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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • June, 2007

    The Telegram "Dogma." Folder 50. The Chekist Anthology

    According to Mitrokhin, in 1979 KGB headquarters sent a telegram to its residencies abroad stating that Soviet intelligentsia, the American embassy in Moscow, and foreign correspondents who were accredited to work in the Soviet Union, had been holding anti-soviet activities. The telegram text, which is provided by Mitrokhin in his entry, states that Kopalev, Chukovskaya, Kornilov, Vladimov, and Vojnovich were expelled from the U.S.S.R. Union of Writers for their anti-socialist publications. However, after this incident they started to gain influence among Soviet writers and many anti-soviet materials were published, which led to publication of the almanac “Metropol.” The American embassy assisted the publication by organizing events with influential intelligentsia of the West who inspired Soviet writers in favor of capitalism. Mitrokhin states that KGB officials ordered all residencies to immediately stop these activities. It was planned to publish provocative materials about all Western supporters of the almanac. KGB residencies in the West were in charge of collecting these materials.

  • June, 2007

    Association of the United Postwar Immigrants. Folder 52. The Chekist Anthology.

    In this entry Mitrokhin provides an example of methods the KGB used to make foreign intelligence services distrust Soviet anti-socialist organizations. Mitrokhin cites the case of the Association of the United Soviet Postwar Immigrants. According to Mitrokhin, the head of the organization was a former citizen of the Soviet Union, but after WWII he stayed in Western Germany and had been actively promoting anti-socialist ideology among immigrants. Mitrokhin does not provide his real name, but uses his KGB codename “Konstantinov.” According to Mitrokhin, in February of 1963 the KGB sent counterfeit documents to West German counter-intelligence stating that “Konstantinov” had been an active KGB spy since WWII. The KGB also sent letters in the name of Association of United Soviet Postwar Immigrants to National Alliance of Russian Solidarists stating that the officials of the latter organization are “politically bankrupt” and that they were no longer able to promote anti-socialist ideology. The KGB residency in Belgium prepared a flyer with false information stating that the Association of United Soviet Postwar Immigrants was a corrupt institution whose president used its funds for personal use. According to Mitrokhin, the reputation of the Association of United Soviet Postwar Immigrants was destroyed and no longer remained influential.

  • June, 2007

    Kompromats. Folder 34. The Chekist Anthology.

    June 01 2007 - In this entry Mitrokhin explains the importance of having kompromats (a form of grey propaganda used in information warfare against opponents in business and politics) for Soviet anti-socialist activists. Mitrokhin provides two examples of KGB kompromats that played significant roles in repressing oppositionists. In late 1960s the Ukrainian nationalist movement had been growing in popularity. Ivanchenko was one of the radicals who allowed himself to publicly criticize Soviet policies and claimed that Ukraine faced Russification. He organized a club that promoted anti-socialist philosophy. All these facts of his biography were documented by the KGB. Mitrokhin states that Ivanchenko knew many influential Ukrainian nationalists very well. His connections were critical to the KGB. According to Mitrokhin, in 1970 he was blackmailed by the KGB. They used a kompromat: either Ivanchenko became their undercover agent and helped them to fight the anti-socialist movement or he would be excluded from the university and charged for his ideological crimes. Ivanchenko was recruited and his new codename was “Nikolai.” In another example of kompromat Mitrokhin states that in the second half of 1972 Jewish population in Odessa started an opposition movement against the Soviet immigration policies. One of their leaders, Emmanuel Pekar, was once arrested at the Odessa market for selling watches of foreign origin; however he was not charged. Mitrokhin states that Pekar was offered a choice—to become a KGB undercover agent in the Jewish community or go to trial for speculation. Pekar was recruited and his new codename was “Milan.”

  • June, 2007

    The USSR-France Society. Folder 71. The Chekist Anthology

    This note describes the relations between the U.S.S.R. – France Society and the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (SSOD). According to Mitrokhin, SSOD was founded in 1958 as a public organization for intellectuals interested in Soviet studies. However, the U.S.S.R. – France Society served as a cover institution for KGB agents. Although the multi-national organization was a threat to leaks of confidential information, undercover agents used the relations between the two organizations to establish connections with diplomats, the heads of influential clubs, journalists, and scientists. It was convenient for KGB agents to organize events to promote political goals. Because of the relations developed as a result of these activities, the KGB residency prevented a number of anti-socialist decisions.

  • June, 2007

    Agent Reports. Procedural guidance on the form of agent reports in criminal cases. Folder 10. The Chekist Anthology.

    This document outlines the limits and requirements of an agent’s engagement in the implementation of given objectives. The limits of an agent’s participation in a criminal investigation are set by an operative responsible for a particular case. Taking into account concrete circumstances of each assignment, the operative determines proper format of an agent report in order to fully detail all relevant information. The primary requirement of agent reports is to capture the circumstances, connections, and function of persons and events under investigation. Agent reports must be comprehensive, complete and objective. In criminal cases, every agent must conduct a deep examination of one’s lifestyle, behavior, habits, psychological condition, peer pressure, facial expressions and intonation. Agent reports are attached to an agent’s Working and Personal files. When an agent is relocated to a different KGB center, the reports included in the Working file remain in the original center for 10 years, while his or her Personal file is sent to a new location, where a new Working file is created.

  • June, 2007

    Actions to Promote Discord. Folder 90. The Chekist Anthology.

