July 24, 1963
Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 24 July 1963
Boissevain reports on Fidel Castro. During a banquet held by the Egyptian ambassador, Castro speaks to Swiss Ambassador Masset of a decision to nationalize the former building of the U.S. embassy, currently in use by the Swiss embassy acting as U.S. representatives. Castro is noted as having "the air of one who is boasting to a trusted friend about how he has crossed an opponent." Boissevain thinks it best to keep on Castro's good side and requests an illustrated work of the Netherlands to be sent as a gesture of goodwill.
August 16, 1963
Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Reinink), 16 August 1963
Reinink writes to Amsterdam on the current situation in Havana. There is positive press about the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, it's more a case of lip service to the Soviet Union than genuine enthusiasm from the Cuban Socialist Party. The "new communists" especially have strong reservations about the treaty, and have cast aspersions on Nikita Khrushchev for reaching an agreement with Washington. More than half of the party leadership share this opinion, according to Reinink. Cuba's leadership is now more falling in line with China and Mao Zedong than with the Soviet Union.
September 19, 1963
Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana, 19 September 1963
This letter concerns Cuba's political and economic isolation. Castro has attempted to repair relations with the capitalist countries to no avail, and the author relates his/her own experiences with Castro. Che Guevara, Cuba's Minister of Industry, approached the author and staff asking for economic assistance in the form of trade. The author relates how he has submitted a request to a high standing industry in the Netherlands if supplies can be shipped to Cuba.
November 01, 1963
Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 1 November 1963
Van Roijen writes to Amsterdam from Washington on a meeting between him and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Rusk says there are now no more Soviet military personnel stationed in Cuba, although there are still technicians and instructors remaining. The belief is those too will soon leave after training the Cuban forces has completed. Rusk notes the icy relations between Moscow and Havana now, notably regarding Castro's refusal to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
November 11, 1963
Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Pos), 11 November 1963
R.H. Pos, the Dutch Ambassador to Cuba, writes home to Amsterdam reporting on attempts at espionage in the Dutch Embassy. The gardener reported to the Embassy staff that he was invited to take a seat in an automobile used by the Cuban secret service. He was asked by the Cuban government to observe which Cubans and foreigners frequent the Dutch Embassy. He refused them point blank, which the Dutch Embassy thanked.
February 25, 1964
Foreign Ministry Report on Bulgarian-Cuban Cultural Relations
Deputy Minister Gero Grozev advises the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Committee for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries on cultural relations with Cuba. Based on the current political situation Grozev argues that Bulgaria should postpone developing a cultural center in Havana.
June 15, 1964
Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Reinink), 15 June 1964
First Secretary of the Dutch Embassy in Cuba, K.W. Reinink sends a cable to Amsterdam concerning a talk with Fidel Castro. Among the issues discussed are Dutch-Cuban relations, Cuban industrial development, the economic conditions of Cuba and the sugar trade.
March 01, 1965
Statement of Raul Castro Ruz Pertaining to Cuba’s Minister of Industry, Ernesto "Che" Guevara
In a conversation between Kliszko and Raul Castro, a referral was made to the position assumed by the Minister of Industry in Cuba, Ernesto Guevara, at the economic seminar of Afro-Asian countries in Algeria in February 1965. Castro stated that he was not prepared to discuss the essence of the issue, e.g. the extent of aid from socialist countries to developing countries, but he felt Guevara's comments were extreme and out-of-place at the seminar.
