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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • April 15, 1971

    Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to Melvin R. Laird and William P. Rogers, 'Military Cooperation with France, NSDM’s 103 and 104'

    Kissinger sends a follow up memorandum to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense regarding NSDM 103 and 104, on military assistance to the French nuclear program. Kissinger reiterates the classified nature of these decisions to offer aid and instructs them to inform the French "as soon as possible." They must also prepare guidelines for use in the event that the assistance becomes public.

  • July 21, 1971

    Memorandum for President Nixon from Kissinger, "Berlin Negotiations: The Unresolved Issues"

    National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger updates President Nixon on the status of the Four Power Berlin negotiations between the Soviet Union, East Germany, West Germany, and the United States, focusing on unresolved issues on which the four states were unable to agree.

  • November 19, 1971

    South African Nuclear Fuel Agreement

    U.S. State Department memorandum weighing the arguments for and against renewing the agreement to sell uranium enrichment services to South Africa. The political fallout from engaging with the South African apartheid regime coupled with the fact that they had not signed the NPT were closely considered.

  • March 21, 1972

    Memorandum of Conversation between Chairman Mao Zedong and President Richard Nixon

    Mao Zedong and Richard Nixon focus on "philosophic problems" in relations between China and the United States during their first meeting.

  • March 22, 1972

    Memorandum of Conversation between Richard Nixon and Zhou Enlai

  • July 04, 1972

    Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, 'Proposed NSSM on the Implications of an Indian Nuclear Test,' with cover memorandum from Richard T. Kennedy

    National security assistant Henry Kissinger asks President Nixon to approve a proposal for a national security study memorandum [NSSM] on the implications of an Indian nuclear test for U.S. interests.

  • January 16, 1973

    H. Daniel Brewster to Herman Pollack, 'Indian Nuclear Developments'

    The interagency group prepared a response to NSSM 156 on 1 September 1972 and it was sent to Kissinger. The summary of the study reproduced here includes the conclusion that an Indian test would be “a set-back to nonproliferation efforts” and that Washington should “do what [it] can to avert or delay” one. Thus, recommendations included a number of unilateral and multilateral actions that the United States government could take, noting that “given the poor state” of Indo-American relations, an “overly visible” U.S. effort would more likely speed up an Indian decision to test a device, Even non-US efforts were likely not to “be per se effective.”

  • February 23, 1973

    Letters between Ahmet H. Ozbudun, C.V. Narasimhan, and Robert Muller

    Ozbudun sends Narasimhan a report on ROK foreign policy and National Assembly elections.

  • July 27, 1973

    Memorandum of Conversation with Robert Galley, July 27, 1973

    Transcript of a conversation between French Minister of Armed Forces Galley and U.S. officials, including Kissinger and Schlesinger. Galley says that the French are making progress and have benefited from their talks with Foster. Kissinger notes that the U.S. has a “cooperative spirit” with regards to French foreign policy. Galley notes the advances that have been made by the French and asks for aid with modernization of their forces to bring the French to the same level as the U.S., specifically in regards to missile hardening, underground testing, and submarines, among others. Kissinger notes that now that the French have missile technology, it is in the best interest of the U.S. that it be effective and not become irrelevant, but there is strong opposition not only from abroad but at home, as well. Kissinger wants to know how long the French can keep their advances a secret, and Galley notes that many things have already been kept secret and can continue to be kept as such. They end the discussion with talks about meeting again sometime in August.

  • August 09, 1973

    Memorandum of Conversation, 'French Nuclear Discussion'

    Transcript of conversation between Kissinger and Schlesinger. Kissinger wants to make Galley "drool" by keeping him interested without actually giving anything up. Kissinger worries about what the British want in terms of Polaris and notes that putting the French on the same footing as the U.S. would scare the British enough to get their point across.

  • August 17, 1973

    Memorandum of Conversation, 'Visit of French Defense Minister Galley; Strategic Programs'

    Kissinger wants to help the French without giving them too much. Foster thinks that the French have the worst missile program in the world, while the Chinese have the best. He thinks the best thing we can do is to look at their designs and offer suggestions, especially in regards to forming their objectives and planning how to meet them. Foster notes that any help we give to the French is perceived as a full commitment, so Kissinger warns that we must remain “cold-blooded.”

  • August 30, 1973

    Scowcroft to Kissinger on the Meeting with Galley

    Scowcroft briefs Kissinger for his meeting with Galley. This lengthy document includes information on what the French are specifically asking for, the outline for the meeting (as proposed by Kissinger, himself), Foster’s notes for the meeting expanded, and a reminder to discuss underground testing.

  • August 31, 1973

    Memorandum of Conversation with Robert Galley, August 31, 1973

    Discussion between Galley and Blancard with Kissinger, Foster and Sonnenfeldt held in secret. Kissigner wishes to give the strategic assessment of France followed by Foster’s specific observances. Kissinger notes that the Soviets are expanding rapidly, and there is a need for a warning system. They discuss the importance of building up a deterrent, and the U.S. thinks it is feasible to assist the French in this regard. The French are asking for clarifications and information on MIRV and MRV. Kissinger discusses how these exchanges are not going through the normal channels, stressing the need for secrecy, though Congressional approval may be needed for some points, and they conclude by setting up a time for Foster to come to France.

  • September 05, 1973

    Memorandum of Conversation—Kissinger and Schlesinger

    Kissinger and Schlesinger discuss possible concessions to France in light of potential changes in their government. Other topics of discussion include foreign relations with the Middle East, MIRV, and security in Europe.

  • November 12, 1973

    Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong and Henry Kissinger

    Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai. The three discussed a large range of topics from Sino-Soviet relations to the Middle East to the influence of Chinese communism.

  • December 03, 1973

    Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger from Richard H. Solomon, “The Korean Situation and the China Element"

    National Security Council staff member Richard H. Solomon advises Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to work with the Chinese in order to respond to North Korea's provocations along the Northern Limit Line

  • December 04, 1973

    Note of Conversation between Richard Nixon and Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu

  • December 04, 1973

    Memorandum of Conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu and President Nixon

    Ceasescu, Nixon and Kissinger discuss issues ranging from European security to the situation in the Middle East.

  • December 22, 1973

    Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger from John A. Froebe, Jr., “Korean West Coast Island Situation"

    John A. Froebe, Jr., briefs Henry Kissinger on the Northern Limit Line Dispute.

  • March 25, 1974

    Report, National Security Council Under Secretaries’ Committee, 'Action Plan for Implementing NSDM 235'

    An interagency NSC sub-committee was exploring the problem of safeguards for sensitive nuclear exports. The problem was that an existing group, the Zangger Committee based on NPT membership, did not have a broad enough membership or scope to manage the problem and that France did not belong to the Zanggger Committee.. Under Secretaries Committee proposed “talks with other suppliers of technology and equipment in the reprocessing and enrichment fields on desirable new constraints or guidelines that should be followed.”