Special dossier containing a resolution to send a Soviet geological prospecting party to survey North Korea for beryllium.

Resolution establishing Design Bureau No.11 (KB-11), which was the Soviet analog of the secret wartime American nuclear weapons laboratory at Los Alamos, New Mexico.

Council of Ministers decree on the formation of the postwar Soviet missile industry.

Resolution outlining the work of the newly established Design Bureau No.11 (KB-11). Atomic bombs are referred to in the resolution as “jet engines S,” in two versions, S-1 and S-2 (abbreviated as RDS-1 and RDS-2). RDS-1 meant the analog of the first U.S. plutonium-239 implosion type atomic bomb tested on 16 July 1945 in New Mexico RDS-2 signified the analog of the uranium-235 gun type bomb exploded over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945.

Igor Kurchatov, the scientific director of the Soviet nuclear project writes secret police chief Lavrenti Beria, whom Stalin had given principal responsibility for the atomic effort, asking for additional resources to solve uranium shortages faced by the project. (excerpts)

This report describes the food crisis in India and suggests the dispatch of a goodwill mission to Latin American countries

Possibility of food cooperation between India and Cuba

Special dossier refining aspects of the geological prospecting party to North Korea, to extract "rare elements".

A letter from Dr. Bhabha to Dr. Bhatnager arguing for the establishment and a small experimental pile of fissile material and its benefits, including operational and training experience

French High Commissioner for Atomic Energy, Joliot-Curie, criticizes Henry DeWolf Smyth of Princeton University for omitting from his report the “vital contributions of French science to the discoveries leading to the making of atomic bombs.”

The minutes describe the internal discussion at the National Security Council of a proposal to establish a nuclear program sent from New York by Admiral Alvaro Alberto, who was representing Brazil at the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC). The Council approved the Admiral’s proposal and one of its members, Colonel Bernardino Corrêa de Matos Netto declared that "it is not convenient that Brazil relinquishes [nuclear energy], because it is necessary to prepare the ground for future generations."

Memorandum of the Special Committee of the CC CPSU postponing the geological prospecting for uranium in North Korea.

A series of notes from Dr. Bhabha detailing important requirements and recommendations for the development of India’s nuclear power capabilities.

Memo from Edmund Gullion, Special Assistant to the Undersecretary, to J. K. Gustafson of the Atomic Energy Commission summarizing the most important unresolved policy issues between the U.S. and South Africa.

Memo from J. K. Gustafson to Carroll L. Wilson, both of the US Atomic Energy Commission, regarding a conversation Anton Gray had with General Smuts, the fourth prime minister of South Africa, about South Africa's uranium development and its effect on relations with the US and the UK.

A letter from S.S. Bhatnagar to Dr. Bhabha informing him of the creation of a Ministry of Scientific Research.

Memo from Alexander M. Rosenson, chief of the monetary affairs staff at the Dept. of State, to Wendel with the economic section of the US policy agenda towards South Africa attached.

Homi Bhabha, Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, informs Joliot-Curie, French High Commissioner for Atomic Energy, that the Indian government has decided to set up a factory for processing monazite and has selected a French firm to develop the factory.

House debate on the Atomic Energy Bill, which proposed controlling South Africa's nuclear energy by placing the state in charge of mining and ownership of uranium, thorium, and other radioactive materials.

Indian scientist S.S. Bhatnagar informs Joliot-Curie, the French High Commissioner for Atomic Energy, about plans for the training of Indian chemists in France in preparation for development of a plant in India for processing monazite salts.