January 11, 1967
Cooperation between the Czechoslovak and Cuban Intelligence Services
The report introduces Czechoslovak's assistance in the Operation MANUEL after the isolation of socialist Castro regime. Cuba looked for alternative routes in Europe in order to promote and influence the revolutionary movement in Latin America. Czechoslovakia assistance in the operation is of a strictly technical nature and its intelligence service is doing its utmost to protect the interests of the country by securing all technical matters. The report says that terminating the assistance was not possible for both practical and political reasons-- all direct flights between Czechoslovakia and Cuba would be suspended and a drastic cooling off of relations between two governments. Czechoslovak's refusal in assisting the operation would be interpreted as a political decision to suspend assistance to the national liberation movement in Latin America countries. However, the reports says that the assistance of Czechoslovak intelligence service to the operation is in no way amounts to agreeing with its political content and constitutes a minor aspect of intelligence work. The Soviet intelligence was also involved in organizing the operation in Moscow and offered assistance to its Cuban counterpart.
November 07, 1967
Complaint by [Government of] Brazil Regarding Czechoslovak Transport of Guerrilla Fighters from Cuba to Latin America
Head of the 1st Administration of the Ministry of the Interior Josef Houska reports a complaint by the Brazilian government regarding to Czechoslovak assistance of transporting guerrilla fighters from Cuba to Latin America. Brazilian government issued an official warning that relations between Brazil and Czechoslovak could be deteriorated in connection with the support for Cuba. Houska says Brazilian officials' argument could be proof that Czechoslovak specially selected officials making technical arrangement for the transits belong to some section of the Czechoslovak civil service. However, the Czechoslovak authorities cannot be blamed that they go along with the activities of the Cuban Embassy in Prague, which controls the transport of the guerrillas since an embassy is entitled to engage in full diplomatic activities in a friendly country. Houska argues that the Brazilian government does not have conceret evidence for the direct accusation of Czechoslovakia. The position of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs could have been the result of pressure by ultra-reactionary forces in domestic policy which are concerned by the opposition activities in Brazil and abroad.
November 17, 1967
Operation MANUEL: Origins, Development and Aims
Comrade Josef Houska submits a document concerning issues related to cooperation with the Cuban intelligence service especially the Operation MANUEL to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Operational MANUEL started in 1962 when the Cuban intelligence asked the Czechoslovak resident in Havana to arrange a transit through Prague for Venezuelan nationals who underwent guerrilla training in Cuba. In 1964 talks were held between Cuban and Czechoslovak intelligence services but no formal agreement of the tasks and responsibilities was concluded between the two. The Soviet government was informed about the Operation MANUEL and stated its agreement with the project. Houska says that the main objective of the operation is the education and training of revolutionary cadres from Latin America and the organization of combat groups. Participants of the operation were not confined to cadres from among the ranks of communist parties but also included members from various nationalist and anti-American groupings. The routes of individual participants in the operation were determined by the Cuban intelligence service who mainly directed the Operation MANUEL. Houska says problems that arisen in the course of the operation were solved in collaboration with Cuban and the Soviet authorities. The document cautioned about counter-espionage institutions' increasing interests in the operation and the fact that the US intelligence service agents were among the operation participants. Houska says refusal to offer assistance would have a negative impact on Cuba and Czechoslovakia would lose control over the operation.
March 11, 1976
Minutes of the Meeting between Todor Zhivkov and Fidel Castro in Sofia
Conversation for the record between Zhivkov and Castro during a four-day-long state visit of the Cuban leader to Bulgaria. Among the main issues discussed was the state of economic development in both countries, their relations with Albania, China, Romania and Yugoslavia; the Cuban foreign policy in Africa and the Caribbean; the civil war in Angola; the battle for the Third World.
September 29, 1977
Memorandum of Conversation with Ethiopian Foreign Secretary Dawit Wolde Giorgis, 17 September 1977
The memorandum concerns an Operation named Torch, which the United States was supposedly planning in order to destabilize the Ethiopian regime. It involved the arming of internal opposition groups with US weapons.
September 29, 1977
Attachement to the memorandum of conversation with Ethiopian Foreign Secretary Dawit Wolde Giorgis.
Memorandum on US Operation "Fakel" [Torch], which the United States was supposedly planning in order to destabilize the Ethiopian regime. It involved the arming of internal opposition groups with US weapons. This report was attached to the memorandum of conversation with Ethiopian Foreign Secretary Dawit Wolde Giorgis.
July 11, 1985
Information about the Visit of a Delegation of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (GNRU) to Bulgaria
A summary of statements made by GNRU leaders during meetings with Bulgarian officials, regarding the history of GNRU and its ongoing struggle to maintain its existence and to help unify communist movements throughout Central America. During the visit the delegation requested financial assistance from Bulgaria’s Fatherland Front along with the establishment of a university exchange program with AONSU [Bulgaria's Academy for Social Sciences and Management]. The following GNRU leaders were present: Rolando Morán, Gaspar Ilom, Pablo Monsanto. Ana-Maria, Ronaldo Moran’s spouse, and Captain Maria, spouse of Pablo Monsanto, attended some of the meetings and met with the Vice-Chair of the Bulgarian Women’s Movement – comrade V. Grueva. Comrade Pencho Kubadinski and Comrade Dimitar Stanishev welcomed the delegation and held discussions with all three leaders.