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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • February 13, 1989

    Ciphered Telegram No. 41, Embassy of Hungary in Pakistan to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    Short report on a recent Pakistani missile test based on information from an Indian official. India does not believe Benazir Bhutto's statement that Pakistan's nuclear program is peaceful. Includes speculation on China's involvement in the program. Pakistan has also approached contacts in Hungary about obtaining nuclear technology.

  • February 26, 1989

    Memorandum of Conversation between George H.W. Bush and Zhao Ziyang

    George H.W. Bush and Zhao Ziyang discuss Sino-American relations and China's reform and opening, in addition to the situations in Korea, India, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union.

  • August 10, 1989

    National Intelligence Daily for Thursday, 10 August 1989

    The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 10 August 1989 describes the latest developments in Israel, Lebanon, Iran, Panama, the Soviet Union, China, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Korea, and West Germany.

  • October 24, 1989

    National Intelligence Daily for Tuesday, 24 October 1989

    The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 24 October 1989 describes the latest developments in the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, and Colombia.

  • November 28, 1989

    Ciphered Telegram No. 219, Embassy of Hungary in Pakistan to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    Short report on India's response to Pakistan's purchase of a nuclear reactor from China.

  • December 12, 1989

    Ciphered Telegram No. 227, Embassy of Hungary in Pakistan to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    Short report on talks with the chairman of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission. Pakistan wants to purchase a nuclear power plant control system from Hungary.

  • January 13, 1990

    Department of State, Memorandum from Elizabeth Rindskopf to Mr. Kimmit, 'Pakistan Nuclear-New Trial for Pervez'

    Pervez’s lawyers had mounted an entrapment defense in 1987 and a Supreme Court decision relating to that defense (Matthews vs. United States) case made it possible for Pervez to launch successfully a bid for retrial on all of the counts. After plea bargaining discussions, a trial was avoided when Pervez pleaded nolo contendere to the count of illegal export of beryllium. He was released from prison on 4 April 1990 on the basis of time served.

  • April 10, 1990

    Department of State, Memorandum from Abraham Sofaer to Mr. Kimmit, 'Pakistan Nuclear-Final Resolution of Pervez Case'

    Pervez’s lawyers had mounted an entrapment defense in 1987 and a Supreme Court decision relating to that defense (Matthews vs. United States) case made it possible for Pervez to launch successfully a bid for retrial on all of the counts. After plea bargaining discussions, a trial was avoided when Pervez pleaded nolo contendere to the count of illegal export of beryllium. He was released from prison on 4 April 1990 on the basis of time served.

  • October 26, 1990

    National Intelligence Daily for Friday, 26 October 1990

    The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 26 October 1990 describes the latest developments in Iran, Kuwait, the Soviet Union, Lebanon, Pakistan, New Zealand and Gulf States.

  • May 09, 1991

    National Intelligence Daily for Thursday, 9 May 1991

    The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 9 May 1991 describes the latest developments in Iraq, Kuwait, Israel, Lebanon, the Soviet Union, India, Pakistan, Yemen, Cambodia, the United Nations and Panama.

  • June 27, 1991

    National Intelligence Daily for Thursday, 27 June 1991

    The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for Thursday, 27 June describes the latest developments in Yugoslavia, USSR, Cambodia, Philippines and India.

  • July, 1991

    National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 5-91C, 'Prospects for Special Weapons Proliferation and Control'

    With the term “weapons of mass destruction” having not yet fully come into general usage, this NIE used the term “special weapons” to describe nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (formerly the term “special weapons” was sometimes used to describe nuclear weapons only). With numerous excisions, including the names of some countries in the sections on “East Asia and the Pacific” and “Central America,” this wide-ranging estimate provides broad-brushed, sometimes superficial, pictures of the situations in numerous countries along with coverage of international controls to halt sensitive technology exports to suspect countries.

  • July 25, 1991

    National Intelligence Daily for Thursday, 25 July 1991

    The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 25 July 1991 describes the latest developments in Iraq, Kuwait, the Soviet Union, Israel, Lebanon, ASEAN, South Africa, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Pakistan and Middle East.

