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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • May 08, 1961

    Department of State Cable 5245 to Embassy United Kingdom, Message from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan

    President Kennedy writes British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to discuss the implications for NATO and West German security if the US or UK assisted the French nuclear program.

  • October 15, 1961

    Polish Report on International Radio Transmissions

    Report on the West's radio transmissions, including: NATO's torpedo activity in the Baltic Sea and the US plans to help strengthen Western navies in the region; US troop movements into Europe due to the Berlin Crisis; US tests of intercontinental ballistic missile "Titan"; exercises of Operation Skyshield and Polaris A-2, among many other missile tests

  • December 19, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation, 'Skybolt'

    This memorandum details an extensive conversation between representatives from the U.S. and Great Britain about President Kennedy's decision to cancel work on "Skybolt," or a surface-to-air missile that the British were invested in. The meeting was an attempt to placate a "looming crisis" in Anglo-American relations.

  • May 29, 1963

    State Department Telegram 6389 to US Embassy United Kingdom

    In this telegram, President Kennedy encourages Prime Minister Macmillan to take a positive interest in the MLF project, in which the British had little interest because of financial reasons and their doubts about the German role. Kennedy also expressed concern about the future of German nuclear efforts.

  • February 08, 1964

    Record of Conversation from Chairman Mao Zedong's Reception of the Cambodian Ambassador to China Sisowath Sirik Matak

    Mao and Matak discuss Western imperialist collaboration with India, attempts to overthrow the Cambodian government, and the situation in Vietnam, among other topics.

  • May 12, 1964

    Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Dean Rusk, UK Foreign Secretary Butler, and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, 'Tripartite Discussion of Non-Dissemination'

    In this discussion between Rusk and the British and French Foreign Ministers, the three discuss a proposed British nonproliferation declaration. Rusk had no objection but Couve de Murville found the declaration “patronizing” because it said “in effect that we [nuclear weapons states] are sinners and don’t want others to join us in sin.”

  • November 11, 1964

    Cable from MAE to MD on USSR comments on MLF

    Note by ambassador to Moscow Straneo on comments by Soviet press regarding meetings between high-level US officials and new british Foreign Minister Patrick Gordon Walker on MLF.

  • December 07, 1964

    Memorandum of Conversation between President Johnson and Prime Minister Harold Wilson

    In this conversation, President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson discuss the MLF and the proposed ANF--the "Atlantic Nuclear Force," a British proposal as an alternative to the MLF. The two leaders weighed the pros and cons of both proposals, with President Johnson ultimately deciding to give a positive response to the ANF, leaving it up to the British to see if Bonn could be enlisted.

  • December 07, 1964

    Untitled Read-Out for State Department of Johnson-Wilson Conversation

    Account of the first day of the Johnson-Wilson discussions prepared by State Department Executive Secretary Benjamin Read probably on the basis of an account by Secretary of State Rusk.

  • December 08, 1964

    US Comments on the UK Proposal of a Project for an Atlantic Nuclear Force

    General comments relating to the establishment of an Atlantic nuclear force, objectives that any new arrangement of NATO nuclear forces must meet, specific comments on the UK's proposal, characteristics of the force, components, contribution of the United States Forces, non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, command and voting arrangements, review provisions.

  • December 10, 1964

    Memorandum of Conversation between President Johnson and Prime Minister Harold Wilson

    During this conversation Wilson, McNamara, Rusk, and Ball continued the discussion of the British proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force, including possible command arrangements. Other topics included the impact of the Chinese nuclear test and a nonproliferation agreement.

  • April 15, 1969

    Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to President Nixon, 'Guidance to State and Defense Department on Our Attitude Toward Military Cooperation with the French'

    Kissinger informs Nixon of a discussion he had with British Defense Minister Denis Healey about French/U.S. military cooperation. Kissinger has told Healey that the French have not approached the U.S., and that any decision to aid France would have to be heavily weighed beforehand. Kissinger and Healey have agreed to inform one another should he be approached for such assistance by France in the future.

  • April 22, 1969

    Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to William P. Rogers, US-French Military Relations

    This is a follow up of a memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon that was sent on April 15, 1969, where Nixon approved Kissinger to tell the Secretary of State the same points that were discussed in the original memorandum. Such points were that Kissinger has told Healey, British Defense Minister, that the French have not approached the U.S. for military assistance, and that any decision to aid France would have to be heavily weighed beforehand. The necessity for secrecy on these topics is stressed by Kissinger.

  • October 21, 1969

    Memorandum from Theodore L. Eliot Jr. to Henry A. Kissinger, 'British Position on Nuclear Cooperation with France'

    The British have not made any military or nuclear alliance with France, and they will disclose any such approaches from France to the United States. The U.S. is willing to say in response that they have not been approached by the French and would be willing to disclose any such approach in the future, but the U.S. is not willing say that their position is exactly the same as the British one because they "are not sure of the detailed implications of the broad phraseology of [the British’s] statement" and do not want to be bound to any extreme commitments.

  • December 07, 1971

    Memorandum from Theodore L Eliot Jr. to Henry A. Kissinger, 'Briefing the British Regarding Our Special Defense Programs with the French'

    Eliot forwards a letter sent to William J. Galloway of the American Embassy in London, containing information for the British Foreign Office about US nuclear assistance to France. The letter describes the current status of cooperation between the US and France, including the preparations for nuclear safety talks and the first meeting with the French ballistic missile project.

  • May 03, 1972

    Memorandum from Holsey G. Handyside, 'Status Report on Proposed Nuclear Safety Talks with the French'

    Holsey G. Handyside reports on a meeting with Christopher J. Makins, First Secretary of the British Embassy. Handyside informs Makins that organizational meetings for the US-French nuclear safety talks were planned for May 4-5. The talks will not include any Restricted Data that the French do not already have. Handyside reiterates that the French are not aware that the British have been informed of the exchange. He also asked Makins for his opinion on why the British government has repeated asked for status updates about the talks.

  • June 16, 1972

    Cable from Holsey G. Handyside to Ronald I. Spiers, 'Guidance on Nuclear Weapons Safety Talks with French'

    Handyside sends guidance for discussions with British diplomat Clive Rose on US nuclear assistance to France. The cable outlines points of discussion and emphasizes the secret nature of these talks as "we do not plan to inform French of fact that we are keeping UK generally informed."

  • August 09, 1973

    Memorandum of Conversation, 'French Nuclear Discussion'

    Transcript of conversation between Kissinger and Schlesinger. Kissinger wants to make Galley "drool" by keeping him interested without actually giving anything up. Kissinger worries about what the British want in terms of Polaris and notes that putting the French on the same footing as the U.S. would scare the British enough to get their point across.

  • July 04, 1974

    Letter by the Italian Ambassador in London, Raimondo Manzini, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Aldo Moro

    Italian Ambassador to London, Raimondo Manzini, writes to Foreign minister Moro in the aftermath of the 1974 Ottawa Declaration. He discusses the British interest in reviving the Special Relationship with the US and its effects on European politics, and suggests that through intensified dialogue and cooperation, an Anglo-Italian solidarity could function as a counterweight to the close Franco-German relations.