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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • November 01, 1962

    Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 1 November 1962

    Boissevain reports on the aftermath of the crisis and its effects on Cuba, especially in Havana. Rather than the majority being in support of government actions while a minority supported the opposition, there is a public outcry from the masses about the Soviet handling of the crisis. Fidel Castro's response is a speech to the people explaining the Soviet reasons for their actions, while the Soviet Union voices its support for Castro's Five Points and sends Anastas Mikoyan to Havana as a "troubleshooter."

  • November 01, 1962

    Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 1 November 1962

    Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen sends a cable on a conversation he had with a member of the U.S. State Department. Firstly, the State Department was pleased to know Indonesian President Sukarno had not pledged support to Cuba during the crisis. Secondly, they hoped to make the point to Sukarno how alliance with the Soviets could not be relied upon, as the Cuban crisis and the Soviet abandonment of India have demonstrated. Thirdly, the Indonesian Ambassador Zain was going to pay six week visit to Jakarta, in an effort to promote U.S. economic support to Indonesia.

  • November 02, 1962

    Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 2 November 1962

    Boissevain writes a cable detailing a meeting between Fidel Castro and UN Secretary General U Thant. Cuba refused any inspection of missile silos, if the Americans did not uphold their pledge to not threaten Cuba with invasion. The Five Points were mentioned as preconditions for peace and Castro pledged Cuba was ready and willing to work towards peace. It appears Castro was aware of Soviet considerations for "global politics" as the reason behind the Soviet withdrawal of missiles.

  • November 02, 1962

    Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 2 November 1962

    The cable concerns a conversation between Dutch Ambassador to the United States van Roijen and Director Ward P. Allen of the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, regarding further actions of the Organization of American States (OAS) in the aftermath of the Cuban crisis. Allen made note that he had very little information regarding Cuba and how Cuba would fit into future dealings with the OAS.

  • November 02, 1962

    Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 2 November 1962

    The cable is centered around Cuba and the Organization of American States (OAS). Van Roijen and Ward P. Allen discuss a cable intercepted from Venezuela about possible attempts of sabotage by pro-Castro organizations in Caracas. However, there is no report from the U.S. Embassy Caracas to confirm this. There are, however, protests being reported in the American-aligned Latin American countries, which is seen as an attempt by Cuba to stir revolutionary sentiment in these countries. The size and frequency of these protests by pro-Castro and communist groups is very limited.

  • November 02, 1962

    Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 2 November 1962

    The letter begins with Boissevain criticizing Castro's speech, claiming he could have written it before it was ever delivered. The speech concerned Castro's meeting with UN Secretary General U Thant, and the contents of the speech were such that the Cuban people were kept at boiling point. Boissevain claims this is a necessity to make the people accept the sacrifices demanded of them and forget the hardships they face. Castro's exclamations that "we are above all Marxist-Leninists" raised applause, but Soviet support has died down. Boissevain suspects Anastas Mikoyan will have a hard time reasoning with Castro after the disappointment in the eyes of Cuba.

  • November 07, 1962

    Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 7 November 1962

    The cable focuses on a report from the German embassy that in several places in Cuba, Soviet weapons are hidden under cement. There is still no progress on the dialogue between Fidel Castro and Anastas Mikoyan.

  • November 09, 1962

    Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 9 November 1962

    Van Roijen cables from Washington about a conversation he had with British Ambassador to the United States David Ormsby-Gore. Ormsby-Gore explains the possible reaction from Moscow to the defeat suffered in the crisis as twofold: Those who are of the opinion that Khrushchev will make a countermove, while those whose judgment is that Khrushchev has finally understood that the Americans in fact are willing to fight for their vital national interests has learned severe lessons for future Soviet policy in the Cold War. Both van Roijen and Ormsby-Gore that perhaps the most decisive moment of the whole crisis was the American blockade of Cuba herself. The cable concludes with Ormsby-Gore addressing the possibilities of hidden missiles in Cuba, to which he claims aerial reconnaissance has not produced any evidence to support this.

  • November 19, 1962

    Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 19 November 1962

    Boissevain reports to Amsterdam the current domestic situation in Cuba, with attention being paid to Havana. In his words, Cuba is "on a war footing," and describes the various posters with propagandistic slogans urging the people to stand strong against a possible American invasion.

  • November 20, 1962

    Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain)

    The cable concerns the farewell dinner of Anastas Mikoyan, where Fidel Castro is notably absent, supposedly because he was seen drunk elsewhere. Mikoyan finally made Castro concede to UN Secretary General U Thant's last precondition to remove the IL-28 Soviet bombers from Cuba. Boissevain also reports on an air raid on a Cuban cargo ship, which was undamaged after receiving 11 bombs.

