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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • October 15, 1961

    Polish Report on International Radio Transmissions

    Report on the West's radio transmissions, including: NATO's torpedo activity in the Baltic Sea and the US plans to help strengthen Western navies in the region; US troop movements into Europe due to the Berlin Crisis; US tests of intercontinental ballistic missile "Titan"; exercises of Operation Skyshield and Polaris A-2, among many other missile tests

  • February 21, 1962

    Research Memorandum RSB-58 from Roger Hilsman to the Secretary, 'Probable Soviet Reaction to Establishment of Multilateral NATO-Controlled MRBM Force'

    As discussion of a NATO multilateral force (MLF) unfolded, unfolded, one question which had to be addressed was how the Soviet Union would respond to the creation of such a NATO force. Because a NATO force would increase Western military capabilities, Soviet opposition was assumed.

  • April 25, 1962

    Rajya Sabha Q&A on the Export of Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation

    Transcript of questions and answers between members of the Rajya Sabha and the Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs, Shrimati Lakshmi Menon, on the Indian government's opposition to United States export of nuclear weapons.

  • May 19, 1962

    Memorandum by Chief of Defense Staff Aldo Ross to Minister of Defense Andreotti

    Discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting the terms of nuclear warfare proposed at a NATO meeting in Athens. Whether or not to respond to a Soviet nuclear attack with an atomic weapon of equal strength was debated at the meeting, as well as the role that conventional weapons would play in such a conflict.

  • May 28, 1962

    Memorandum by Edward Biegel, Bureau of Western European Affairs, 'WE Answers to the Ball Questionnaire'

    Edward Biegel of the Bureau of Western European Affairs answers Undersecretary Ball's questions on French nuclear ambitions and Western European collective security. He makes the arguments against nuclear sharing, and also mentions the fact that a Baltimore Sun article likely alerted the Soviets to the fact that the US deployed tactical nuclear weapons on the German front.

  • August 24, 1962

    Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Seong-cheol

    The North Korean Foreign Minister discusses with the Soviet Ambassador the nuclear hegemony of the US and their ability to control nuclear proliferation.

  • November 12, 1962

    Hungarian Socialist Workers Party First Secretary János Kádár’s Account of His Visit to Moscow to the HSWP Central Committee

    János Kádár presents on his diplomatic trip to Moscow to the Hungarian Central Committee. Kádár first places the Cuban Missile Crisis in context. This includes describing the success of the Cuban revolution, US aggression towards Cuba, and the Cuban-Soviet military and defense agreement, which ultimately spawned the US’s unilateral military mobilization. Kádár then describes the Soviet Union’s strategy to achieve two goals: protect the Cuban revolution and preserve peace. He notes that Cuba and the Soviet Union disagree about how the crisis was resolved, but asks the congress of workers to show complete support of Soviet actions and successes.

  • December 27, 1962

    Bulgarian UN Representative Milko Tarabanov, Report to Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo on Disarmament Negotiations

    UN Representative Milko Tarabanov reported to the Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo recent developments of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The report summarizes the conference's work from November 1962-December 1962, the period following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Tarabanov reports that Western powers put forward two draft agreements calling for the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, and underground--the proposals were debated during the 17th United Nations session. The Cubam Missile Crisis occurred during the conference's session. Main issues discussed after Cuban Missile Crisis included: suspension of nuclear tests, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's proposal at the 17th session of the UN, ways to measure nuclear weapons testing, and military alliances (NATO). Tarabanov also addresses the inter workings of conference members--Western, socialist, and neutral--including disagreements among Western powers. In summary Tarabanov adds that the prospect for cessation of nuclear tests is poor, but notes that the US may consider closing military bases, though not under pressure of the Soviet Union or neutral countries.

  • January 15, 1963

    MAE Cable Report on Nassau Accords

    Report by italian representative to the Atlantic Council A. Alessandrini on outline to the Atlantic Council of Nassau Accords; the paper also discusses the problem of NATO nuclear defense, the US position on autonomous arsenals and Italy's position.

