January 21, 1971
Brazil's National Security Council Approves the Special Agreement between CNPq and the Nuclear Research Center of Jülich
This document was written to the President of Brazil, confirming the Naitonal Security Council's approval of the Special Agreement between CNPq and the Nuclear Rewsearch Center of Jülich.
October 19, 1971
Brief Study of Scientific Agreement on Nuclear Research between CNPq and the Nuclear Research Center of Jülich
A document issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this special agreement sought to deepen the scientific and technological cooperation between the two nations. This document differed from the Scientific and Technological Agreement previously celebrated in that the CNPq-KFA agreement was more specific, as it indicated which areas would be explored. It was signed directly with a center of nuclear research, clearly demonstrating Brazilian interest in the nuclear field.
April 11, 1972
Cable from the President of Brazil of the National Commission of Nuclear Energy to the Secretary-General Confirming the Arrival of Dr. Klaus Scharmer of the Jülich Research Center
This document was sent to the Secretary-General, confirming the arrival of Dr. Klaus Scharmer to Brazil. Dr. Klaus Scharmer was the head of the International Bureau of the Nuclear Center of Jülich, and his visit was part of an exchange program between Brazilian institutions and universities and the research center. Dr. Scharmer came to Brazil to discuss the implementation of the Special Agreement between CNPq and KFA, in addition to an analogous CNEN-KFA agreement. Dr. Scharmer toured nuclear research institutions in Belo Horizonte, Sãp Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.
June 05, 1972
Brief Study of the Agreement Permitting the Entrance of West German Nuclear Ships into Brazilian Waters and their Permanence in Brazilian Ports
This document deals with the issue of the entrance of German nuclear-propelled ships into Brazilian waters, as well as their stay in Brazilian ports. This is yet another agreement in the wake of the Scientific and Technological Agreement of 1969. It states the Brazilian interest in the development of nuclear technology and its commercial marine uses.
May 21, 1974
Report from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to President Ernesto Geisel, 'Subject: The Indian nuclear test'
This is a note from the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Antonio Azeredo da Silveira, to Brazilian President Ernesto Geisel, regarding India’s nuclear test in 1974. It indicates the main consequences of the Indian test to both the world and Brazil, and suggests that Argentina has the necessary incentives to follow India’s path.
August 13, 1974
Memorandum, Information for the President of Brazil, No. 055/74 from the National Security Council
Outline of the government of Brazil’s decision to acquire all phases of the cycle of production of nuclear fuel through cooperation with a foreign government, in this case the Federal Republic of Germany. Reference is made to the need to develop uranium enrichment technology in accordance with the 1967 nuclear policy, which had not yet been implemented.
Cables between the Brazilian Embassy in Washington and the Brazilian Foreign Ministry on the Transfer of Nuclear Material
A series of correspondence between Brazilian Foreign Ministry and Brazilian Ambassador to the US about the transfer of nuclear material from France to Brazil. Myron Kratzer, Acting Assistant Secretary for Scientific Affairs in the US, expressed his concern over the fact the nuclear material was of American origin.
November 18, 1976
Memorandum from Ambassador Figuerero to Castro Madero
This memo, produced by the Argentine Ambassador in charge of the Scientific and Technical Affairs Division of the Argentine Foreign Ministry, alerts the Director of the Argentine Nuclear Commission Carlos Castro Madero that the new Carter administration will attempt to exert pressure on Brazil’s nuclear program and hinder its nuclear deal with West Germany. It notes that regardless of Carter’s nuclear policy, Brazil would “try by all means confirm its right to nuclear development.”
November 19, 1976
US Embassy Cable, Brazilian Public Reaction to US Nuclear Policies
The US Embassy in Brazil quotes a Brazilian ministry official who declares Brazil will continue its nuclear program “despite all the threats and reprisals” from the US. The unnamed official goes on to say, “The Americans, our allies, are behaving in a way worse than that of our common enemies, the Russians.”
