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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • April 21, 1953

    Memorandum from V.M. Molotov to Members of the Presidium of the CC CPSU

    On false claims of the use of biological weapons in the Korean War.

  • April 24, 1953

    Memorandum about Sessions of the CPSU CC Presidium from 13 March to 24 April 1953

    A small excerpt from a document listing all the issues (30 in total) considered by the CPSU Presidium at its six sessions from 13 March through 24 April 1953. The excerpt shows that the biological warfare allegations were taken up by the CPSU Presidium on 24 April.

  • April 24, 1953

    Cover Sheet for Issue II considered by the CPSU Presidium at its Session on 24 April 1953

    A cover sheet verifying that the allegations of the United States used biological weapons in Korea were discussed at the CPSU Presidium on 24 April 1953.

  • April 24, 1953

    Protocol No 6 of the Meeting of the Presidium of the CC CPSU about the MVD Note on the Results of the Investigations into the Reports of Former Advisers to the Ministry of State Security and DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cdes. Glukhov and Smirnov

    Response of USSR to false allegations that Americans used biological weapons in North Korea calls for both dismissal of V.N. Razuvaev from his posts as Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK and military adviser and the commission of Molotov to address the allegations and send his resultant report to Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung. This protocol also authorizes the removal of Ignatiev from the CC CPSU.

  • April 28, 1953

    Soviet Foreign Ministry Memorandum, 'Regarding Further Measures of the Soviet Government on the German Question'

    Memorandum on further issues regarding the German Question. The memorandum discusses further actions to be taken by the Soviet leadership in order to respond to developments in the Western controlled sectors of Germany and to increase Soviet influence with the German people.

  • April 30, 1953

    Cable from N. Spencer Barnes to US Department of State Reviewing Developments in the GDR since Stalin’s Death

    Barnes analyzes developments within the GDR following Stalin’s death. Although there was an initial period of confusion within the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany), it has been confirmed that Ulbricht is now directing SED and is continuing to implement socialization policy, though perhaps less dramatically than in the past. Barnes suggests that the Soviets may also be striving, to some extent, to decrease zonal tension.

  • April 30, 1953

    Report No. 2 of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland in the Democratic Republic of Korea for the Period of 1 March 1953 to 30 April 1953

    The Polish Embassy addresses North Korea's reactions toward Stalin's death, its domestic policies in line with the recommendations of the 5th Plenum of the KWP CC, and its stance towards the truce talks.

  • May 02, 1953

    Resolution of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers about Letters to the Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC, V.V. Kuznetsov and to the Charge d’Affaires for the USSR in the DPRK, S.P. Suzdalev

    Cease the publication of false evidence accusing the US for using biological weapons in North Korea; punish Soviet Workers involved.

  • May 02, 1953

    Memorandum from Vladimir Semyonov to Vyacheslav Molotov Evaluating the Prospects for a Successful Resolution of the German Question

    Memorandum to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov on German reunification. The memorandum reviews the developments following the East German proposal of an "all German" conference and the Soviet proposal for a German peace treaty.

  • May 05, 1953

    Vladimir Semyonov, 'Memorandum on the German Question'

    Memorandum on Soviet policy regarding German unification including meetings with the United States, England, and France on an All-German Conference and need for future discussion. Also addressed is Soviet relations with East Germany in the forms of military assistance and economic aid for reparations.

  • May 06, 1953

    Memorandum from Lavrentiy Beria to the CPSU CC Presidium regarding Mass Defections from the GDR, 6 May 1953

    Excerpt of a memorandum from Lavrentiy Beria to the CPSU CC Presidium regarding mass defections from the GDR. By early May 1953, declining conditions in the GDR finally started to draw the attention of the Soviet leadership. Lavrentiy Beria’s 6 May report to the CPSU Presidium is one of the first high-level documents to reflect concerns about the situation, in particular the increased flight of farmers and small businessmen brought about by the forced socialization policy. Beria may have been prompted to submit this report by the discussion of the German issue at a CPSU Presidium meeting on 5 May.

  • May 07, 1953

    Report on Disturbances at the Tobacco Depot in Plovdiv, Bulgaria

    Report on the disturbances at the Plovdiv Tabacco depot on 4 May 1953 following job cuts at the plant.

  • May 08, 1953

    USSR Foreign Ministry Draft Memorandum, 'On Further Soviet Government Measures Pertaining to the German Question'

    Memorandum from the Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry on Soviet foreign policy options with regard to the German Question. The memorandum looks at the effects on Soviet policy toward the western powers in the context of the Postdam conference and at the future state of the Soviet-East German relations.

  • May 11, 1953

    Telegram to V.M. Molotov from Beijing from the USSR Ambassador to the PRC, V.V. Kuznetsov

    Results of a conversation with Mao Zedong, on 11 May 1953, regarding the falsification of evidence proving US use of biological weapons.

  • May 15, 1953

    Memorandum from the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs to Vladimir Semyonov, 'On the Question of Preventing the Defection of Inhabitants from the GDR to West Germany'

    The large-scale migration of GDR’s population to West Germany is becoming a major issue in Germany. The SCC in Germany, the SED, and GDR government discuss and outline measures for preventing this defection in the future.

  • May 17, 1953

    Memorandum from the Chairman of the Party Control Commission Shkiriatov to G.M. Malenkov about the Results of the Party Investigation of the Actions of the Former Minister of State Security of the USSR S.D. Ignatiev

    The results of the party investigation of the duplicitous actions of the former minister of State Security of the USSR S.D. Ignatiev in connection with the report of the former advisers to MOB and MVD DPRK, Cdes. Glukhov and Smirnov; calls for dismissal of Ignatiev from the CPSU.

  • May 18, 1953

    CIA Criticizes American Committee for Liberation Policies

    Dana Durand, chief of the CIA/DDP SR Division, now responsible for the Radio Liberty project, concludes that efforts to unify the Russian emigration have become counterproductive, that RL broadcasting should be separated from émigré politics, and that AMCOMLIB president Leslie Stevens is too wedded to the old approach to continue in office.

  • May 18, 1953

    Memorandum from General Vasilii Chuikov, Pavel Yudin, and Ivan Il'ichev to Georgii Malenkov Critically Assessing the Situation in the GDR

    The Soviet Control Commission in Germany reports statistics and a detailed assessment to Malenkov, analyzing the migration of the East German population to West Germany. It also includes proposals for implementing measures to prevent further departure from the GDR.

  • May 23, 1953

    Letter by United Nations Commander Mark W. Clark to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Solving the Prisoner of War Issue

    General Clark relays to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff the terms of the United Nations proposal to repatriate prisoners of war captured during the conflict in Korea. The agreement grants prisoners the right to refuse to be repatriated.

  • May 24, 1953

    Sample Plan for the Draft Response to the Notes of the Three Powers

    Unhappy with the call for a conference in Lugano, this plan outlines several points that should be taken into consideration when drafting the official response including the Soviet awareness that any lack of results from this conference would result in blame being placed on the Soviet state and the dismissal of questions raised by the Soviet government in prior correspondence. The Soviets conclude that they should arrange the program of the conference in order to maximize the conferences effectiveness in resolving lingering post-war problems.