeting with a US official "Henry" (not Cabot Lodge), where they discuss Maneli's meeting with Ngo Dinh Nhu. Notes that it was an attempt to establish contact between US and Polish officials in Vietnam.

  • February 08, 1964

    Record of Conversation from Chairman Mao Zedong's Reception of the Cambodian Ambassador to China Sisowath Sirik Matak

    Mao and Matak discuss Western imperialist collaboration with India, attempts to overthrow the Cambodian government, and the situation in Vietnam, among other topics.

  • June 29, 1964

    Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Premier Zhou Talked about the Relationship between China-Soviet Difference and the National Liberation Movement'

    Account of Zhou's conversation with Kenyan officials, including discussions of the Sino-Soviet debate, imperialist manipulation of the debate, and enhanced US pressure in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

  • August 06, 1964

    Report on the meeting between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s ambassador Nguyen Ngoc-Son with Qemal Rahmanaj

    This document is a report on a meeting between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's representative, Nguyen Ngoc-Son, with an Albanian official, Qemal Rahmanaj. Nguyen-Ngoc-Son reveals the American and South Vietnamese 1955 plan concerning marching into North Vietnam and establishing order in the South. In 1961 the plan is carried out in 3 phases. In phase 1, the Americans and the South Vietnamese government cooperated to create order in South Vietnam and establish American bases in North Vietnam. Phase 2 includes improving the military capability of the U.S. army and commencing sabotage operations in the North. Phase 3 includes developing the South Vietnamese economy and the beginning of military operations against North Vietnam. Alarmingly, the frequency of attacks against North Vietnam increases even further in 1964. Because of this, the ambassador asks for a press conference to inform Albanian media about the situation in Vietnam.

  • September 10, 1964

    Note on a Conversation by Tarka, Jurgas and Milc at the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi [Excerpts]

    A conversation between three Polish delegates in Hanoi, where they discuss American activities in and attitudes toward Vietnam. They note that the Soviets are not as optimistic about the military situation in Southeast Asia as the Poles.

  • October 05, 1964

    Discussion between Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong

    Zedong advises Pham Van Dong on how to handle war in South Vietnam and protection of North Vietnam.

  • January 06, 1965

    Note No. 2/65 on Conversations with Comrade Shcherbakov about the Developmental Tendencies in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on 22 and 28 December 1964

    Conversation between the East German and Soviet ambassadors to Vietnam, on the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. Shcherbakov expresses his belief that China is increasingly using Vietnam as a pawn, and that, as a result, the Chinese are pushing the Vietnamese towards talks of negotiations with the United States.

  • March 25, 1965

    Conversation between Raul Castro Ruz, and a Member of the Polish Politburo, Zenon Kliszko

    The conversation between Castro and Gomulka took place on the initiative of Castro. Parties discussed the following topics: (1) relations between the UPSR and the PUWP, (2) the issue of the legalization of the Cuban Revolution, (3) the Situation in Vietnam, (4) Cuba and the Current Situation in Latin America, (5) the position of the PUWP with regard to the conference of 81 parties, and (6) the attitude of the socialist camp towards Cuba.

  • March 26, 1965

    Minutes of a Conversation Between the RCP Leadership led by Nicolae Ceausescu and the CCP Leadership Led by Zhou Enlai

    Zhou Enlai, Maurer, and Ceausescu discuss US military engagement in South Vietnam and USSR's response.

  • December 18, 1965

    Discussion between Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi and Nguyen Duy Trinh

    Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi strategize about negotiation with the United States.

  • December 19, 1965

    Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi

    Zhou Enlai puts forward four points necessary for a strengthened Vietnamese and Chinese vantage point in negotiations with the United States.

  • May 10, 1966

    Telegram of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador of Romania in Hanoi, Regarding the Conversation of Petre Balaceanu, Ambassador of Romania in Washington, with Dean Rusk

    This telegram, sent by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ion Moanga, Romanian ambassador to Hanoi, describes the statements of US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, regarding the American wish to withdraw from Vietnam and let the Vietnamese determine their own government.

  • June 07, 1966

    Emil Bodnaras, First Vice-President of the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Received Richard H. Davis, Ambassador of the United States of America in Bucharest

    This document notes the exchange between Emil Bodnaras and US Ambassador to Bucharest, Richard H. Davis, regarding the situation in Vietnam and the condition of the conflict there.

  • February 01, 1967

    Transcript of the Discussions on the Occasion of the Reception by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu of United States Ambassador in Bucharest, Richard H. Davis

    This document is a transcript of a meeting between Nicolae Ceausescu and Richard H. Davis, US Ambassador to Bucharest, in which Davis defends the American position in regard to Vietnam in terms of defense of South Vietnam against aggression of North Vietnam and recognition of the National Liberation Front.

  • April 13, 1968

    Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong

    Zhou Enlai discusses with Pham Van Dong Vietnam’s course of action in the face of American turmoil at home and negotiations in Vietnam.