June 29, 1995
German Bundestag, 13th Legislative Period, 'Response of the Federal Government to the Small Inquiry of the SPD faction—Printed Matter 13/1455—Strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'
Review of steps taken by the German federal government to limit proliferation of nuclear weapons.
September 13, 1995
Aide Memoire, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Support for South African (Avitronics) Bid for the Supply of Electronic Warfare Equipment to Argentine Air Force
Letter stating that the Department of Foreign Affairs has no political problem with a particular permit being granted.
September 14, 1995
Letter, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Confirmation of Support for Approval of Export/Import Applications'
Letter to the Chairman of the Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction expressing that the Department of Foreign Affairs has no objection of certain import/export permits for material and technology related to weaponry.
October 25, 1995
Letter, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Support of the South African Bid for the Supply of Electronic Warfare Equipment to the Argentine Air Force'
Director-General writes to the Secretary for Defence to enquire as to whether the South African tender for an electronic warfare equipment deal has been successful. He suspects that the deal has already been won by Israel.
December 10, 1995
State Department Telegram 28705 to US Embassy in India, 'Arrange Wisner-Varma Meeting on Testing Issue'
Telegram instructing the Charges d'Affairs to arrange an urgent meeting between the United States Ambassador to India and the Indian Prime Minister's Pricipal Secretary to discuss American concerns that India will launch a nuclear test. The State Department was ready for a demarche to the Indian government to express “grave concerns” about the possibility of a test.
December 11, 1995
State Department Telegram 285472 to US Embassy in Tokyo, 'ACDA Director Hollum’s Meeting with Japanese Officials'
Talking points for Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Hollum from the State Department. Hollum was instructed to “urge” the Japanese to convey their concern to the government of India and “strong opposition [to] any such tests.” The State Department did not want to make any public statements about the situation because that “would be counterproductive,” that is, it would tip the U.S.’s hand Japan to tell Tokyo to voice its concerns over the possible Indian Nuclear Test to New Delhi.
December 11, 1995
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Memorandum by Robert S. Rochlin, 'Implications of an Indian Nuclear Weapons Test'
Memo from senior scientist at the ACDA, Robert S. Rochlin, discussing the possible serious political and diplomatic consequences of India launching a nuclear test. In the event that Roa had made a decision to test, the United States did not have enough a“leverage” to encourage a policy reversal or to prevent a regional arms race; Washington would need to organize a “concerted intervention by all the major states.”
December 12, 1995
Email, ITAIN Division Reports to Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, CTB, Nuke, 'Indian Nuclear Update'
Email from ITAIN Division to Reports to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee regarding the state of India's nuclear reactors. Directed to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the message provides a glimmer of the intelligence watch over the Indian nuclear test site. At least two sites were under observation, one where the mysterious cables had been rearranged, and the other where there was much “personnel activity.” The meaning of the acronym "ITAIN" is presently unknown.
December 13, 1995
Email, ITAIN Division to South Asian Romp n’ Stomp, 'India Update – 19951213'
Email from ITAIN Division to South Asian Romp n' Stomp regarding the state of cables at an Indian nuclear facility. According to this message, the cable at the test site had changed its shape again, from a thick cable to two smaller connected cables. The “Stemming pile” is a reference to the mound of dirt that would cover the test device once it had been placed in the hole. The meaning of the acronym "ITAIN" is presently unknown, as it the jokey reference to “South Asian Romp n’ Stomp.”
December 15, 1995
Draft State Department Telegram to US Embassy Beijing, 'Possible Indian Nuclear Test'
The State Department writes to Islamabad urging Pakistan to not react if in fact India chooses to launch a nuclear test. On 15 December the New York Times published a story by Tim Weiner, under the headline “US Suspects India Prepares to Conduct Nuclear Test.” While some Indian journalists and policy experts were convinced that the story was a US government plant, Weiner had simply used due diligence in pursuing a lead from a non-government expert on nuclear proliferation issues. Worried that the story would exacerbate regional tensions by encouraging Pakistan to “act in a manner that jeopardizes our nonproliferation efforts in South Asia,” the Department wanted to enlist the Chinese to encourage the Pakistanis to “exercise restraint in response to these reports.”