  • November 21, 1962

    Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 21 November 1962

    Boissevain writes how nationalistic fervor is at the fever pitch in Cuba. He comments on widespread use of slogans and propaganda posters everywhere in Havana and the effects they have on the average Cuban. Despite the end of the military blockade against Cuba, tensions still run high between Castro and Kennedy. The island is now "completely isolated" resulting in severe shipping delays from Europe, if any arrive at all.

  • November 26, 1962

    Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 26 November 1962

    The short cable concerns a farewell speech given by Anastas Mikoyan, which was, in the words of Boissevain, a "pep talk" to Castro. The speech failed to gain any further concessions from Fidel Castro beyond what Mikoyan could initially get Castro to agree to.

  • November 26, 1962

    Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 26 November 1962

    Boissevain explains the previous disjointed cable sent to Amsterdam on 26 November. Anastas Mikoyan gave a farewell speech which contained old communist platitudes and admiration for the Cuban people. He makes references to Fidel Castro several times, but ironically Castro is not with Mikoyan, instead retreating to Havana University. The leader revealed a manifesto entitled "Cuba's Answer to Kennedy," which contained: a reiteration of Castro's Five Points, the demand of a UN investigation into U.S.-led attacks on Cuban military bases, the Cuban right to defend itself, and a statement regarding lack of faith in Kennedy's promises of nonaggression. In Boissevain's mind this will serve to only aggravate both the Soviet Union and the United States, and, in his words, "an anxious time begins."

  • November 28, 1962

    Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 28 November 1962

    Boissevain writes to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs on the status of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. There are reports of hidden missiles within Cuba, buried in underground fortifications by the Soviets. He attaches confidential information that details the locations and means of concealment of these missiles.

  • December 13, 1962

    Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 13 December 1962

    Boissevain reports on the ongoing cold war between the United States and Cuba and its effect on Cuban society. Cuba's national airport is maintaining service to Mexico city but is marked by continued delays and cancellations. Trade is limited only to Cuban and Spanish ships flying under the flag of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Kennedy's latest address heralds more hardship for the Cuban people. The letter concludes with the prospect of Japan buying Cuban sugar based on a meeting with Japanese Ambassador to Cuba Rokuzo Yaguchi.

  • December 14, 1962

    Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 14 December 1962

    The cable from van Roijen concerns a conversation between him and Director of UN Political Affairs at the U.S. Department of State Joseph Sisco. Sisco informs van Roijen that the Kennedy Administration has decided to let the Cuban issue quietly die, boiling down to the United States and the Soviet Union "agreeing to disagree." The State Department does not think there should be further debate on the issue in the UN Security Council because the U.S. is not willing to make further concessions while there have been no UN inspections. Sisco also reports that the Soviets have made a commitment to withdraw all combat troops from Cuba.

  • December 27, 1962

    Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 27 December 1962

    Van Roijen continues on the conversation he had with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk from the last cable. Rusk believes Cuba may be aligning more with China and is factoring in Chinese interests in Cuba. However, Rusk also saw Chinese initiatives in North Korea and North Vietnam. The relationship with China is, in his words, "not a long-term worry like Moscow but a short-term worry."

  • December 27, 1962

    Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 27 December 1962

    The cable concerns a conversation between Dutch ambassador J. Herman van Roijen and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Rusk said the Cuban issue still was a source of concern, with the upcoming anniversary of the Cuban Revolution, and was concerned about Havana in particular. Rusk conjectured that one of three things would happen: 1) Castro would announce joining the Non-Aligned Movement; 2) The extremists within the Communist Party would overthrow Castro; 3) A revolution against both Castro and the Russians would be mounted. The conversation concludes with Rusk complimenting President Kennedy for his aggressive yet prudent stance against the Soviets during the crisis.

  • February 08, 1963

    Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'NATO Defense Policy'

    These Council of Ministers minutes report on the meeting between Prime Minister De Quay and several of his state secretaries with NATO Secretary-General Stikker, who gave an outline of what was still called a ‘NATO Nuclear Force’. The prime minister responded positively to the plan but indicated the incoming cabinet would have to take a final decision. In the discussion, Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns comments on the attitude of President De Gaulle and points out that NATO and EEC matters ought to be viewed separately.

  • March 15, 1963

    Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'Atlantic Nuclear Weapons Plan'

    The Council discusses the danger of the German Federal Republic moving to acquire an independent nuclear force. Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns regrets the American focus on the Germans at the expense of the British. Resistance from the French regarding the plan is not expected.