  • January 24, 1963

    Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Beck), Report on Soviet-Cuban Conflicts

    Hungarian Ambassador to Cuba János Beck reports on post-Cuban-Missile-Crisis conflict between Cuba and the Soviet Union. Beck highlights Cuba’s tendency to act independent of socialist country opinion. He also mentions the negative influence of nationalism on the Cuban government, which has a direct influence on Soviet-Cuban relations. The Soviets believe Cubans do not understand that Soviet negotiations with the US secured Cuba from a future US invasion. The Cuban Missile Crisis also is evidence that neither the US or Soviet Union want to start a nuclear war.

  • March 26, 1963

    Note by SMD on NATO MLF

    Analysis by Gen. A. Rossi on NATO multinational and multilateral force proposals. In particular, the paper focused on MLF features, with political military legal and financial observations. It includes also a technical analysis of the US proposal for a MLF based on Polaris-armed merchant ships .

  • May 27, 1963

    Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    A North Korean political officer speaks of Kim Il Sung's firm belief that an American nuclear attack could not destroy North Korea for their country would find refuge in the maze of underground caverns.

  • June 05, 1963

    Research Memorandum REU-44 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Evidence of Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction in European NATO Countries with the Lack of a Share in Ownership or Control of Nuclear Weapons'

    Ambassador Livingston Merchant, who was responsible for the U.S. diplomatic effort to win support for the MLF, asked INR to report on the degree to which non-nuclear European members of NATO were satisfied with their “lack of a share in ownership or control of nuclear weapons.” Based on the evidence, mainly various statements made by leading politicians, diplomats, and policymakers, INR experts concluded that most of the countries surveyed (Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Greece) were “relatively satisfied,” while only West Germany was “restive” to the extent that some of its officials were interested in a NATO or European nuclear force.

  • June 13, 1963

    Annex to analysis by SMD on Proposal to assign to NATO Italian Polaris-armed Ships

    Report by Gen. A. Rossi on Polaris SLBM and NATO naval forces, including technological and employment features, costs. The report includes discussions of IRBM forces in Italy, and French and British nuclear forces.

  • March 10, 1964

    Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    A report on a meeting between Nikita Khrushchev and the North Korean ambassador in which the two discussed the situation in South Korea.

  • March 31, 1965

    Record of the Second Meeting between Premier Zhou and President Ben Bella

    Ben Bella and Zhou Enlai discuss a range of issues, including the Vietnam War, the Sino-Soviet split, the Second Asian-African Conference, China's status at the UN, Algerian foreign policy, and developments in the Congo and elsewhere in Africa.

  • February 20, 1966

    Report by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Nuclear Planning Working Group of the "Special Committee" (Washington, 17th-18th February, 1966), with a letter from Andrea Cagiati'

    Cagiati sends Andreotti a report about the meeting in Washington, which concluded Giulio Andreotti's period as Minister of Defense. Cagiati thanks Andreotti for his work, that made sure that "in this period the relationship between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense has been strong and efficient like never before". The report describes the meeting (the first meeting of this working group) and the viewpoints of the participants, with special attention payed to the US nuclear policy. The document describes also the fields which require further investigations by the Working Group. There are Cagiati's personal reflections too.

  • April 19, 1971

    Memorandum from Andropov to Ustinov, Regarding US Positions in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Negotiations

    KGB chief Andropov analyzes the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty negotiations, particularly the US negotiating positions and the preferences of various Washington agencies.

  • March 25, 1974

    Report, National Security Council Under Secretaries’ Committee, 'Action Plan for Implementing NSDM 235'

    An interagency NSC sub-committee was exploring the problem of safeguards for sensitive nuclear exports. The problem was that an existing group, the Zangger Committee based on NPT membership, did not have a broad enough membership or scope to manage the problem and that France did not belong to the Zanggger Committee.. Under Secretaries Committee proposed “talks with other suppliers of technology and equipment in the reprocessing and enrichment fields on desirable new constraints or guidelines that should be followed.”

  • June 03, 1974

    National Security Decision Memorandum 255, Henry Kissinger to Secretary of Defense et al., 'Security and Other Aspects of the Growth and Dissemination of Nuclear Power Industries'

    This memo states that the President has read the report by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee and approved the recommended consultations with other countries. In the memo, Henry Kissinger endorsed consultations with suppliers to establish “common principles regarding the supply of sensitive enrichment technology or equipment” and encouraging multinational frameworks for “enrichment, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing facilities,” among other measures.