Search in
ADD SEARCH FILTER CANCEL SEARCH FILTER

Digital Archive International History Declassified

SEARCH RESULTS

  • May 06, 1987

    Letter from the Ambassador Sergio Romano to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Andreotti

    Italian Ambassador to Moscow, Romano, shares his reflections on the change in Soviet SDI strategy. Romano's analysis underlines the politically fragile and potentially dangerous situation that could emerge as the result of nuclear disarmament in Europe.

  • May 09, 1987

    Telegram by Permanent Representative to NATO Fulci to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'General Rogers' position on US-USSR negotiations for nuclear arms control (LRINF and SRINF)'

    Telegram from Italy's permanent representative to NATO re-caps the controversial position presented by the Supreme Allied Commander Rogers. General Rogers criticizes the Reagan administration's strategy and expresses concern over the disparity between NATO capabilities and those of the Warsaw Pact.

  • May 19, 1987

    Letter from NATO's Secretary General Lord Carrington to Minister of Foreign Affairs Andreotti

    Both Guidi and Carrington share the concern that NATO's High-level Task Force has come to a deadlock in regard to conventional disarmament. Carrington advocates for direct involvement at the ministerial level to end the standstill.

  • June, 1987

    Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

    This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in June 1987 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

  • June 08, 1987

    Stenographic Transcript of the Official talks between Erich Honecker and Zhao Ziyang

    Zhao Ziyang and Honecker discuss economic and political reforms in China, bilateral relations between China and East Germany, attempts to reduce nuclear and chemical weapons stockpiles, and China's attitudes toward the Iran-Iraq War, Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

  • June 12, 1987

    Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Opening Remarks to the First Meeting of the Core Group, Jersey, 12 June 1987

    Written version of an oral address given upon the first meeting of the PPNN Core Group.

  • June 12, 1987

    First Meeting of PPNN Core Group, 12-14th June 1987

    Outline and minutes from the first meeting of the PPNN Core Group, including list of participants, agenda, purpose, activities and structure.

  • July, 1987

    Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

    This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in July 1987 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

  • July 14, 1987

    Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Kenneth Adelman to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 'Your Meeting with Ambassador Merker'

    When ACDA director Kenneth Adelman saw the State Department talking points for a conversation with Pakistani ambassador Jamsheed Marker about the Pervez case he was irritated by the “business-as-usual” tone.

  • July 14, 1987

    State Department Telegram 215122 to Embassy Islamabad, 'Maraging Steel Case: Press Guidance'

    The Pervez arrest immediately raised questions in the media but the State Department would say little other than: let the legal system do its work, no speculation about Pervez’s intentions, and the admission that the Department had expressed concern to Pakistan about the “overall nature and direction of [its] nuclear program.”

  • July 15, 1987

    Department of State, Memorandum from Ted Borek to Mr. Peck [et al.], 'Letter to Justice on Pakistan Export Case'

    This draft of a State Department letter to the Justice Department, that was presumably sent soon thereafter, supported prosecution of Pervez to the “fullest extent of the law.”

  • July 16, 1987

    Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Norman Wulf, Director to the Director, 'Solarz Amendment Applicability to the Pakistani Procurement Case'

    ACDA official Norman Wulf saw a good case, with the information supporting positive answers to basic questions: would the maraging steel to be used for nuclear weapons manufacture, was the Pakistani national working on behalf of his government, would the steel “contribute significantly” to a capability to manufacture a nuclear explosive, and was there an “attempted illegal export”?

  • July 20, 1987

    Department of State, Memorandum from Ted Borek to Mr. Peck [et al.], 'Solarz Amendment: Legal Memorandum for Mr. Armacost'

    The Pervez case immediately raised questions among State Department lawyers about the relevance of the Solarz amendment. A final answer depended on more evidence; the lawyers wanted to see the many documents that Canadian authorities had impounded as well as the tape recordings of Pervez’s conversations with U.S. undercover agents.

  • July 23, 1987

    US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Kenneth Adelman for the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, 'The Pakistani Procurement Cases'

    With Pakistan already violating the “red line” on uranium enrichment, Adelman believed that without a display of resolve “presidential credibility” would be further damaged; that required cutting off aid under the Solarz amendment.

  • July 24, 1987

    Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Briefing Memorandum from Anthony Salvia to the Director, 'HFAC Asia Subcommittee Hearing on Pakistan'

    A hearing by the House subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade on 22 July 1987 made it clear why administration officials worried about the implications of the Pervez case. With Congressman Solarz arguing that the arrest involved “a flagrant and provocative challenge to US nonproliferation objectives.”

  • July 26, 1987

    Department of State, 'Classified Congressional Briefing on Pakistani Clandestine Nuclear-Related Procurement'

    These are the State Department’s talking points for use with Congress. While ACDA officials were fairly certain that a violation of the Solarz amendment had occurred, the State Department did not want to assume anything until it had reviewed the evidence.

  • July 28, 1987

    Department of State, Draft Telegram to Embassy Athens [et al.], 'Pakistani Circumvention of Nuclear Export Controls'

    This telegram included information that US embassies were to share with foreign governments to help them tighten up their export controls of steel tubes.

  • July 28, 1987

    US District Court, 'Indictment: US of America Vs. Arshad Pervez and Inam Ul-Haq'

    The indictment against Pervez and Ul-Haq included charges of conspiracy, bribery, racketeering, export violations, and false statements.

  • July 30, 1987

    Embassy Islamabad telegram 16052 to Department of State, 'Pervez Nuclear Arrest Case—July 23 Statement by MFA Spokesman Gives Greater Emphasis to Conspiracy'

    Only a few weeks after Pervez’s arrest, Under Secretary of State Armacost traveled to Pakistan for wide ranging discussions with General Zia, but with a special focus on nuclear procurement and the uranium enrichment program.

  • July 30, 1987

    'Programme Olympic: Corroborative Notes Following the Briefing of the Minister of Defence in Cape Town on 27 July 1987'