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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • November 01, 1962

    Cable no. 347 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    The cable from Pavlicek, received a day late, confirms that Castro's wish to not have an international inspection and dismantling of the missile bases went ignored. This sparked a great outrage among the prominent party members in Cuba, including Ernesto "Che" Guevara, who was crushed with disbelief upon hearing the news. The situation is one of general confusion as everyone awaits Castro's appearance, and his 5 Points to be fulfilled.

  • November 01, 1962

    Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 1 November 1962

    Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen sends a cable on a conversation he had with a member of the U.S. State Department. Firstly, the State Department was pleased to know Indonesian President Sukarno had not pledged support to Cuba during the crisis. Secondly, they hoped to make the point to Sukarno how alliance with the Soviets could not be relied upon, as the Cuban crisis and the Soviet abandonment of India have demonstrated. Thirdly, the Indonesian Ambassador Zain was going to pay six week visit to Jakarta, in an effort to promote U.S. economic support to Indonesia.

  • November, 1962

    The Polyansky Report on Khrushchev’s Mistakes in Foreign Policy, October 1964

    Excerpt from a report prepared by Politiburo member Dmitry Polyansky on Khrushchev's foreign policy mistakes, presented at 14 October 1962 CPSU Central Committee plenum. Polyansky included a scathing denunciation of Khrushchev’s “adventurism” in sending the missiles to Cuba, causing the “deepest of crises [that] brought the world to the brink of a nuclear war.” Ridiculing Khrushchev’s claims of having achieved a successful “penetration” of Latin America, Polyansky dismissed his contention that the crisis had in fact ended with a Soviet victory.

  • November 01, 1962

    Coded telegram from Soviet official Georgy Zhukov

    Zhukov relays the message that John F. Kennedy sent, via Salinger, that the President needed proof that the weapons in Cuba were dismantled.

  • November 01, 1962

    Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador in Washington, to Maurice Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister, Telegram 6179-6185

    Hervé Alphand, the French Ambassador in Washington, writes to Maurice Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, that the United States (and President Kennedy in particular) does not believe the Cuban crisis is over, that Khrushchev was pushed to build nuclear bases in Cuba by his generals and that Cuba's behavior in this crisis represents a fundamental shift on the international stage of diplomatic relations.

  • November 01, 1962

    Cable no. 341 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Pavlicek relays to Prague the results of the meeting between Cuban foreign minister Raul Roa and UN Secretary General U Thant. Thant expressed sympathy for the Cuban people and acknowledged the right for Cuba to submit their considerations for the resolution to the crisis. The Cuban requests included lifting the American blockade, fulfilling Castro's 5 Points, and no UN inspection of the missile bases. Besides the meeting with the Secretary General, Pavlicek also recounts the meeting of a Latin American delegation including representatives from Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay and Mexico. All nations but Mexico refused to give in to U.S. pressures, and stood in support of Cuba. Pavlicek then moves on to cover the possible subjects of Castro's speech on 1 November, including the Cuban detention of anticommunist groups in country and the results of the negotiations with U Thant. In the meantime, the Cuban government is concerned with curtailing the actions of anti-Soviet groups which have sown confusion and discontent among the population.

  • November 01, 1962

    Józef Dryglas, 'Record of Conversation with USSR Ambassador V. Moskovsky'

    Moskovsky advised Pak Geum-cheol and Kim Chang-man to cooperate with the Soviet-led socialist bloc. Conversation with Kim Il Sung and Moskovsky imply strong relations with the Soviet Union.

  • November 01, 1962

    Brazilian Embassy in Washington, Analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis

    Campos sends an attached memorandum of analysis of the developments of the Cuban crisis, elaborated by the Political Sector of the Embassy. It discusses Soviet motivation, American actions, Soviet reactions, etc.

  • November 02, 1962

    Cable no. 346 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Pavlicek's primary focus in this cable is the effect of the crisis on the national media. The Cuban media is stressing Castro's 5 Points, and some journalists are hesitant to report anything else. There is a slight thread of anticommunism and anti-Soviet sentiment breeding among the media, but these feelings are not widespread, according to Pavlicek. The press is holding off on coverage of all other events such as the Sino-Indian border conflict and Chinese support for Castro's 5 points until after his speech.

  • November 02, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, to Yugoslav Embassies in Havana and Washington and the Yugoslav Mission to the United Nations, New York

    The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry relays to its embassies a summary of the Brazilian proposal on the Cuban Missile Crisis which, they say, mainly includes: the denuclearization of Latin America with inspections, Cuba's commitment to not "export" revolutionary operations, and guarantees to Cuba for sovereignty and independence. Allegedly, Castro welcomed the idea of the above plan. Brazil thinks that the USA could accept it after negotiations.

