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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • January 20, 1972

    Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

    Updates concerning Park Chung Hee's New Years speech on peaceful unification, Red Cross negotiations, and ROK refusal of dual admission of the Koreas into the UN, and the 14th preliminary North-South Red Cross negotiations.

  • January 21, 1972

    US Embassy Airgram A-20 to State Department, 'India’s Nuclear Intentions'

    In response to the State Department's request, the U.S. Embassy in India identified a number of reasons that made it unlikely that India would a test a nuclear device in the coming weeks, but saw “straws” suggesting an underground test “sometime in future.” For example, the Government of India had publicly acknowledged ongoing work on the problem of safe underground testing. Moreover, India might have an interest in making its nuclear capabilities known to “enemies.” Whatever the Indians decided, external pressure would have no impact on a highly nationalist state and society: “we see nothing US or international community can presently do to influence GOI policy directions in atomic field.”

  • January 27, 1972

    Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

    Update concerning the defense of Seoul, 15th preliminary Red Cross negotiations, and Japan's apparent establishment of links with North Korea and its emissary to North Korea for personal and economic exchanges.

  • February 02, 1972

    Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

    Update concerning ROK outline on Korean question, Japan-DPRK 5-year trade agreement, 16th preliminary Red Cross negotiation, and North Korean leader Kim Byong Sik's statement in Time magazine.

  • February 03, 1972

    Telegram from S. Shahabuddin, Charge d’Affaires, Caracas

    Recommendation that India become a Permanent Observer at the Organization of American States.

  • February 09, 1972

    Letters between Ahmet H. Ozbudun and C.V. Narasimhan

    Ozbudun sends Narasimhan a report concerning the 17th preliminary meeting of the ROK and the DPRK Red Cross organizations, points of concession indicated at the 17th preliminary meeting of the North-South Red Cross organizations, the interview of Premier Kim Il Sung, and "Japan-DPRK trade agreement," etc.

  • February 09, 1972

    Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

    Updates on the 17th preliminary Red Cross negotiations and Kim Il Sung's interview concerning unification, Red Cross talks, and North Korea's Six-Year Plan.

  • February 16, 1972

    Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

    Update concerning 18th preliminary Red Cross negotiation, Japan-DPRK relationship intensification, and the reassignment of ROK Vietnam troops to the DMZ.

  • March 21, 1972

    Memorandum of Conversation between Chairman Mao Zedong and President Richard Nixon

    Mao Zedong and Richard Nixon focus on "philosophic problems" in relations between China and the United States during their first meeting.

  • March 22, 1972

    Memorandum of Conversation between Richard Nixon and Zhou Enlai

  • February 23, 1972

    Letters between Ahmet H. Ozbudun and C.V. Narasimhan

    Ozbudun sends Narasimhan a letter on the 19th ROK-DPRK Red Cross preliminary meeting, the first session of the Commission for 1972, a briefing for UNCURK, Japan-DPRK trade and other "relations", and statement of the ROK Foreign Minister on pre-conditions towards a Korean settlement.

  • February 23, 1972

    Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

    Update on UNCURK committee meetings, 19th preliminary Red Cross negotiations, ROK statement on preconditions for Korean settlement, and expedition of Japan-DPRK trade relationship.

  • February 23, 1972

    Memorandum from Ray Cline, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, enclosing 'Possibility of an Indian Nuclear Test'

    At the request of Undersecretary of State John Irwin, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) prepared an assessment which included a detailed review of Indian’s nuclear facilities and their capacity to produce weapons-grade plutonium as well as capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons to a target. While India had signed agreements with Canada and the United States that nuclear reactors were to be used for peaceful purposes, the Indians were likely to claim that an explosive device for “peaceful” purposes was consistent with the agreements. Whether the Indians were going to test in the near future was in doubt. INR could not “rule out” one in the near future. Further, the “strongest incentive [to test] may well be the desire for the increased status of a nuclear power.” All the same, “it our judgment that a decision to authorize a test is unlikely in the next few months and may well be deferred for several years.” Weighing against a test were the financial and diplomatic costs, for example, “India's full awareness that assistance from the US and other countries (possibly including the USSR) would be jeopardized.”

  • February 27, 1972

    Joint Communique between the United States and China

    The United States and China pledge to improve relations with one another in the famous "Shanghai Communique."

  • February 29, 1972

    Letters, David B. Vaughan to C.V. Narasimhan and the Secretary-General

    Vaughan sends Narasimhan letters concerning UNCURK's budget and United Nations Cemetery in Pusan.

  • March 01, 1972

    Letters between Ahmet H. Ozbudun and C.V. Narasimhan

    Ozbudun sends Narasimhan a letter on representatives on UNCURK, new economic measures of the ROK, and working-level meeting of the North-South Red Cross Organizations.

  • March 07, 1972

    US Embassy Canada cable 391 to State Department, 'India’s Nuclear Intentions'

    U.S. embassy officials report on an interview with Lauren Gray, the chairman of Canada’s Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), who had recently visited India. Having spoken with Homi Nusserwanji Sethna, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and other officials, Gray believed that Sethna opposed a test and that as long as Sethna and Indira Gandhi were in office “there was no chance” that India would test a nuclear device, which would take three to four years to prepare. Other officials with the AECB disagreed with Gray's estimates - based on their assessment of Indian’s ability to produce weapons grade plutonium, they argued that it would take no more than a year to produce a device. They also pointed out that about 18 months earlier there had been a “blackout” of statistical information on plutonium production in India.

  • March 08, 1972

    Letters between Ahmet H. Ozbudun and C.V. Narasimhan

    Ozbudun sends Narasimhan a letter on Mr. Marshall Green's visit to the ROK, the doubling of Japan-DPRK trade during 1972, ROK-DPRK Red Cross talks: 3th working committee meeting, and USSR-DPRK contacts.

  • March 09, 1972

    State Department cable 40378 to US Embassy Ottawa, 'Indian Nuclear Intentions'

    During a discussion with the Canadian embassy counselor, U.S. country desk director David Schneider opined that Indian was unlikely to test a device in the “near future” but he wanted Ottawa’s prognosis. Schneider was also interested in whether the Soviets, with their close relationship with India, might be able to use their influence to “deter” a test. If India tested, the U.S. could respond with a “strong statement,” but whether “punitive” measures would be taken would depend on whether the test “violated existing agreements.” In October 1970, the State Department had cautioned the Indians that a “peaceful nuclear explosion” was indistinguishable from a weapons test and that the test of a nuclear device would be incompatible with U.S.-Indian nuclear assistance agreements.

  • March 14, 1972

    US Embassy Canada Cable 430 to State Department, 'India’s Nuclear Intentions on South Asia Situation'

    Elaborating on his earlier cable and responding to the general issues raised by the Department’s 9 March message, science attaché Hudson questioned Lauren Gray’s evaluation of Sethna, suggesting that by combining “guile” and “technical proficiency,” the latter could easily have “easily misled” the Canadian. Based on consultations with a variety of Canadian insiders with knowledge of and experience with the Indian nuclear program, the Embassy saw no technical or fiscal barriers to an Indian test. Moreover, any pressure on India not to test would increase the “likelihood” of that happening.