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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • April 10, 1995

    Letter, Thabo Mbeki to Al Gore

    Responding to Al Gore's 4th April letter, Mbeki offers support for the NPT while noting the need for supermajority and strengthening the review process.

  • April 13, 1995

    Letter, Al Gore to Thabo Mbeki

    The letter congratulates Mr Thabo and South Africa for pledging to the NPT agreements and offering suggestions during the revision process. Gore also says that he will be able to meet Foreign Minister Nzo in New York on 19th April.

  • April 13, 1995

    Letter, Alfred Nzo to The Honourable Edward Bwanai, Minister of External Affairs, Malawi

    The letter asks for improvements in the review process for the NPT.

  • April 14, 1995

    Telegram from NATO Deputy Secretary General De Franchis, 'NATO-Russia relations and Italy's position'

    Deputy Secretary General of NATO Amedeo De Franchis briefs Italian embassies about the state of NATO-Russia relations, and the Italian position. He emphasizes the importance of Russian security concerns and calls for caution in NATO's enlargement strategy.

  • April 17, 1995

    Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, NPT Conference 17/4/95-12/5/95, 'Darryl’s meeting with Sven Jurchewsky [sic] 145/95'

    Summary of meeting with Canadian diplomat Sven Jurschewsky about strategy for the NPT review confernece.

  • April 18, 1995

    1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Summary and Verbal Records (excerpts)

    Opening statements in the General Debate by Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States, Russia, South Africa, The Netherlands.

  • April 19, 1995

    Statement by the Foreign Minister of The Republic of South Africa, Mr. Alfred Nzo, 'The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)'

    Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo thanked the President of NPT, offers a legal analysis of X(2) Article and the commitment to dispose of nuclear weapons, referring to articles of treaty.

  • April 27, 1995

    Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries, 'Result of the Exchange of Views on the Review and Extension Conference on the NPT'

    The Ministers of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries agreed that the NPT should be extended and a regular review conference held every five years.

  • June 15, 1995

    German Bundestag, 12th Legislative Period, 'Printed Matter 12/5116--Resolution Recommendation and Report of the Foreign Relations Committee (3rd Committee)'

    Resolution for the extension of the Non-proliferation Treaty and setting goals for NPT policy.

  • June 19, 1995

    Saddam Hussein Meeting with Ba’ath Party Members to Discuss the Results of the UN Inspectors’ Mission to Look for WMDs

    Saddam, General Amir, and Party members speculate on various motivations behind a UN plan for monitoring the status of WMD's in Iraq. Saddam states that Iraq possesses no biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, but he is informed that a "traitor" had falsely reported to the UN that Iraq was in the possession of a certain number of missiles. They discuss possible UN conclusions and assumptions regarding WMD's in Iraq.

  • June 29, 1995

    German Bundestag, 13th Legislative Period, 'Response of the Federal Government to the Small Inquiry of the SPD faction—Printed Matter 13/1455—Strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'

    Review of steps taken by the German federal government to limit proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  • September 13, 1995

    Aide Memoire, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Support for South African (Avitronics) Bid for the Supply of Electronic Warfare Equipment to Argentine Air Force

    Letter stating that the Department of Foreign Affairs has no political problem with a particular permit being granted.

  • September 14, 1995

    Letter, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Confirmation of Support for Approval of Export/Import Applications'

    Letter to the Chairman of the Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction expressing that the Department of Foreign Affairs has no objection of certain import/export permits for material and technology related to weaponry.

  • October 25, 1995

    Letter, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Support of the South African Bid for the Supply of Electronic Warfare Equipment to the Argentine Air Force'

    Director-General writes to the Secretary for Defence to enquire as to whether the South African tender for an electronic warfare equipment deal has been successful. He suspects that the deal has already been won by Israel.

  • December 10, 1995

    State Department Telegram 28705 to US Embassy in India, 'Arrange Wisner-Varma Meeting on Testing Issue'

    Telegram instructing the Charges d'Affairs to arrange an urgent meeting between the United States Ambassador to India and the Indian Prime Minister's Pricipal Secretary to discuss American concerns that India will launch a nuclear test. The State Department was ready for a demarche to the Indian government to express “grave concerns” about the possibility of a test.

  • December 11, 1995

    State Department Telegram 285472 to US Embassy in Tokyo, 'ACDA Director Hollum’s Meeting with Japanese Officials'

    Talking points for Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Hollum from the State Department. Hollum was instructed to “urge” the Japanese to convey their concern to the government of India and “strong opposition [to] any such tests.” The State Department did not want to make any public statements about the situation because that “would be counterproductive,” that is, it would tip the U.S.’s hand Japan to tell Tokyo to voice its concerns over the possible Indian Nuclear Test to New Delhi.

  • December 11, 1995

    Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Memorandum by Robert S. Rochlin, 'Implications of an Indian Nuclear Weapons Test'

    Memo from senior scientist at the ACDA, Robert S. Rochlin, discussing the possible serious political and diplomatic consequences of India launching a nuclear test. In the event that Roa had made a decision to test, the United States did not have enough a“leverage” to encourage a policy reversal or to prevent a regional arms race; Washington would need to organize a “concerted intervention by all the major states.”

  • December 12, 1995

    Email, ITAIN Division Reports to Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, CTB, Nuke, 'Indian Nuclear Update'

    Email from ITAIN Division to Reports to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee regarding the state of India's nuclear reactors. Directed to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the message provides a glimmer of the intelligence watch over the Indian nuclear test site. At least two sites were under observation, one where the mysterious cables had been rearranged, and the other where there was much “personnel activity.” The meaning of the acronym "ITAIN" is presently unknown.

  • December 13, 1995

    Email, ITAIN Division to South Asian Romp n’ Stomp, 'India Update – 19951213'

    Email from ITAIN Division to South Asian Romp n' Stomp regarding the state of cables at an Indian nuclear facility. According to this message, the cable at the test site had changed its shape again, from a thick cable to two smaller connected cables. The “Stemming pile” is a reference to the mound of dirt that would cover the test device once it had been placed in the hole. The meaning of the acronym "ITAIN" is presently unknown, as it the jokey reference to “South Asian Romp n’ Stomp.”

  • December 15, 1995

    Draft State Department Telegram to US Embassy Beijing, 'Possible Indian Nuclear Test'

    The State Department writes to Islamabad urging Pakistan to not react if in fact India chooses to launch a nuclear test. On 15 December the New York Times published a story by Tim Weiner, under the headline “US Suspects India Prepares to Conduct Nuclear Test.” While some Indian journalists and policy experts were convinced that the story was a US government plant, Weiner had simply used due diligence in pursuing a lead from a non-government expert on nuclear proliferation issues. Worried that the story would exacerbate regional tensions by encouraging Pakistan to “act in a manner that jeopardizes our nonproliferation efforts in South Asia,” the Department wanted to enlist the Chinese to encourage the Pakistanis to “exercise restraint in response to these reports.”