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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • September 27, 1950

    Ciphered Telegram, from Vyshinsky to Gromyko

    On the meeting that took place between Tsarapkin and an American intermediary named Lancaster. They talked about the Korean issue.

  • September 28, 1950

    Ciphered Telegram from Gromyko to Vyshisnky in New York

    Gromyko asks Vyshinsky to get Tsarapkin to inform American intermediary Lancaster that Malik has agreed to the meeting. Malik must hear out the Americans and if it seems that they're willing to work towards a peaceful resolution, tell Lancaster that any questions that the Americans had during this discussion will be answered in the next meeting.

  • December 09, 1950

    Resolution of the CPSU Politburo with Approved Article Draft for Pravda

    It was decided that the article "Concerning the joint statement of Truman and Attlee" be published in the Russian newspaper"Pravda."

  • June 27, 1951

    Reception of Alan G. Kirk, US Ambassador to the Soviet Union

    Record of Gromyko's discussion with Alan G. Kirk on whether the Soviet government is willing to support a peaceful resolution to the Korean problem. Gromyko answered in the affirmative. The two discussed ways to achieve a resolution, and who should be represented at the peace talks.

  • June 30, 1951

    Ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

    Telegram from Mao to Stalin advising on the manner in which he believes armistice negotiations should be carried out.

  • July 16, 1952

    Revised Princeton Statement [on American Foreign Policy]

    The Psychological Strategy Board issues a restrained revision of the Princeton Statement adopted at a May 1952 meeting at Princeton on psychological operations [available in the Hoover Archives] convened at the initiative of Free Europe Committee President C.D. Jackson.

  • August 18, 1952

    Report, Zhou Enlai to Chairman Mao [Zedong] and the Central Committee

    Zhou reports on the initial plans for his visit to Moscow and some of the conversations he's held concerning the Korean War.

  • November 03, 1952

    CPSU Politburo Decision with an Approved Message from Pushkin to Stalin

    Decision to approve the draft TASS publication denying the reported talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Korean issue.

  • May 08, 1953

    USSR Foreign Ministry Draft Memorandum, 'On Further Soviet Government Measures Pertaining to the German Question'

    Memorandum from the Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry on Soviet foreign policy options with regard to the German Question. The memorandum looks at the effects on Soviet policy toward the western powers in the context of the Postdam conference and at the future state of the Soviet-East German relations.

  • June 03, 1953

    Record of Molotov's Conversation with US Ambassador Bohlen

    A follow-up conversation after the one on the 28th of May. The two discuss the talks that were taking place in Panmunjom, and Bohlen mentions the American men with Soviet wives currently residing in the Soviet Union. Molotov is unaware of this situation.

  • June 13, 1953

    Cable 5321, from Ambassador Reber in Bonn to US State, Washington

    Cable from Samuel Reber to U.S. Department of State Outlining U.S. Perspectives on Four-Power Talks

  • June 19, 1953

    National Security Council Report, NSC 158, 'United States Objectives and Actions to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States'

    Recommendations adopted by the National Security Council at the suggestion of the Psychological Strategy Board on covert actions to be undertaken in the Soviet Satellite States. Authorized by the National Security Council, NSC 158 envisaged aggressive psychological warfare to exploit and heighten the unrest behind the Iron Curtain. The policy was endorsed by President Eisenhower on June 26, 1953.

  • September 25, 1953

    Draft Instructions to Chuikov and Semyonov

    In March 1953, Moscow had declined Ulbricht’s request for tightening up the sector border in Berlin, then the major loophole in the SED leadership’s efforts to seal off East Germany. In the aftermath of the demonstrations and unrest in Berlin, the SED leadership apparently tried to reintroduce the idea of increased “border security” in Berlin. Eager to salvage whatever was left of its political position as a champion of German unity, Moscow again held such measures as politically “disadvantageous” and “unacceptable.” Certainly, the Kremlin was also aware of the continued widespread resentment among the Berlin and GDR population which made any more restrictive measures a risky undertaking. Instead, the Soviets urged the SED to increase its “fight against hostile elements” in West Berlin—an issue that would become more and more the focus of Soviet attitude on Berlin.

  • December 11, 1953

    National Security Council, NSC 174, Draft 'United States Policy Toward The Soviet Satellites In Eastern Europe'

    This report by the National Security Council discusses Soviet control over Eastern Europe, barriers to Soviet control of the satellites, and the power threat that consolidation poses to the United States. As a result, the NSC recommends that United States pursue a policy of resistance towards Soviet domination of its Eastern European satellites, and should impose pressure and propaganda to weaken Soviet influence.

  • July 05, 1954

    From the Journal of V. V. Vaskov, 27 August 1954: Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation with Comrade Mao Zedong on 5 July 1954

    Soviet Charge d’Affaires in Beijing V.V. Vaskov and Comrade Mao Zedong discuss the Soviet plans to take advantage of the changing situation in France. Mao mentions that Zhou is meeting with Ho Chi Ming and Vo Nguyen Giap in Guanxi and won't be able to come to Geneva until July 12-13. The topic of conversation then shifts to the US and a recent meeting between US President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Mao notes that there is a diverge between Eisenhower and Churchill regarding the desirability of a dialogue with the Communists. Mao says that the US has dispersed its forces far and wide, so they are trying to resurrect West Germany and Japan.

  • July 12, 1955

    Central Committee Plenum of the CPSU Ninth Session, Concluding Word by Com. N. S. Krushchev

    Khrushchev responds to the accusations raised by Cde. Molotov about the state of Soviet foreign policy. He discusses the Soviet relationship with the Yugoslav leadership, the Austrian treaty, Soviet-US relations.

  • November 09, 1956

    Department of State, Incoming Telegram No. 1130

    Text of a personal note sent by Ambassador Bohlen to Foreign Affairs Minister Gromyko regarding an American citizen being detained in Hungary.

  • June 24, 1957

    Minutes of the Meeting of the CPSU CC Plenum on the State of Soviet Foreign Policy

    The Soviet leadership discusses the state of Soviet foreign policy after the Hungarian crisis and Khrushchev’s visit to the US. Molotov criticizes Khrushchev for recklessness in foreign policy direction. Soviet inroads in the Middle East and the Third World are analyzed. The effects of the crises in Eastern Europe are placed in the context of the struggle against US imperialism.

  • December 10, 1957

    Letter, Nikolai Bulganin to Dwight D. Eisenhower

    Bulganin proposes a halt on nuclear tests among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom beginning on January 1, 1958.

  • January 12, 1958

    Letter, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Nikolai Bulganin