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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • November 11, 1971

    Letter, Ozbudun to Narasimhan, "North-South Red Cross Talks"

    Ozbudun reports on the Red Cross negotiations between two Koreas.

  • November 15, 1971

    Cable from William P. Rogers to American Embassy Paris, 'Military Relations with France'

    Text of a letter from Foster to Blancard discussing an exchange of nuclear safety information between the United States and France. Foster goes into detail about the specific procedures and systems which could be discussed. The US could not exchange any information classified as Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data.

  • November 16, 1971

    Memorandum from Theodore L Eliot Jr. to Henry A. Kissinger, 'Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Hearings on Projected Nuclear Safety Talks with the French'

    Description of a hearing held by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to discuss sharing nuclear safety information with the French. Issues raised included the effect of the talks on US-Soviet relations, the question of who initiated the talks, and the type of information which could and could not be shared. Overall the hearing was successful and most of the Committee (aside from Senator Symington) was in favor of the information exchange.

  • November 19, 1971

    South African Nuclear Fuel Agreement

    U.S. State Department memorandum weighing the arguments for and against renewing the agreement to sell uranium enrichment services to South Africa. The political fallout from engaging with the South African apartheid regime coupled with the fact that they had not signed the NPT were closely considered.

  • November 23, 1971

    Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

    Ozbudun updates Narasimhan on domestic and international affairs in ROK. The 9th preliminary Red Cross talks made no progress. The ROK government worries that PRC's entry in the UN will affect the UN Korean question discussion. A Russian reporter may visit Seoul to sound out potential trade relations. Japan decides to forgo trade and banking relations with North Korea.

  • November 23, 1971

    Rajya Sabha Q&A on Chinese Proliferation of Nuclear Missiles

    Transcript of questions and answers between members of the Rajya Sabha and the Minister of Defence on Chinese success in producing nuclear missiles.

  • November 26, 1971

    Letter, Ozbudun to Lansky, "Local Staff Reduction at UNCURK"

    Ozbudun informs Lanksy of the reduction of eight local staff at UNCURK.

  • November 29, 1971

    Letter, Ozbudun to Narasimhan

    In connection with the issue of two Chinas in the UN, Kim Dae Jung proposes an ROK national effort toward national unification by precluding war and consideration of simultaneous entry of the two Koreas into the UN.

  • November 29, 1971

    Letter, Ozbudun to Narasimhan

    Kim Jong-pil calls for the strengthening of the ROK defense posture because of North Korea's war preparations.

  • December 01, 1971

    Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

    Ozbudun updates Narasimhan on the proposal of an agenda for full Red Cross negotiations, the ROK government's willingness to establish diplomatic relations with non-aligned countries that have relations with North Korea, and UNCURK's invitation to meet with the NNCS.

  • December 07, 1971

    Memorandum from Theodore L Eliot Jr. to Henry A. Kissinger, 'Briefing the British Regarding Our Special Defense Programs with the French'

    Eliot forwards a letter sent to William J. Galloway of the American Embassy in London, containing information for the British Foreign Office about US nuclear assistance to France. The letter describes the current status of cooperation between the US and France, including the preparations for nuclear safety talks and the first meeting with the French ballistic missile project.

  • December 15, 1971

    Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

    Narasimhan and Ozbudun inform each other of the Red Cross negotiation agenda proposal failure and Park Chung Hee's announcement of a state of emergency.

  • December 30, 1971

    Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

    In a series of letters, Narasimhan provides updates on the state of emergency, the Red Cross negotiations, North Korea's defense posture, the US ambassador's remarks on US-ROK relations, North Korean infiltrations, and UNCURK meetings.

  • 1972

    Letter from P.V. [Col. Ryszard Kuklinski] to USA Embassy

    Polish Colonel Ryszard Kuklińsk makes contact with the US embassy in Bonn describing himself as a foreign "MAF" from a Communist country, and requested a secret meeting.

  • 1972

    About the AFKIC: American-Korean Friendship and Information Center

    The American-Korean Friendship and Information Center (AKFIC) describes its founding, organization, and activities.

  • 1972

    A Visit to the DPRK: A Report from the Delegation of the American-Korean Friendship and Information Center to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

    A report on a North Korean sponsored tour of Pyongyang made by staff and supporters of the AKFIC in 1972.

  • January 05, 1972

    Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

    Updates on UNCURK and UN member departures, the Tae Yun Gak Hotel fire, reaction to the Special Law on National Security and Defense, and Japan's continued economic aid to ROK and discontinuation of ties with North Korea.

  • January 06, 1972

    State Department cable 3088 to Embassy New Delhi

    The State Department asks the U.S. Embassy in India for its assessment of the likelihood that India is planning a nuclear test explosion.

  • January 13, 1972

    Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

    Updates on the intensification of military tension, Park Chung Hee's commitment to war preparations through heavy and chemical industries, hypothesis on Japan's view on the Korean question, and Park's support of Red Cross talks.

  • January 14, 1972

    State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Note, 'India to Go Nuclear?'

    The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) evaluates the available intelligence on India’s nuclear intentions. There were varying reports that India would test a device that month, sometime in 1972, or that the government was undertaking a program to test a “peaceful nuclear explosive.” According to INR, India had the capability to produce some 20-30 weapons, and it could easily test a device in an underground site, such as an abandoned mine, that would be hard to discover. Because the U.S. government had given a “relatively modest priority to... relevant intelligence collection activities” a “concerted effort by India to conceal such preparations... may well succeed.” What would motivate India to test, the analysts opined, were domestic political pressures and concerns about China and Pakistan.