May 19, 1954
Minutes of the Talk between Huan Xiang and Humphrey Trevelyan on the Return of Chinese and US Nationals to Their Respective Countries (Excerpt)
Trevelyan offered to mediate the issue of Chinese and American expatriates as a private person. Huan Xiang replied by affirming that US nationals were free to leave China while many Chinese were not allowed to leave the US. He declared to have no authority on the mediation request and would consult with related people.
May 27, 1954
Minutes of the Talk between Huan Xiang and Trevelyan on the Return of Chinese and US Nationals to their Respective Countries (Excerpt)
Huan Xiang reaffirmed that Beijing did not deny exit permits for Americans while the US prevented many Chinese nationals from leaving the US. He agreed to talk to the US either directly or through Trevelyan's introduction. Trevelyan said that he did not know the US attitude on this issue and would contact Huan Xian in a few days.
May 26, 1955
Minutes of Conversation between Premier Zhou Enlai and British Charge d'Affaires Humphrey Trevelyan
Zhou briefed Trevelyan about China’s position in Taiwan issue that was produced in a document produced by PRC National People’s Congress Standing Committee in response to Britain’s request.
July 13, 1955
Minutes of Conversation between Premier Zhou Enlai and British Charge d'Affaires Con O'Neill
O’Neill passed on US position on the Sino-US talks in Geneva to Zhou. Zhou and O’Neil exchanged the positions of both countries regarding the talks and the dispute regarding the repatriation of the Chinese and American nationals to their country of origins.
July 18, 1955
Minutes of Conversation between Premier Zhou Enlai and British Charge d’Affaires Con O’Neill
O’Neill passed on a draft joint news release from the US regarding the date of the first Sino-US Ambassadorial Talk. Zhou first disputed with O’Neil that the US calling the PRC capital "Peiping" instead of "Beijing/Peking" in the draft was disrespectful to China. Then, Zhou said that the Chinese government needed some time to consider the time suggested by the US as well as the wording of the draft. He did not accept the explanation from O’Neill regarding the draft per se and the name the US used in the draft.
March 23, 1957
Memorandum of Conversation between John Foster Dulles and Selwyn Lloyd, 'Atomic Energy Items: (1) French Request (2) Test Limitation'
US-UK discussion of French nuclear weapons potential and efforts that could be undertaken to hinder or advance the their program. The French request for technical assistance from these two governments was also covered.
February 06, 1958
Abstract of Conversation: Premier Zhou and Ambassador Nehru
Indian Ambassador to China Nehru and Premier Zhou discuss Sino-British relations, focusing on Britain's position on Chinese representation at the United Nations. According to the Premier, Britain is acceding to American demands and allowing the United States to create 'two Chinas.'
May 06, 1961
State Department Telegram 5245 to US Embassy United Kingdom, forwarding message from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan
In this telegram, President Kennedy expresses doubts about aiding the French nuclear program to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. He maintained that such an action would shake NATO and signify a "major reversal" in U.S. opposition to "Nth country programs,"subsequently increasing Germany's desire to acquire nuclear weapons.
May 08, 1961
Department of State Cable 5245 to Embassy United Kingdom, Message from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan
President Kennedy writes British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to discuss the implications for NATO and West German security if the US or UK assisted the French nuclear program.
October 15, 1961
Polish Report on International Radio Transmissions
Report on the West's radio transmissions, including: NATO's torpedo activity in the Baltic Sea and the US plans to help strengthen Western navies in the region; US troop movements into Europe due to the Berlin Crisis; US tests of intercontinental ballistic missile "Titan"; exercises of Operation Skyshield and Polaris A-2, among many other missile tests
December 19, 1962
Memorandum of Conversation, 'Skybolt'
This memorandum details an extensive conversation between representatives from the U.S. and Great Britain about President Kennedy's decision to cancel work on "Skybolt," or a surface-to-air missile that the British were invested in. The meeting was an attempt to placate a "looming crisis" in Anglo-American relations.
May 29, 1963
State Department Telegram 6389 to US Embassy United Kingdom
In this telegram, President Kennedy encourages Prime Minister Macmillan to take a positive interest in the MLF project, in which the British had little interest because of financial reasons and their doubts about the German role. Kennedy also expressed concern about the future of German nuclear efforts.
February 08, 1964
Record of Conversation from Chairman Mao Zedong's Reception of the Cambodian Ambassador to China Sisowath Sirik Matak
Mao and Matak discuss Western imperialist collaboration with India, attempts to overthrow the Cambodian government, and the situation in Vietnam, among other topics.
May 12, 1964
Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Dean Rusk, UK Foreign Secretary Butler, and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, 'Tripartite Discussion of Non-Dissemination'
In this discussion between Rusk and the British and French Foreign Ministers, the three discuss a proposed British nonproliferation declaration. Rusk had no objection but Couve de Murville found the declaration “patronizing” because it said “in effect that we [nuclear weapons states] are sinners and don’t want others to join us in sin.”
December 07, 1964
Memorandum of Conversation between President Johnson and Prime Minister Harold Wilson
In this conversation, President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson discuss the MLF and the proposed ANF--the "Atlantic Nuclear Force," a British proposal as an alternative to the MLF. The two leaders weighed the pros and cons of both proposals, with President Johnson ultimately deciding to give a positive response to the ANF, leaving it up to the British to see if Bonn could be enlisted.