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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • November 02, 1962

    Entry from the Journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, Conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru

    Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru regarding border disputes with China. Approaching the Soviet envoy at a social gathering, the Indian official relayed an oral message to Khrushchev from Indian Prime Minister Nehru (whom he described as "exceptionally busy, very tired"), giving his analysis of the underlying motives behind China's actions in the border dispute. The Indian leader assessed that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai--with whom Nehru had cooperated in championing the rise of the non-aligned movement only a few years earlier--opposed the current militant policy toward India, but that leftist dogmatists-sectarians within the Chinese leadership, such as Liu Shaoqi, supported it. They did so, Nehru reportedly maintained, not because of the border dispute, but to strike a blow against the general phenomenon of neutrality in order to discredit Moscow's line of peaceful coexistence and competition with the West, and avoiding general nuclear war. In fact, Nehru was said to declare, the Chinese threatened to embroil the entire world in war, and had divided the globe into two new camps: not East and West, but "one - for the continuation of the human species, the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against."

  • November 02, 1962

    Telegram from A.I. Mikoyan to CC CPSU re 1 November 1962 meeting with Stevenson

    Mikoyan discusses the results of a meeting with Stevenson. The two discussed the quarantine in Cuba, the dismantling of weapons, the possibility of the Soviets and Americans coming to agreements over the issues to be discussed by the UN Security Council and the possibility of normalization of relations with Cuba in the future.

  • November 02, 1962

    Ciphered Telegram from Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to the Central Committee for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

    The telegram bears on the circumstances surrounding Fidel Castro's controversial 27 October letter to Khrushchev. Alekseev describes Castro's demeanor as being irritated and paranoid at the time of writing the letter. He provides background on Castro's actions and attitudes at the peak of the crisis, and especially his nocturnal visit to the Soviet embassy and preparation of his letter to Khrushchev on the night of 26-27 October. He advises Moscow on how to handle the Cuban leader, and offers analysis into the emotions and overall mood of Castro and his associates at that moment in the crisis.

  • November 02, 1962

    Cable of V.V. Kuznetsov on 1 November 1962 conversation between CPSU CC Politburo Member A.I. Mikoyan and acting UN Secretary General U Thant

    Kuznetsov relays the results of a conversation between Mikoyan and U Thant. The bulk of the conversation between the two concerns U Thant’s recent visit to Cuba and his conversation with Castro. Mikoyan stresses lifting the quarantine around Cuba.

  • November 03, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the UN V.A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry

    The number and location of U.S. ships, along with International Red Cross and UN observers, in and around Cuba.

  • November 03, 1962

    Notes of Conversation between A.I. Mikoyan and Fidel Castro

    Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Alexeev reports on the conversation between Mikoyan and Fidel Castro. The Cuban leader expresses his disappointment that the Cuban leadership was not consulted on the issue of withdrawing Soviet weapons from Cuba and on the Cuban Missile Crisis in general, and emphasizes the negative impact it has had and confusion it has caused on the Cuban people.

  • November 04, 1962

    Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko to Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the UN Zorin in New York

    Gromyko sends instructions to Kuznetsov and Zorin to relay to Stevenson concerning the definition of “offensive weaponry.”

  • November 04, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry

    Alekseev sends the results of a meeting with Cuban leadership, the Cubans were expressing discontent because of the fact that Soviet government had not consulted them on a number of issues.

  • November 04, 1962

    Soviet Report on Conversation with US Congressional Staff

    Report on the relief in Washington after the height of the crisis had passed and the possibility of the US pledging not to invade Cuba, provide ports and other government facilities to Cuban emigres or training Cuban emigres on US territory. The report also highlighted the American reluctance on the normalization of economic relations and the Guantanamo base.

  • November 04, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation between Castro and Mikoyan

    Mikoyan discusses the Soviet decision to exclude the Cubans from negotiations with the US, regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis, with Cuban leadership.

  • November 05, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Alekssev to USSR Foreign Ministry

    Alekseev reports to the Foreign Ministry about Castro’s dissatisfaction about not being consulted regarding the question of dismantling. Alekseev shows him some letters that passed between Khrushchev and Kennedy.

  • November 05, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to USSR Foreign Ministry (1)

    Dobrynin discusses an article in the “Washington Post,” concerning the Soviet Union, that appears to have received information directly from Robert Kennedy.

  • November 05, 1962

    Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko to Mikoyan and Alekseev in Havana

    Response to Alekseev’s telegram regarding Fidel Castro’s doubts as to the Khrushchev-Kennedy exchange of letters.

  • November 05, 1962

    Telegram (No.4448) from the Minister of the USSR Merchant Fleet to Captain of Ship "Amata" via Soviet ambassador in Havana (Alekseev

    Bakaev gives instructions to the captain of the “Amata,” regarding the UN representatives to be lodged on the ship.

  • November 05, 1962

    Telegram from TROSTNIK (Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (General Isa Pliev)

    Malinovsky informs Pliev that withdrawal of Luna missiles, FKR [cruise missiles] and IL-28 airplanes has not been discussed and they will probably be left in Cuba under his command.

  • November 05, 1962

    Gromyko Cable to Kuznetsov and Zorin in New York

    Gromyko cable to Kuznetsov and Zorin in New York regarding preparation for International Red Cross' inspection of the Soviet ship "Amata", the number of observers on each vessel, division of the inspection cost, the duration of IRC inspection, and Soviet acceptance to let IRC observers inspect Soviet ships bound for Cuba.

  • November 05, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to USSR Foreign Ministry (2)

    Dobrynin sends the results of a meeting with Robert Kennedy, during which Dobrynin clears up a “misunderstanding” between the Soviets and Americans and the two discuss American surveillance planes taking fire over Cuba.

  • November 05, 1962

    Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko to Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the UN Zorin in New York

    Gromyko relays instructions to Kuznetsov and Zorin regarding negotiations on lifting the blockade, elimination of tension and normalization of the situation around in the Caribbean Sea.

  • November 05, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation between Castro and Mikoyan

    Mikoyan, Castro and the Cuban leadership firther discuss the Soviet Union’s lack of regard for the Cubans during the missile crisis and the nature of UN inspections.

  • November 05, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation, A.I. Mikoyan with Osvaldo Dorticos, Ernesto Guevara, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez

    Alekseev and Mikoyan discuss the nature of UN inspections in Cuba with Cuban leadership. Cuban leadership discusses what they feel is a Soviet concession to the US, thereby weakening the international socialist movement.