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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • October 24, 1962

    Cable no. 319 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Vladimir Pavlíček)

    This cable sent to Prague confirms the decision by President John F. Kennedy to blockade Cuba, based on talks between Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa and Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev. Despite no orders for the American warships to stop Soviet ships, Alekseev was preparing in anticipation for "dangerous provocations." Cuba canceled all PanAm flights, while at the same time allowing Czech and Soviet flights to proceed.

  • October 24, 1962

    Telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, to USSR envoys and the USSR delegate to the UN.

    The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered its ambassadors to visit the local ministers of foreign affairs and inform them of the declaration of the USSR on the situation in Cuba and its decision to bring the American violation of the UN charter before the UN.

  • October 24, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis and U.S.-USSR-Cuban relations. It says, the "American arguments in favor of the military blockade of Cuba are: firstly, they have solid proof that Cuba will get atomic weapons; secondly, Kennedy must take more severe measures because of the internal pressure, that’s why his option is blockade, although he is trying to transfer this issue to the UNO [United Nations Organization] in order to alleviate the pressure on himself; thirdly, transferring Cuba’s issue to the UNO he is creating a precedent against unilateral USSR actions in Berlin."

  • October 24, 1962

    Letter from Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy

    Khrushchev expresses outrage at Kennedy’s establishment of quarantine in Cuba.

  • October 24, 1962

    Chief of Staff, Bulgarian Navy, Order Regarding Naval Combat Readiness

    The Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Navy issued an order to prepare the Navy for mobilization, citing a Bulgarian government declaration about the Cuban missile crisis. The Chief of Staff's secret order includes 19 specific commands for preparation. Commands include orders regarding necessary supplies for combat readiness, repair schedules, deployment, arming vessels, radio communication, and increased surveillance, among others. The Chief of Staff order includes reporting requirements and specific dates for execution.

  • October 24, 1962

    Report to CPSU Central Committee From Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii and A. Epishev

    The response from the Soviet Army following the announcement of the Soviet government about the aggressive actions of the US toward Cuba.

  • October 24, 1962

    Cable from Federal Republic of Germany Embassy, Washington (Knappstein)

    West German Ambassador Karl-Heinrich Knappstein in Washington, D.C. sends a report to Federal Minister Schröder about the Cuban crisis situation in both military and political terms. He discusses the presence of both American and Soviet submarines and aircraft in Cuba. He also discusses several of the diplomatic meetings that have taken place regarding the Cuban crisis - between Kennedy, Khrushchev, Rusk and others.

  • October 24, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA

    Dobrynin relays the results of a meeting with R. Kennedy during which R. Kennedy is outraged at the “deception” of the Soviet Union by putting long-range missiles in Cuba.

  • October 25, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry about meeting with Brazilian officials to discuss the US preparing a military invasion of Cuba.

  • October 25, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 25 October 1962

    Drozniak discusses the ongoing Cuban Missile Crisis situation, including the rumors of a possible US military invasion of Cuba.

  • October 25, 1962

    Cable no. 323 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    The cable states Cuba has alerted its armed forces to maximum combat readiness. Cuba's government had already taken the precautions of arresting known counterrevolutionaries in all aspects of society, with all important factors monitored. General aura of the country is one of tenseness, but the people continue about their lives as normal. There is a sense of strong revolutionary unity in the wake of this blockade, especially after a speech given by Castro. Cable concludes with a message that the first Soviet ship arrived on the basis of not carrying any military hardware.

  • October 25, 1962

    Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 61

    Protocol 61 indicates Khrushchev was already taking steps away from the crisis unfolding. Khrushchev decided that the ships carrying the IRBM missiles (the R-14s) on the high seas should turn around and come home.

  • October 25, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    A telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry describing Vidaković's meeting with Brazilian Ambassador Pinto. They mostly discussed the Cuban crisis in relation to decisions made in the Organization of American States (OAS) councils.

  • October 25, 1962

    Political Letter from Ambassador Max Troendle to Secretary General Pierre Micheli

    A political letter from Ambassador Max Troendle to Secretary General Pierre Micheli describing aspects of the Soviet position on the Cuban crisis and how "It seems that on Cuba, the Soviets want to avoid meeting the American challenge, that they want to negotiate, talk, and not to face a showdown."

  • October 25, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to the Brazilian Embassy in Washington

    A telegram from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to the Brazilian Embassy in Washington relaying a message from the Brazilian Embassy in Moscow regarding their interpretations of the Soviet Union's position on the events related to the Cuban Missile Crisis and U.S.-Cuban relations. The ambassador feels that the Soviets fear war more than the North-Americans; and he says that at no point does the Soviet government specifically refute the NorthAmerican affirmation that it is sending an amount of offensive armament with Cuba, limiting itself to reiterating that the Cuban-Soviet accord of 3 September for defensive military help to Cuba continues in force.

  • October 25, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Memorandum from the Soviet Union on the Sino-Indian Border Dispute and the Sale of Aircrafts to India'

    The Chinese Foreign Ministry informed all of its embassies and Charge d’Affaires about the Soviet Memorandum on the Sino-Indian Dispute and emphasized the necessity to make clear that India was the invader, not China.

  • October 25, 1962

    Political Letter from Ambassador Max Troendle

    Ambassador Max Troendle discusses the situation in the Soviet Union after the Cuban Missile Crisis in regards to the public opinion and press attacks now being much calmer. He also mentions Israel’s newly arrived ambassador, Joseph Tekoah, who is familiar with the conditions in Latin America from his own experience.

  • October 25, 1962

    Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 61

    In response to President Kennedy's letter protesting the placement of missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev proposes a resolution to the crisis. When the time seemed right he would offer to dismantle the missiles already on the island (the MRBMs or R-12s) if Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba.

  • October 25, 1962

    Cable from Soviet ambassador to the US Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign Ministry (2)

    Soviet Ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin repots to the Soviet Ministry on the political situation in Washington at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Dobynin reports that US President John F. Kennedy has staked his reputation as a leader on a solution to the Cuban crisis and, as such, it is possible that he might take the gamble of invading Cuba.

  • October 25, 1962

    Danish Defense Intelligence Service Weekly Brief (Excerpts)

    An intelligence report from the Danish Defense Intelligence Services providing a general background on the historical events in Cuba leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis (Castro's revolutionary government), the defense systems and readiness of Cuba and its closest allies and military aid and materials in Cuba.