    Contains information on active measures undertaken by the KGB residency in Ankara, Turkey during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. The residency carried out active measures to destabilize Turkey’s military regime, undermine US military personnel’s sense of security through the publication of threatening leaflets, inflame the rivalry between Greece and Turkey, and foster anti-American sentiments. Mitrokhin provides detailed descriptions of several operations involving altered or fabricated personal correspondence, as well as newspaper articles written by, or ‘inspired’ by KGB agents or confidential contacts. The KGB residency claimed that these operations resulted in, among other things, the removal of Foreign Minister Nuri Birgi from office, and the expulsion of several American diplomats for allegedly interfering with Turkish elections.

  • June, 2007

    The Case of Zinovyeva and Others, 1972. Folder 23. The Chekist Anthology

    Mitrokhin describes KGB reports on slanderous and politically harmful material disseminated in Kaluga Oblast.

  • June, 2007

    The Conrad Case. Folder 72. The Chekist Anthology

    In this folder Mitrokhin describes the work experience of German KGB agent Conrad (codename “Gregor”), his experience as a spy, involvement with communist parties in different countries, and activities as the head of military sabotage groups in Western Europe.

  • June, 2007

    The Kardinal and Mavr Case. Folder 94. The Chekist Anthology.

    In this entry, Mitrokhin draws upon KGB files to describe “Kardinal” (formerly “Lord”)-Lothar Schwartz (b. 1928), a member of the Socialist Democratic Party of Germany, and a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

  • June, 2007

    The Ref Case. Folder 68. The Chekist Anthology.

    Drawing upon KGB files, Mitrokhin presents a profile of Marcel Laufer “Ref,” a Uruguayan citizen of Jewish ancestry and a special agent of the KGB.

  • June, 2007

    Neutralizing of Dissidents’ Activities in the 1970s. Folder 49. The Chekist Anthology

    In this entry Mitrokhin describes dissidents’ activities in the Soviet Union and KGB attempts to stop them.

  • June, 2007

    The Sakharov-Bonner Case. Folder 44. The Chekist Anthology.

    In this folder Mitrokhin provides a detailed history of Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner’s anti-socialist activities in the Soviet Union as well as their achievements and failures.

  • June, 2007

    The KGB of the Ukrainian SSR. Annual review by V.V. Fedorchuk of counter-intelligence operations in 1970. Folder 16. The Chekist Anthology.

    Annual review presented by V.V. Fedorchuk, chairman of the KGB in the Ukrainian SSR, summarizes the main successes, failures, and future priorities of the KGB in 1971.

  • June, 2007

    Signs of Anti-Sovietism, 1972. Folder 21. The Chekist Anthology

    On December 25, 1972 Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council granted the KGB authority to issue official warnings. The goal of the warnings was to prevent activities that threatened national security. Mitrokhin’s notes demonstrate that they were not intended as a punishment or penalty. The order of the Presidium provided for the use of the official warnings as a preventative measure.

  • June, 2007

    The Skeptic Case. Folder 54. The Chekist Anthology.

    In this entry, Mitrokhin draws upon KGB sources to describe Boris Yakovlevich Krilov (“Maximilian”), an agent from the KGB’s First Chief Directorate, who was responsible for the surveillance of Soviet citizens. Maximilian’s duties led him to investigate a certain Nikitin about whom the latter compiled the following entry.

  • June, 2007

    The Richard Zorge Case. Folder 59. The Chekist Anthology

    In this entry, Mitrokhin recounts how during the 1960s the leadership of the KGB had shown its Dzerzhinsky Central Club agents a 2-part French movie entitled “Who Are You, Doctor Zorge?” A Soviet spy, Zorge aroused much interest within the ranks of the KGB. Drawing upon KGB files, Mitrokhin states how Zakharov, the Deputy Director of the KGB, consequently issued an order to prepare a report on Zorge.

  • June, 2007

    Non-conformism. Evolution of the 'democratic movement' as a politically harmful process since the mid-1950s. Folder 9. The Chekist Anthology.

    In this transcript, Mitrokhin points out that according to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) bourgeois ideology affected cohesion of the Soviet society in three major ways: 1) by creating opposition and manipulating people’s personal weaknesses in order to pull apart the Soviet organism; 2) by inflaming disputes between younger and older generations, members of intelligentsia and working class; 3) by building up everyday propagandist pressure.

  • June, 2007

    The Nationalism Case. Folder 57. The Chekist Anthology.

    In this entry, Mitrokhin expresses the KGB’s views on the threat of organized oppositionist nationalism within the Soviet bloc.

  • June, 2007

    The KGB vs. Vatican City. Folder 29. The Chekist Anthology.

    In this entry Mitrokhin describes the history of chilly diplomatic relations between the KGB and Vatican City from the 1960s through the mid 1980s.

  • 2008

    Interview with Former Romanian Foreign Minister, Corneliu Mănescu, Regarding the Romanian Delegation’s Over-Flight of China and Visit to Moscow During the Cuban Missile Crisis (excerpts)

    Former Romanian Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu discusses an incident involving the flight of a Romanian delegation over Chinese territory just prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Manescu reports that at the time, Romanian leader Gheorghiu-Dej interpreted miscommunication regarding their flightplan as a Soviet attempt on his life. He also discusses the Romanian response to the Cuban Missile Crisis.