Brazil Scope Paper: Implications of the Argentine Visit
Cyrus Vance - apparently unintentionally - left behind this document while meeting with Brazilian President Geisel. It lays out US negotiations with Argentina to ratify the Treaty of Tlateloco, to accept full scope safeguards and to delay the construction of a reprocessing facility in exchange for US nuclear assistance and Brazil’s acceptance of a moratorium on the construction of a reprocessing facility.
January 31, 1977
Memorandum from Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira to President Geisel on Jimmy Carter’s “Radical” Nuclear Stance
Brazilian Minister of State for External Relations, Antonio F. Azeredo da Silveira, comments on the recently elected Carter administration’s nuclear politics. Silveira’s message to President Geisel displays Brazilian frustration over American interference in its nuclear program and relations with Germany.
February 25, 1977
Memorandum from Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira to President Geisel, US Threats and Promises and Brazilian Responses
This memo outlines “possible American approaches” and “possible Brazilian reactions” as the US attempts to compel the Brazilians and Germans to cease their nuclear cooperation.
March 21, 1977
Brazilian Embassy Cable, Brazilian Ambassador to Bonn Reports on Soviet Pressure on West Germany
The Brazilian Ambassador in Bonn reports on a Der Spiegel article, which states, “After the United States, it is now the Soviet Union’s turn to exert pressure for Bonn to revise its controversial atomic agreement with Brazil.” The article shows US-Soviet solidarity against Brazil and Germany’s cooperation in developing nuclear weapons.
March 22, 1977
Letter to Hugo Abreu on a Conversation between Vice-Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Admiral José Calvente Aranda and the Argentine Ambassador Oscar Camilión
Abreu reports a conversation in which ambassador Camillión revealed President Videla’s desire to visit Brazil, implying that Itaipu was a sensitive issue, but of domestic nature. The Argentine government suggested a joint declaration on nuclear issues to turn away international suspicions on "the production of the bomb."
September 07, 1977
Letter from US Congressman Paul Findley to Brazilian Vice-President Adalberto Pereira dos Santos
Findley proposes a system of mutual inspection of nuclear facilities between Argentina and Brazil. According to the agreement he proposed, Brazil and Argentina would renounce the intention to develop a nuclear device and would accept mutual inspections of their respective nuclear facilities.
November 30, 1977
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information to the President, 'Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's Visit'
According to a US document left behind by Cyrus Vance, Argentina had agreed to ratify the Treaty of Tlateloco, to accept full scope safeguards and to delay the construction of a reprocessing facility in exchange for US nuclear assistance and Brazil’s acceptance of a moratorium on the construction of a reprocessing facility. Commenting the paper, Foreign Minister Silveira defines US strategy as “irresponsible” and considers it as an encouragement to the rivalry and confrontation between Argentina and Brazil.
September 23, 1978
US Embassy Paris cable 31540 to State Department, 'Elysée Views on Reprocessing Issues'
A source in President Giscard's staff informed the US embassy that Pakistan was determined to complete the reprocessing plant and was searching for another country willing to supply the necessary technology. Also discusses a developing nuclear deal between West Germany and Brazil.
June 18, 1979
Notice No. 135/79 from the General Secretariat of the Brazilian National Security Council
In 1978 the National Security Council identified the most important shortcoming of nuclear cooperation with Germany: the non-transfer of technology for the production of uranium hexafluoride (UF6). The lack of this crucial phase for the production of nuclear fuel led Brazil to decide to develop this method by national means, in view of the unwillingness of France and Great Britain to export said technology without a full scope of safeguards. The document reports how the government decided to create an autonomous nuclear project with regard to cooperation with Germany and free from the international safeguards regime. Coordinated by CNEN and implemented by the Institute of Energy and Nuclear Research (IPEN), this project represented the first phase of the “parallel” nuclear program whose objective was the autonomous mastery of the nuclear cycle.