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  • May 10, 1995

    Summary Report on One-on-One Meeting between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, May 10, 1995, 10:10 a.m.-1:19 p.m., St. Catherine's Hall, the Kremlin

    Yeltsin and Clinton discuss arms control agreements such as START II, the nuclear aspirations of Iran and North Korea, NATO expansion, and other subjects.

  • June 15, 1995

    German Bundestag, 12th Legislative Period, 'Printed Matter 12/5116--Resolution Recommendation and Report of the Foreign Relations Committee (3rd Committee)'

    Resolution for the extension of the Non-proliferation Treaty and setting goals for NPT policy.

  • June 19, 1995

    Saddam Hussein Meeting with Ba’ath Party Members to Discuss the Results of the UN Inspectors’ Mission to Look for WMDs

    Saddam, General Amir, and Party members speculate on various motivations behind a UN plan for monitoring the status of WMD's in Iraq. Saddam states that Iraq possesses no biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, but he is informed that a "traitor" had falsely reported to the UN that Iraq was in the possession of a certain number of missiles. They discuss possible UN conclusions and assumptions regarding WMD's in Iraq.

  • June 29, 1995

    German Bundestag, 13th Legislative Period, 'Response of the Federal Government to the Small Inquiry of the SPD faction—Printed Matter 13/1455—Strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'

    Review of steps taken by the German federal government to limit proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  • July, 1995

    Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Newsbrief, Number 30

    A compilation of the latest news, events, and publications related to nuclear weapons and nuclear non-proliferation. The “Newsbrief” was produced by the PPNN and personally edited by Ben Sanders.

  • July 26, 1995

    Letter, Ben Sanders to Shephard Forman

    Summary of activities of the PPNN and request for further action along with a funding proposal for the Ford Foundation.

  • September 13, 1995

    Aide Memoire, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Support for South African (Avitronics) Bid for the Supply of Electronic Warfare Equipment to Argentine Air Force

    Letter stating that the Department of Foreign Affairs has no political problem with a particular permit being granted.

  • September 14, 1995

    Letter, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Confirmation of Support for Approval of Export/Import Applications'

    Letter to the Chairman of the Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction expressing that the Department of Foreign Affairs has no objection of certain import/export permits for material and technology related to weaponry.

  • October, 1995

    Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Newsbrief, Number 31

    A compilation of the latest news, events, and publications related to nuclear weapons and nuclear non-proliferation. The “Newsbrief” was produced by the PPNN and personally edited by Ben Sanders.

  • October 12, 1995

    Report on the Eighteenth Meeting of the Program for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation ( PPNN) Core Group

    Summarizes events and agenda of the eighteenth meeting of the PPNN Core group including a report on the Consequences of the 1995 NPT conference

  • October 25, 1995

    Letter, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Support of the South African Bid for the Supply of Electronic Warfare Equipment to the Argentine Air Force'

    Director-General writes to the Secretary for Defence to enquire as to whether the South African tender for an electronic warfare equipment deal has been successful. He suspects that the deal has already been won by Israel.

  • December 10, 1995

    State Department Telegram 28705 to US Embassy in India, 'Arrange Wisner-Varma Meeting on Testing Issue'

    Telegram instructing the Charges d'Affairs to arrange an urgent meeting between the United States Ambassador to India and the Indian Prime Minister's Pricipal Secretary to discuss American concerns that India will launch a nuclear test. The State Department was ready for a demarche to the Indian government to express “grave concerns” about the possibility of a test.

  • December 11, 1995

    State Department Telegram 285472 to US Embassy in Tokyo, 'ACDA Director Hollum’s Meeting with Japanese Officials'

    Talking points for Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Hollum from the State Department. Hollum was instructed to “urge” the Japanese to convey their concern to the government of India and “strong opposition [to] any such tests.” The State Department did not want to make any public statements about the situation because that “would be counterproductive,” that is, it would tip the U.S.’s hand Japan to tell Tokyo to voice its concerns over the possible Indian Nuclear Test to New Delhi.