December 15, 1995
Talking Points, State Department, South Asian Regional Affairs, 'Additional Testimony and Q’s and A’s for Congressional Briefing'
State Department talking points for analyzing the issue of a potential Indian Nuclear Test. These talking points review the state of play after Ambassador Wisner’s demarche to the Indian Foreign Ministry. Recognizing Prime Minister Rao’s cautiousness, US government officials did not believe that he had made a decision to test, but they were aware that he was under great pressure to do so. Therefore, the U.S. government was working with allies, encouraging them “to urge India not to test.” Parallel discussions were taking place with the Pakistanis over the production of enriched uranium over above the 3 to five 5 percent level that could be used to fuel nuclear reactors. The Pakistanis were denying that they were producing highly enriched uranium but intelligence reports suggested that they were contemplating such action or had already begun the process.
December 15, 1995
Email, ITAIN Division to South Asian Romp n’ Stomp, 'India Update 19951215'
A subsequent email from ITAIN Division to South Asian Romp n' Stomp regarding the state of cables at an Indian nuclear facility. US government observers were perplexed (“clear as mud”) by what they saw at the test site—the cables looked different, perhaps because the satellite photography had been taken at a different angle, and the National Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC) was not sure what the explanation was. At Drill Site 3, where much activity had previously been observed, “lotsa trucks and folks” were busy and a “probable satellite television truck” had been deployed. One wit observed that that was for MTV viewing on “long lonely nights.” An alternative interpretation is that the analysts were seeing a digital communications system using small dishes that could send encrypted messages via satellite. The meaning of the acronym "ITAIN" is presently unknown, as it the jokey reference to “South Asian Romp n’ Stomp.
Excerpts from Recollections by the Former Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Aleksandr Kapto
Aleksandr Kapto reflects on the Soviet Union's normalization of relations with South Korea, and the consequential fallout in relations between North Korea and the USSR. According to Kapto, North Korea threatened to develop nuclear weapons and withdraw from the NPT as a result of Soviet-South Korean rapprochement.
January 19, 1996
State Department Telegram 008785 to US Embassy India, 'CTBT Letter from the President: India-Specific Talking Points'
A State Department telegram outlining talking points on why supporting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was in India's best interest. As it became evident that Rao was not going to make a decision to test, President Clinton resumed pressure for Indian support for the CTBT by signing off on a letter to Rao about the test ban. The State Department sent the Embassy talking points about the value of Indian support for the CTBT for Ambassador Wisner to use when delivering the Clinton letter.
January 24, 1996
State Department Telegram 012545 to Intsum Collective, 'Intsum: India: Nuclear Test Unlikely'
Provides an overview of preparations for the nuclear test as well as a discussion on the pressures weighing on Indian Prime Minister Rao to launch the test. Prepared by one of INR’s South Asia experts, Steven Ghitelman, it provides an overview of the test site preparations that began in November and decided described Prime Minister Rao as facing pressures to test from the BJP and from the nuclear establishment. The pressures were not insurmountable because other considerations were important, such as avoiding international sanctions, continuing steps toward economic liberalization, and pressures to support the CTBT. Ghitelman concluded that it would be “vintage Rao” for him to allow the scientists to prepare for a test “while not authorizing them to conduct one.” That is what happened.
February 12, 1996
Cable from Brazilian Embassy in Washington to Foreign Ministry, 'Brazil-United States. Brazilian space program. Visit of the chairman of CTA to Brazil.'
This document describes the Computer Technology Associates’ (CTA) interest in investing in Brazil's space sector. In a scheduled visit to Brasília, Tom Velez, CEO at CTA, would discuss his company’s interest in producing 20 communication satellites using Brazilian technology and construction of the proper infrastructures to launch these satellites from CLA.
February 28, 1996
Cable from Brazilian Foreign Ministry to Embassy in Washington, 'Brazil-United States. Visit of the Secretary of State. Non-proliferation.'
This cable reports the visit of the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Brazil. Issues related to non-proliferation dominated the meeting. Christopher emphasized the importance of Brazil strengthening its commitments to non-proliferation norms by signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Brazilian officials expected to improve the dialogue with the US administration after Brazil’s adherence to the MTCR.
March 25, 1996
Cable from Brazilian Embassy in Washington to Foreign Ministry
This document reports the visit of Kenneth Fisher, Lockheed’s representative, to Brasília. During the meeting, Fisher argued that in order for Lockheed to start its operations in Brazil, the company required Brazilian adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime and the consent of the American government.