Search in
ADD SEARCH FILTER CANCEL SEARCH FILTER

Digital Archive International History Declassified

SEARCH RESULTS

  • November 13, 1978

    'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy Belgium cable 21508 to State Department

    Belgian response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear developement, agreeing to cooperate fully.

  • October 22, 1979

    Memorandum of conversation between Dutch Defense Minister Willem Scholten and US Deputy National Security Advisor David Aaron

    A conversation between Dutch Defense Minister Scholten and US Deputy National Security Advisor Aaron in which Aaron outlines and defends the United States' views of the Netherlands' position on TNF modernization.

  • December 04, 1979

    Memorandum of conversation between Dutch Prime-Minister Van Agt and Belgian Prime-Minister Wilfried Martens

    Van Agt and Martens discuss how their positions on TNF modernization are being affected by coalition politics within their respective legislatures.

  • December 05, 1979

    Exchange of notes, Defense Minister Scholten (also to other NATO Defense ministers) – British Defense Secretary for Defense

    Defense Minister Scholten writes to other NATO Defense Ministers to clarify the position of the Netherlands on TNF modernization. He focuses on issues related to the size of the modernization program, which in its current state he fears is too large, and also the possibility of separating the issues of making a decision on modernization and then implementing it. The British Defense Secretary then writes to refute each of his concerns on the wider issue of TNF modernization. An addendum focuses more specifically on the issues relating to the Netherlands.

  • December 10, 1979

    Major points from the discussions in Brussels, Rome, London, Washington, Bonn

    An outline of key points made in each of several meetings over a one week period. Includes the following: the Netherlands and Belgium will try to decide as late and as simultaneously as possible on TNF modernization; Italy will try to help the Dutch influence FRG and U.S. positions; U.K. is committed to helping Dutch cabinet remain intact; FRG does not oppose the Dutch move to delay their decision but also believes Netherlands should not try to block NATO decision-making.

  • December 11, 1979

    Result deliberations Belgian core-cabinet

    Information obtained by the Dutch government regarding Belgian discussions on the modernization of NATO’s intermediate nuclear weapons. The Belgian cabinet agrees that TNF should be linked with arms negotiations, with a reevalutation of progress every 6 months used to direct modernization, in order to guarantee the lowest possible level of military balancing.

  • 1983

    The Secret Armenian Army

    Report on the Armenian Secret Army's locations across the Middle East, Europe, and other parts of the globe.

  • November 15, 1984

    Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'European cooperation in the field of armaments'

    This analysis focuses on the state of European security cooperation, discussing both common defense and coordination of military production. It criticizes the lack of unity, complexity of the current configuration, and its negative impact on transatlantic relations.

  • December 13, 1984

    Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Ministerial session of the Atlantic Council (Bruxelles, 13th-14th December, 1984). Security problems'

    Overview of the key security issues facing the Alliance in preparation for the December 1984 meeting in Brussels. The document discusses the state of Alliance, conventional and nuclear weapons, and the installment of INF in Europe, focusing on the potential for continuing East-West dialogue around disarmament.

  • March, 1985

    Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'The Libyan Nuclear Program: A Technical Perspective'

    For years, U.S. intelligence agencies did not take seriously Muammar Gaddafi’s efforts to develop a Libyan nuclear capability and this report provides early evidence of the perspective that the Libyan program “did not know what it was doing.” According to the CIA, the program’s “serious deficiencies,” including “poor leadership” and lack of both “coherent planning” and trained personnel made it “highly unlikely the Libyans will achieve a nuclear weapons capability within the next 10 years.” The Libyan effort was in such a “rudimentary stage” that they were trying to acquire any technology that would be relevant to producing plutonium or enriched uranium.

  • October 15, 1985

    Brussels: Notes for talks with Secretary Shultz

    Strongly worded notes regarding the Italian actions during the Crisis of Sigonella. The brief document reiterates Italy's version of the facts related to the hijacking of Achille Lauro and the events that followed, denying any wrongdoing, and blaming the US for unlawful actions.