March 20, 1965
Minutes of Conversation between Cuban Defense Minister Raúl Castro and Polish Leader Władysław Gomułka, Warsaw, 20 March 1965
During his visit in Poland, Castro relates Cuba's position on a conversation taken place in Moscow and why it may be of interest to the Cubans. Gomulka raises the issue of the missiles. In Gomulka's opinion two factors were decisive: contradictions which arose within the socialist camp and the policy which was conducted by Khrushchev. Gomulka is assured that US is capable of conducting a war with Cuba by way of conventional weapons, it does not have to use nuclear weapons. It is clear that the socialist camp and the USSR cannot defend Cuba in any other way but by using nuclear weapons. If a conflict is meant to be, then it will be a nuclear conflict, there is no other way. Gomulka further raises a question whether to go into a nuclear war or not. Castro disagrees with a manner nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Cuba by Soviets. Khruchshev explained that he did not have time. Per Gomulka, Khrushchev conducted a policy which was not thought-out and which was all-out. Gomulka further discusses his talks with Chinese and Vietnamese comrades re: nuclear weapons issue.
March 22, 1965
Conversation between Raul Castro Ruz, and a member of the Polish Politburo, Cde. Zenon Kliszko
During a trip from Orneta to Katowice, Raul Castro and Zenon Kliszko had conversation on the following topics: (1) assessment of the position of the Italian Communist Party, (2)assessment of the position of the Romanian Workers’ Party, (3) the UPSR and other Communist Parties in Asia, and (4) the Matter of a Former Member of the National Leadership UPSR – J. Ordoqui. For the Polish side, the program of the Italian Communist Party is not clear, particularly with regard to the question of establishing a uniform workers’ party.
March 25, 1965
Conversation between Raul Castro Ruz, and a Member of the Polish Politburo, Zenon Kliszko
The conversation between Castro and Gomulka took place on the initiative of Castro. Parties discussed the following topics: (1) relations between the UPSR and the PUWP, (2) the issue of the legalization of the Cuban Revolution, (3) the Situation in Vietnam, (4) Cuba and the Current Situation in Latin America, (5) the position of the PUWP with regard to the conference of 81 parties, and (6) the attitude of the socialist camp towards Cuba.
January 11, 1967
Cooperation between the Czechoslovak and Cuban Intelligence Services
The report introduces Czechoslovak's assistance in the Operation MANUEL after the isolation of socialist Castro regime. Cuba looked for alternative routes in Europe in order to promote and influence the revolutionary movement in Latin America. Czechoslovakia assistance in the operation is of a strictly technical nature and its intelligence service is doing its utmost to protect the interests of the country by securing all technical matters. The report says that terminating the assistance was not possible for both practical and political reasons-- all direct flights between Czechoslovakia and Cuba would be suspended and a drastic cooling off of relations between two governments. Czechoslovak's refusal in assisting the operation would be interpreted as a political decision to suspend assistance to the national liberation movement in Latin America countries. However, the reports says that the assistance of Czechoslovak intelligence service to the operation is in no way amounts to agreeing with its political content and constitutes a minor aspect of intelligence work. The Soviet intelligence was also involved in organizing the operation in Moscow and offered assistance to its Cuban counterpart.
November 17, 1967
Operation MANUEL: Origins, Development and Aims
Comrade Josef Houska submits a document concerning issues related to cooperation with the Cuban intelligence service especially the Operation MANUEL to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Operational MANUEL started in 1962 when the Cuban intelligence asked the Czechoslovak resident in Havana to arrange a transit through Prague for Venezuelan nationals who underwent guerrilla training in Cuba. In 1964 talks were held between Cuban and Czechoslovak intelligence services but no formal agreement of the tasks and responsibilities was concluded between the two. The Soviet government was informed about the Operation MANUEL and stated its agreement with the project. Houska says that the main objective of the operation is the education and training of revolutionary cadres from Latin America and the organization of combat groups. Participants of the operation were not confined to cadres from among the ranks of communist parties but also included members from various nationalist and anti-American groupings. The routes of individual participants in the operation were determined by the Cuban intelligence service who mainly directed the Operation MANUEL. Houska says problems that arisen in the course of the operation were solved in collaboration with Cuban and the Soviet authorities. The document cautioned about counter-espionage institutions' increasing interests in the operation and the fact that the US intelligence service agents were among the operation participants. Houska says refusal to offer assistance would have a negative impact on Cuba and Czechoslovakia would lose control over the operation.