  • November 02, 1962

    Cable no. 348 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Fidel Castro's speech is the centerpiece of this cable from Pavlicek. Castro's rhetoric touched on the unity of the Cuban people, and their refusal to an "undignified agreement." Pavlicek predicts his speech will foster a great response both internally and externally. Castro also acknowledged the help provided by the Soviet Union and the anti-Soviet campaign mounted by counterrevolutionaries. Pavlicek's only complaint was a lack of emphasis on the "critical role" the Soviet Union has played in the negotiations to resolve the crisis. However, the reaction to Fidel's speech is one of calming the situation and a clear orientation for the Cubans.

  • November 02, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'The Problem of How to Express a Position on the Cuban-Soviet Relationship'

    A request from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba to the Foreign Ministry office, asking advice on the position they should take in regards to the complex Soivet-Cuban relationship. The embassy suggests China support the speech made by Castro on 1 November 1962, but that otherwise discussions of Soviet-Cuban relations should not be discussed at Chinese initiative.

  • November 02, 1962

    Chinese Embassy to the Soviet Union, Information on the report delivered by Maj. Boris Gelibusiji from the defense department of the Soviet Union in the Moscow Engineering and Physics College

    Further information from the Chinese Embassy to the Soviet Union on the report delivered by Maj. Boris Gelibusiji from the Defense Department of the Soviet Union in the Moscow Engineering and Physics College, describing comments he made on the Sino-Indian border conflict and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

  • November 02, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'The Soviet Union Continued a Reconciliatory Approach to the Cuban Problem'

    A report from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union about Soviet-Cuban relations in the build-up of US-Cuban tensions. According to this Chinese document, the Soviet's involvement is one of hopeful reconciliation in the Cuban problem.

  • November 02, 1962

    Entry from the Journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, Conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru

    Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru regarding border disputes with China. Approaching the Soviet envoy at a social gathering, the Indian official relayed an oral message to Khrushchev from Indian Prime Minister Nehru (whom he described as "exceptionally busy, very tired"), giving his analysis of the underlying motives behind China's actions in the border dispute. The Indian leader assessed that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai--with whom Nehru had cooperated in championing the rise of the non-aligned movement only a few years earlier--opposed the current militant policy toward India, but that leftist dogmatists-sectarians within the Chinese leadership, such as Liu Shaoqi, supported it. They did so, Nehru reportedly maintained, not because of the border dispute, but to strike a blow against the general phenomenon of neutrality in order to discredit Moscow's line of peaceful coexistence and competition with the West, and avoiding general nuclear war. In fact, Nehru was said to declare, the Chinese threatened to embroil the entire world in war, and had divided the globe into two new camps: not East and West, but "one - for the continuation of the human species, the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against."

  • November 02, 1962

    Ciphered Telegram from Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to the Central Committee for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

    The telegram bears on the circumstances surrounding Fidel Castro's controversial 27 October letter to Khrushchev. Alekseev describes Castro's demeanor as being irritated and paranoid at the time of writing the letter. He provides background on Castro's actions and attitudes at the peak of the crisis, and especially his nocturnal visit to the Soviet embassy and preparation of his letter to Khrushchev on the night of 26-27 October. He advises Moscow on how to handle the Cuban leader, and offers analysis into the emotions and overall mood of Castro and his associates at that moment in the crisis.

  • November 03, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Ministry to Yugoslav Embassies in Washington, Havana, Mexico, Caracas, and LaPaz, and Missions in Santiago de Chile, Montevideo, and New York City (United Nations)

    A message from the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry (originally, the embassy in Rio), saying that they are extremely satisfied with Tito’s message which contributed to Brazilian President João Goulart’s decisiveness on Cuban crisis.

  • November 03, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 3 November 1962

    Drozniak reports on the information from several sources on the Cuban Missile Crisis, particularly the White House and State Department's reactions to the agreement to dismantle the Soviet missiles in Cuba and the continued trouble they are having with Castro's refusal to allow UN inspections.

  • November 03, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 3 November 1962

    In a conversation between Drozniak and Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Walt Rostow, Rostow compares "the initial stages of the armed conflict in Cuba to the [Japanese attacks on] Pearl Harbor [on 7 December 1941]. [He said that President] Kennedy was ready for war. The most pressing issue at the moment is a quick removal of the [Soviet] missiles from Cuba."

  • November 04, 1962

    Meeting of the Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba with Mikoyan in the Presidential Palace

    Minutes of the meeting between Anastas Mikoyan, Fidel Castro, and other members of the Secretariat of the ORI in the Old Presidential Palace. The purpose of this meeting is to resolve differences between the Cuban and Soviet governments in order to protect Marxist principles. Among other things, they discuss economic sanctions against Cuba, military intervention by other Latin American countries, the importance of the Cuban revolution to Marxism, and Cuba's relationship with the United States.