  • December 11, 1995

    Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Memorandum by Robert S. Rochlin, 'Implications of an Indian Nuclear Weapons Test'

    Memo from senior scientist at the ACDA, Robert S. Rochlin, discussing the possible serious political and diplomatic consequences of India launching a nuclear test. In the event that Roa had made a decision to test, the United States did not have enough a“leverage” to encourage a policy reversal or to prevent a regional arms race; Washington would need to organize a “concerted intervention by all the major states.”

  • December 12, 1995

    Email, ITAIN Division Reports to Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, CTB, Nuke, 'Indian Nuclear Update'

    Email from ITAIN Division to Reports to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee regarding the state of India's nuclear reactors. Directed to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the message provides a glimmer of the intelligence watch over the Indian nuclear test site. At least two sites were under observation, one where the mysterious cables had been rearranged, and the other where there was much “personnel activity.” The meaning of the acronym "ITAIN" is presently unknown.

  • December 13, 1995

    Email, ITAIN Division to South Asian Romp n’ Stomp, 'India Update – 19951213'

    Email from ITAIN Division to South Asian Romp n' Stomp regarding the state of cables at an Indian nuclear facility. According to this message, the cable at the test site had changed its shape again, from a thick cable to two smaller connected cables. The “Stemming pile” is a reference to the mound of dirt that would cover the test device once it had been placed in the hole. The meaning of the acronym "ITAIN" is presently unknown, as it the jokey reference to “South Asian Romp n’ Stomp.”

  • December 15, 1995

    Draft State Department Telegram to US Embassy Beijing, 'Possible Indian Nuclear Test'

    The State Department writes to Islamabad urging Pakistan to not react if in fact India chooses to launch a nuclear test. On 15 December the New York Times published a story by Tim Weiner, under the headline “US Suspects India Prepares to Conduct Nuclear Test.” While some Indian journalists and policy experts were convinced that the story was a US government plant, Weiner had simply used due diligence in pursuing a lead from a non-government expert on nuclear proliferation issues. Worried that the story would exacerbate regional tensions by encouraging Pakistan to “act in a manner that jeopardizes our nonproliferation efforts in South Asia,” the Department wanted to enlist the Chinese to encourage the Pakistanis to “exercise restraint in response to these reports.”

  • December 15, 1995

    Talking Points, State Department, South Asian Regional Affairs, 'Additional Testimony and Q’s and A’s for Congressional Briefing'

    State Department talking points for analyzing the issue of a potential Indian Nuclear Test. These talking points review the state of play after Ambassador Wisner’s demarche to the Indian Foreign Ministry. Recognizing Prime Minister Rao’s cautiousness, US government officials did not believe that he had made a decision to test, but they were aware that he was under great pressure to do so. Therefore, the U.S. government was working with allies, encouraging them “to urge India not to test.” Parallel discussions were taking place with the Pakistanis over the production of enriched uranium over above the 3 to five 5 percent level that could be used to fuel nuclear reactors. The Pakistanis were denying that they were producing highly enriched uranium but intelligence reports suggested that they were contemplating such action or had already begun the process.

  • December 15, 1995

    Email, ITAIN Division to South Asian Romp n’ Stomp, 'India Update 19951215'

    A subsequent email from ITAIN Division to South Asian Romp n' Stomp regarding the state of cables at an Indian nuclear facility. US government observers were perplexed (“clear as mud”) by what they saw at the test site—the cables looked different, perhaps because the satellite photography had been taken at a different angle, and the National Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC) was not sure what the explanation was. At Drill Site 3, where much activity had previously been observed, “lotsa trucks and folks” were busy and a “probable satellite television truck” had been deployed. One wit observed that that was for MTV viewing on “long lonely nights.” An alternative interpretation is that the analysts were seeing a digital communications system using small dishes that could send encrypted messages via satellite. The meaning of the acronym "ITAIN" is presently unknown, as it the jokey reference to “South Asian Romp n’ Stomp.

  • December 16, 1995

    Letter from Vitalii Kataev to Malyshev regarding a South Korean Company's Purchase of Russian Helicopters

    This letter, sent to the General Director of Kumertau Aviation, details a South Korean company's proposal to purchase 200 helicopters.