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July 01, 1981
Memorandum from Max Hugel to the Director of Central Intelligence, '[Redacted] Report'
Report discusses contingency plans for implementing martial law, but only in relation to the possibility of extremist resistance from organizations such as Solidarnosc (Solidarity) and KOR (Workers Defense Committee).
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July 06, 1981
Conversation between SPD chairman Willy Brandt and the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev on 30 June 1981 in Moscow
Memorandum of a conversation between Brandt and Brezhnev. Among other things, Brezhnev focused on the increased hostility between members of the international community. He pointed to debate over missiles in Europe as an example of that tension.
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July 11, 1981
Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Chairman Andropov
KGB Chairman Andropov and East German Minister for State Security Mielke meet to discuss ongoing Stasi/KGB cooperation and international affairs. Topics of conversation include the Ronald Reagan administration, the Polish Solidarity Crisis,
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July 12, 1981
Report 3: Delegation of the Chinese Communist Party, 3-12 July 1981: Third Meeting of the Two Delegations, Saturday 11 July at 17.00
Chiaromonte and Peng Chong discuss on the internal situation in China after the 6th Plenum; on URSS and Afghanistan; Cambodia; European missiles; on China and Soviet Union. Berlinguer comments on the resolution of the 6th Plenum and appreciate it.
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July 17, 1981
Memorandum from John Stein to the Secretaries of State and Defense and Director of the National Security Agency, 'Polish General Staff Evaluation of Soviet Military PResence and Activities in Poland...'
Report outlines the conflicting views of Polish military and government leadership on the implementation of martial law and growing influence of the Soviet military.
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July 24, 1981
Memorandum from John Stein to the Director of the Central Intelligence, '[Redacted] Report'
Translation elaborates on how funds should be allocated towards various Polish infrastructure projects including highways, waterways, and railways. In addition, it mentions allocating funds for the defense training for new government and industrial leaders.
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August 14, 1981
Memorandum from John Stein to the Secretaries of State and Defense and Director of the National Security Agency, 'The Current Political Situation in Poland; Polish Ministry of Defense Plans for the Possible Introduction of Martial Law'
Translated report discusses how the increased presence of Solidarnosc (Solidarity) warrants the introduction of martial law. However, it affirms that no formal steps to introducing martial law have been taken.
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August 18, 1981
Telegram from Czechoslovak Embassy in Addis Ababa
Prague’s representation to Addis Ababa offers an insight into the Soviet Union’s economic assistance toward Ethiopia in the early 1980s, while voicing, at the same time, the Soviet economic delegation’s nuanced and candid impression of Mengistu’s abilities to control the course of the revolutionary transformations.
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August 20, 1981
Acting Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence, National Foreign Assessment Center, to Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 'Warning Report-Nuclear Proliferation'
In response to an IAEA report that Pakistan diverted plutonium from the Karachi nuclear power plant, a CIA analysis suggests that the Pakistanis “were not overly concerned” about these events. Of greater concern to regional security and stability was the discussions of the sale of F-16 fighter-bombers as part of a U.S. aid package to ensure Pakistan’s cooperation in the covert efforts against Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
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August 22, 1981
Notes from Brezhnev's Meeting with Stanislaw Kania and Wojciech Jaruzelski, 14 August 1981
In this meeting, Brezhnev expresses anxiety about Poland's path, especially since it has deteriorated since Congress when it was expected to improve. Kania says that the political crisis can be overcome and that theyare seizing the initiative. Brezhnev insists that they will soon face off with the enemy, and there is still the opportunity to mobilize and rebuff the counterrevolution. Brezhnev concludes that large scale political action is the most feasible way to turn Poland to socialism.