  • December 09, 1985

    Letter by Minister of Foreign Affairs Andreotti to West German Minister of Foreign Affaris Genscher

    Foreign Minister of Italy, Giulio Andreotti wishes to exchange views with his German counterpart Genscher about the research phase of the SDI project, to try and find common ground before continuing talks with the United States on the subject of industrial cooperation in SDI research.

  • December 12, 1985

    Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'FNI negotiations - Assessments of the American negotiator, Ambassador Glitman'

    A brief report by US Ambassador Glitman regarding the INF negotiations with the USSR. There is an increased willingness to negotiate, and the parties have come closer in some aspects, but major differences still persist.

  • December 12, 1985

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'East-West relations'

    This document analyzes East-West relations following the December 1985 meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in Geneva. It discusses the new and more open foreign policy line of the Soviet Union, and underlines the important role of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy under the complex circumstances.

  • December 13, 1986

    Telegram by Permanent Representative to NATO Fulci, 'Ministerial Session of the Atlantic Council - Point II of the agenda. Discussion in restricted session about the prospects on East-West relations in the post-Reykjavik scenario'

    The document discusses the internal debate caused by Schultz's address at the Atlantic Council of Ministers. NATO countries are divided into two camps regarding the strategy and pace of nuclear disarmament and reduction talks.

  • November 06, 1987

    Telegram by Permanent Representative to NATO Fulci to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'NPG, Point II-A of the agenda (implementation of the decision of 12th December 1979: State of deployments)'

    The telegram compiles updates from Defence Ministers (UK, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy) on the status of deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles decided in December 1979.

  • March 05, 1988

    Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'NATO summit in Bruxelles (2nd-3rd March 1988)'

    The document describes the Declaration produced at the meeting of Heads of state and governments in Brussels. The declaration reaffirms solidarity between the Western allies and the essential nature of the transatlantic relations in managing security and disarmament.

  • September 08, 1989

    Ambassadors’ Conference at the Austrian Foreign Ministry, Vienna

    Summary of discussion between Austrian Foreign Minister Erich Maximilian Schmid and ambassadors from Belgium, Finland, Yugoslavia, Luxembourg, and Sweden about the state of Eastern Europe, the decline of the arms race, and Western reactions to German Reunification.

  • June, 2007

    Association of the United Postwar Immigrants. Folder 52. The Chekist Anthology.

    In this entry Mitrokhin provides an example of methods the KGB used to make foreign intelligence services distrust Soviet anti-socialist organizations. Mitrokhin cites the case of the Association of the United Soviet Postwar Immigrants. According to Mitrokhin, the head of the organization was a former citizen of the Soviet Union, but after WWII he stayed in Western Germany and had been actively promoting anti-socialist ideology among immigrants. Mitrokhin does not provide his real name, but uses his KGB codename “Konstantinov.” According to Mitrokhin, in February of 1963 the KGB sent counterfeit documents to West German counter-intelligence stating that “Konstantinov” had been an active KGB spy since WWII. The KGB also sent letters in the name of Association of United Soviet Postwar Immigrants to National Alliance of Russian Solidarists stating that the officials of the latter organization are “politically bankrupt” and that they were no longer able to promote anti-socialist ideology. The KGB residency in Belgium prepared a flyer with false information stating that the Association of United Soviet Postwar Immigrants was a corrupt institution whose president used its funds for personal use. According to Mitrokhin, the reputation of the Association of United Soviet Postwar Immigrants was destroyed and no longer remained influential.

  • June, 2007

    Non-conformism. Evolution of the 'democratic movement' as a politically harmful process since the mid-1950s. Folder 9. The Chekist Anthology.

    In this transcript, Mitrokhin points out that according to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) bourgeois ideology affected cohesion of the Soviet society in three major ways: 1) by creating opposition and manipulating people’s personal weaknesses in order to pull apart the Soviet organism; 2) by inflaming disputes between younger and older generations, members of intelligentsia and working class; 3) by building up everyday propagandist pressure.