  • December 15, 1995

    Draft State Department Telegram to US Embassy Beijing, 'Possible Indian Nuclear Test'

    The State Department writes to Islamabad urging Pakistan to not react if in fact India chooses to launch a nuclear test. On 15 December the New York Times published a story by Tim Weiner, under the headline “US Suspects India Prepares to Conduct Nuclear Test.” While some Indian journalists and policy experts were convinced that the story was a US government plant, Weiner had simply used due diligence in pursuing a lead from a non-government expert on nuclear proliferation issues. Worried that the story would exacerbate regional tensions by encouraging Pakistan to “act in a manner that jeopardizes our nonproliferation efforts in South Asia,” the Department wanted to enlist the Chinese to encourage the Pakistanis to “exercise restraint in response to these reports.”

  • December 15, 1995

    Talking Points, State Department, South Asian Regional Affairs, 'Additional Testimony and Q’s and A’s for Congressional Briefing'

    State Department talking points for analyzing the issue of a potential Indian Nuclear Test. These talking points review the state of play after Ambassador Wisner’s demarche to the Indian Foreign Ministry. Recognizing Prime Minister Rao’s cautiousness, US government officials did not believe that he had made a decision to test, but they were aware that he was under great pressure to do so. Therefore, the U.S. government was working with allies, encouraging them “to urge India not to test.” Parallel discussions were taking place with the Pakistanis over the production of enriched uranium over above the 3 to five 5 percent level that could be used to fuel nuclear reactors. The Pakistanis were denying that they were producing highly enriched uranium but intelligence reports suggested that they were contemplating such action or had already begun the process.

  • 1999

    Dossiers of political parties intent on exporting an Islamic revolution

    A Dossier reviewing the origins and policies of Islamic political parties, including: The Organization of Fighters of Afghanistan for Islam, The Movement of the Islamic Revolution (DIR), The Council of Islamic Accord (SIS), The Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (IDA), The United Front of the Islamic Revolution (OFIR), The Corps of Guardians of the Islamic Jihad of Afghanistan (KSIRA), The Party of Victory (“Nasr”), The Party of Allah (“Hezbe Allah”).

  • May, 1999

    Report, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Z Division, 'Challenges of Advanced Nuclear Weapon Development in Pakistan'

    This study, even more heavily redacted than the Z Division study on India (November 1988), examined the status of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon status, and number of other topics (deleted from the table of contents), and policy implications. The Joint Special Operations Command is among the agencies on the distribution list. As the report is a “Gamma Controlled Item,” some of the excisions relate to communications intelligence information.

  • April, 2004

    KGB Active Measures in Southwest Asia in 1980-82

    Materials provided by former KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin to CWIHP, following the publication of the Working Paper No. 40, "The KGB in Afghanistan." As with all Mitrokhin’s notes, his compilation on Soviet “active measures” in South and Southwest Asia is based on other smuggled-out notes and was prepared especially for CWIHP. Please read the Notes on Sources for information on the nature and limitations of these documents.

  • June, 2007

    An Illegal Trainer (KGB history of agent "Halef"). Folder 60. The Chekist Anthology.

    Describes training techniques used by the KGB in logistical preparation of their operatives for assignments abroad. This article focuses on the employment history of the KGB agent codenamed “Halef.” Between 1955 and 1967, Halef was stationed in Hong Kong and Tokyo. In 1967, due to his insignificant feedback and a weak performance as a field operative, Halef was transferred back as a trainer. As a trainer, Halef traveled extensively. While in the United States, the KGB developed a fictitious identity for Halef – a so-called legend-biography – in case his activity aroused suspicion and he were detained by authorities. In the United States, France and Mexico, Halef’s objectives included developing and testing means of communication with the KGB, which could be used to inform the KGB of an operative’s arrival to and departure from a country, request a meeting, or announce an emergency. In addition to assessing the existing signal language used among operatives, the KGB also instructed Halef to collect the data necessary to set up new surveillance locations in a number of countries. In 1977, Halef was performing assignments in Pakistan and Burma. In 1978, he and his wife were engaged in assignments throughout the USSR. From the USSR, they were relocated to the GDR and then to Bulgaria, where they boarded a cruise ship going from Varny to Suhumi to survey the ports of the Black Sea basin. Traveling through Odessa, Halef photographed military vessels and observed the procedures of the border patrol and customs officers.