November 01, 1949
Memorandum for Mr. Wisner, 'HCFE Broadcasting (Interim Report)' [Approved for Release, November 7, 2012]
An official from the Department of State, the Office of Policy Coordination updates Frank Wisner on possibilities for providing the Free Europe Committee (FEC) with intelligence reports for use in planned Radio Free Europe broadcasts. He also suggests that Foreign Broadcast Information Bureau monitoring reports of Soviet bloc media can be provided, but only in English translations.
June 19, 1953
National Security Council Report, NSC 158, 'United States Objectives and Actions to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States'
Recommendations adopted by the National Security Council at the suggestion of the Psychological Strategy Board on covert actions to be undertaken in the Soviet Satellite States. Authorized by the National Security Council, NSC 158 envisaged aggressive psychological warfare to exploit and heighten the unrest behind the Iron Curtain. The policy was endorsed by President Eisenhower on June 26, 1953.
July 21, 1953
Intelligence Advisory Committee, Special Estimate (SE-47), 'Probable Effect Of Recent Developments In Eastern Germany On Soviet Policy With Respect To Germany'
This intelligence report presents and analyzes Soviet policy in East Germany before, during, and after the East German Uprising. The report assesses potential actions the Soviets could take in the future towards East Germany, and the likelihood of each.
November 23, 1960
International Operations Division, Management Turmoil at Radio Free Europe
The IOD officer responsible for RFE informs Cord Meyer of the turmoil in the RFE Czechoslovak Service. He opines that resignation of the RFE Munich leadership [European Director Erik Hazelhoff and his deputies David Penn and Charles J. McNeill] “would be an extremely healthy thing.”
July 12, 1961
From the Journal of S.M. Kudryavtsev, 'Record of a Conversation with Prime Minister of the Republic of Cuba Fidel Castro Ruz, 24 June 1961'
Kudryavtsev informs Fidel Castro of plans made by counterrevolutionaries with the assistance of the US intelligence community to assassinate prominent Cuban leaders. Castro argues that an assassination of Cuban leaders will not change the effects of the Cuban Revolution and could be disastrous for US relations in Latin America.
July 05, 1963
Bulgarian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Information Report on NATO
On 5 July 1963 the Bulgarian Ministry of Internal Affairs completed an information report on NATO's activity during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the report, the ministry outlines detailed espionage carried out by NATO agents. According to the report, the NATO Military Intelligence Services provided instructions for NATO member-states' military attaches stationed in Warsaw Pact countries and agents they could get to cooperate with them. Agents were to observe and report specific military intelligence collecting in Warsaw Pact countries -- arms deliveries, missile sites, military movements, etc. The report also includes explanation of how the attaches carried out their intelligence gathering -- reading official press, speaking in Russian and misrepresenting themselves as Russian, etc . The Bulgarian Interior Ministry notes that Western governments were well-informed of Bulgarian military structures -- including exact formations and secret designations.
January 11, 1967
Cooperation between the Czechoslovak and Cuban Intelligence Services
The report introduces Czechoslovak's assistance in the Operation MANUEL after the isolation of socialist Castro regime. Cuba looked for alternative routes in Europe in order to promote and influence the revolutionary movement in Latin America. Czechoslovakia assistance in the operation is of a strictly technical nature and its intelligence service is doing its utmost to protect the interests of the country by securing all technical matters. The report says that terminating the assistance was not possible for both practical and political reasons-- all direct flights between Czechoslovakia and Cuba would be suspended and a drastic cooling off of relations between two governments. Czechoslovak's refusal in assisting the operation would be interpreted as a political decision to suspend assistance to the national liberation movement in Latin America countries. However, the reports says that the assistance of Czechoslovak intelligence service to the operation is in no way amounts to agreeing with its political content and constitutes a minor aspect of intelligence work. The Soviet intelligence was also involved in organizing the operation in Moscow and offered assistance to its Cuban counterpart.
November 17, 1967
Operation MANUEL: Origins, Development and Aims
Comrade Josef Houska submits a document concerning issues related to cooperation with the Cuban intelligence service especially the Operation MANUEL to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Operational MANUEL started in 1962 when the Cuban intelligence asked the Czechoslovak resident in Havana to arrange a transit through Prague for Venezuelan nationals who underwent guerrilla training in Cuba. In 1964 talks were held between Cuban and Czechoslovak intelligence services but no formal agreement of the tasks and responsibilities was concluded between the two. The Soviet government was informed about the Operation MANUEL and stated its agreement with the project. Houska says that the main objective of the operation is the education and training of revolutionary cadres from Latin America and the organization of combat groups. Participants of the operation were not confined to cadres from among the ranks of communist parties but also included members from various nationalist and anti-American groupings. The routes of individual participants in the operation were determined by the Cuban intelligence service who mainly directed the Operation MANUEL. Houska says problems that arisen in the course of the operation were solved in collaboration with Cuban and the Soviet authorities. The document cautioned about counter-espionage institutions' increasing interests in the operation and the fact that the US intelligence service agents were among the operation participants. Houska says refusal to offer assistance would have a negative impact on Cuba and Czechoslovakia would lose control over the operation.
September 29, 1977
Memorandum of Conversation with Ethiopian Foreign Secretary Dawit Wolde Giorgis, 17 September 1977
The memorandum concerns an Operation named Torch, which the United States was supposedly planning in order to destabilize the Ethiopian regime. It involved the arming of internal opposition groups with US weapons.
September 29, 1977
Attachement to the memorandum of conversation with Ethiopian Foreign Secretary Dawit Wolde Giorgis.
Memorandum on US Operation "Fakel" [Torch], which the United States was supposedly planning in order to destabilize the Ethiopian regime. It involved the arming of internal opposition groups with US weapons. This report was attached to the memorandum of conversation with Ethiopian Foreign Secretary Dawit Wolde Giorgis.
The Operational Situation as Reported in 1971, 1975, and 1981. Folder 35. The Chekist Anthology.
In folder 35 Mitrokhin discusses the KGB’s assertion of an increase in domestic dissent and unrest in the 1970s and early 1980s as well as the methods the KGB utilized to combat this threat. Soviet intelligence believed that this increase in domestic unrest was due primarily to an increased effort by the United States and its allies to promote internal instability within the USSR. In response, the KGB continued to screen foreigners, increased the harshness of penalties for distribution of anti-Soviet literature, and monitored the activities and temperament of nationalists, immigrants, church officials, and authors of unsigned literature within the Soviet Union. Mitrokhin’s note recounts the KGB’s assertion that foreign intelligence agencies were expanding their attempts to create domestic unrest within the USSR. These activities included the support and creation of dissidents within the Soviet Union, the facilitation of the theft Soviet property such as aircrafts, and the public espousal of a position against Soviet persecution of dissidents and Jews. Responding to public exposure of these activities, the KGB proclaimed its legality and trustworthiness while also beginning to assign some agents verbal assignments without written record.