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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • October 26, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Explanation to Burma about the Line of Actual Control'

    The Chinese Foreign Ministry claims that India is "reoccupying" territories and has crossed the Line of Actual Control.

  • October 26, 1962

    Cable from Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, The Hague, to Dutch Embassy, London, 26 October 1962

    This cable from Foreign Minister Luns refers to a personal letter received from British Foreign Minister Lord Home, regarding the stance of the United Kingdom in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The letter is one encouraging support to the United States at the UN Security Council, and that such a crisis would have repurcussions not only for the Caribbean but for Europe as well. Luns later sent a reply of thanks, indicating continuing solidarity with the Western World and promises to keep in closer touch with the British.

  • October 26, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet delegate to the UN Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry (3) on the meeting between Garcia-Inchaustegui and U Thant on October 26, 1962

    The meeting between the Cuban delegate to the UN Garcia-Inchaustegui and U Thant.

  • October 26, 1962

    Letter from Yugoslav President Tito to Brazilian President Goulart

    Yugoslav President Tito is writing to Brazilian President Goulart discussing concerns over the situation in Cuba. In Tito's opinion, the best course of action is for direct negotiations to continue in the UN.

  • October 26, 1962

    Telegram from Fidel Castro to N. S. Khrushchev

    In his message to Khrushchev, Fidel Castro evaluated the two possible scenarios of American aggression against Cuba. Castro seems to suggest a retaliatory nuclear strike against the US in the case of an attack on Cuba.

  • October 26, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Jeneiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča Popović talks with Brazilian Foreign Ministry official Carlos A. Bernardes about the situation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. They are afraid that euphoria could make the US intensify a conflict that could lead to invasion, because the US ambassador [Lincoln Gordon] claims constantly that the solution to this crisis is not only disarmament of Cuba, but also liquidation of Fidel’s regime.

  • October 26, 1962

    Letter from Mexican Ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS), Washington, to Mexican Foreign Minister

    A letter from the Mexican Ambassador to accompany the attachments of three examples of reports on the OAS U.S. Resolution from Argentina, Costa Rica, the U.S. and the Dominican Republic. The ambassador also describes a conversation he had with Mr. Ward P. Allen of the North American delegation (and the U.S. State Department).

  • October 26, 1962

    Telegram from East German Ambassador, Moscow, to East German Secretary of State (First Deputy Foreign Minister) Otto Winzer

    The East German Ambassador in Moscow, Rudolf Dölling, writes to the East German Secretary of State (First Deputy Foreign Minister), Otto Winzer, about several diplomatic meetings that have been held concerning US-Cuban relations and tensions. One of these meetings is between several Eastern European countries: East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, USSR, Romania and Czechoslovakia.

  • October 26, 1962

    Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 26 October 1962

    Van Roijen relates the current situation in Washington and the American view on the crisis. The removal of the missiles was a non-negotiable issue for the Americans, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared their removal was absolutely essential. In the mind of American statesmen, the missiles in Cuba was directly connected to the 1961 Berlin crisis, as it was a new Soviet technique. The hurried construction of the bases was reported to go on, meaning time is of the utmost essence. The Americans were not above considering force to resolve the crisis, although this was relegated to a worst-case scenario.

  • October 26, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 26 October 1962

    Drozniak makes an assessment of the Cuban Missile Crisis situation, based on his conversations with foreign diplomats and respected journalists. Among other topics, he includes his opinion that "The operation of installing the [Soviet] missiles in Cuba was carried out in great hurry, without special adherence to secrecy, and perhaps even with the awareness that the missiles would be discovered relatively quickly. This [fact] has been interpreted [by the Americans] as [a possible] attempt by the USSR to test Kennedy’s “the will and readiness to fight.” [Soviet leader Nikita S.] Khrushchev chose Cuba, because he considered Berlin to be too dangerous."

  • October 26, 1962

    Entry from the Journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, Conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad

    Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad. The encounter took place a day after the Soviet leadership had dramatically modified its policy on the Sino-Indian dispute (in an October 25 article in Pravda), suddenly taking a pro-China position, evidently due to the danger of global war breaking out as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, then peaking. While taking pains to welcome the Pravda article as helpful in correcting misunderstandings among Indian Communists, the CPI leader acknowledged that the party secretariat had concluded that "this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India," pushing the Indian Government toward the West, and he pleaded with the Soviets to influence China to resolve the border dispute "without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself."

  • October 26, 1962

    Report on “Extraordinary Measures” Regarding Czechoslovak Organizations

    This concerns the status of Czechoslovak domestic organizations at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Included in the report are the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, Central Council of Labor Unions, Czechoslovak Union of Youth, and the National Front.

  • October 26, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), Noon, Friday

    Campos offers an analytical review of the latest events in the Cuban Crisis, which has led him to some conclusions, including the goals of the United States government (to block new offensive arms from arriving in Cuba and to obtain the dismantling or removal of the present warlike installations).

  • October 26, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet delegate to the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry (1) regarding the meeting with U Thant on the latter's second address

    Soviet response to the new UN proposal based on the US and Soviet government’s approval. They also discussed a proviso in U Thant's first address forbidding ships arriving in Cuba from carrying weaponry, a new American proposal and the Soviet inability to discuss actions to be taken on Cuban territory.

  • October 26, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation, West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder and Soviet Ambassador Andrei Smirnov, Bonn

    A discussion between Federal Minister Schröder and Soviet Ambassador Smirnow [Smirnov] in which Smirnov presents to the minister a statement of the Soviet Government concerning the aggressive acts the United States had committed against the Republic of Cuba. In this statement the Soviet Government was explaining its view on the blockade the United States had imposed on Cuba. It also commented on the other aggressive steps President Kennedy intended to take against Cuba as announced on 22 October.

  • October 27, 1962

    Ciphered Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev

    A telegram dispatched from the Soviet embassy in Havana early on the morning of Saturday, 27 October 1962. Fidel Castro was at the embassy and composing an important "personal" message for Nikita Khrushchev. The alarmed Cuban leader anticipated US invasion in the next "24-72 hours."

  • October 27, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Ghana, 'Report on Conversation with the Third Secretary of Cuban Embassy'

    Chinese embassy in Ghana discusses the situation in Cuba. Ghana proposes African-Asian delegation to inspect Cuban military establishments; also says the U.S. will attack Cuba at 9:30 pm on the evening of 27 or 28 October 1962, but does not identify the source of this information.

  • October 27, 1962

    Cable no. 326 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    The cable concerns a conversation between Vrana and Pinner the night before, about Castro's conviction of an impending invasion of Cuba by the United States and associated mercenaries. Prague is told if that event comes to pass, all classified documents in the embassy will be burned. Emergency measures are being prepared, and tensions are evidently high.

  • October 27, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to the Brazilian Embassy in Havana, 1 a.m., Saturday

    Instructions from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to the Brazilian Embassy in Cuba on what gestures can be made next to that government in order to stop the construction of the nuclear missile bases.

  • October 27, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Mexico (Pio Corrêa), 7 a.m., Saturday

    An official of the Brazilian Embassy in Mexico describes a meeting with the under-Secretary of External Relations, who communicated his conviction that the the United States is not disposed to negotiate on the Cuban question and has decided to intervene militarily on the island, since it is persuaded that the military and political base that has been established by the USSR disturbs the world equilibrium between the two blocs.