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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • November 02, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Envoy G. Zhukov to CC CPSU

    Soviet envoy to the UN, G. Zhukov, reports to the Soviet leadership on his discussion with US diplomat John McCloy. The US diplomat said that the US hoped the U2 spy plane pictures taken the day before will show that the withdrawal of Soviet Missiles was proceeding as agreed. Provided that progress was made on the issue of Cuba, further cooperation between the two superpowers was possible, including an agreement on an atmospheric test ban and on the militarization of the outer space.

  • November 02, 1962

    Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 2 November 1962

    The letter begins with Boissevain criticizing Castro's speech, claiming he could have written it before it was ever delivered. The speech concerned Castro's meeting with UN Secretary General U Thant, and the contents of the speech were such that the Cuban people were kept at boiling point. Boissevain claims this is a necessity to make the people accept the sacrifices demanded of them and forget the hardships they face. Castro's exclamations that "we are above all Marxist-Leninists" raised applause, but Soviet support has died down. Boissevain suspects Anastas Mikoyan will have a hard time reasoning with Castro after the disappointment in the eyes of Cuba.

  • November 02, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'The Soviet Union Continued a Reconciliatory Approach to the Cuban Problem'

    A report from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union about Soviet-Cuban relations in the build-up of US-Cuban tensions. According to this Chinese document, the Soviet's involvement is one of hopeful reconciliation in the Cuban problem.

  • November 02, 1962

    Entry from the Journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, Conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru

    Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru regarding border disputes with China. Approaching the Soviet envoy at a social gathering, the Indian official relayed an oral message to Khrushchev from Indian Prime Minister Nehru (whom he described as "exceptionally busy, very tired"), giving his analysis of the underlying motives behind China's actions in the border dispute. The Indian leader assessed that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai--with whom Nehru had cooperated in championing the rise of the non-aligned movement only a few years earlier--opposed the current militant policy toward India, but that leftist dogmatists-sectarians within the Chinese leadership, such as Liu Shaoqi, supported it. They did so, Nehru reportedly maintained, not because of the border dispute, but to strike a blow against the general phenomenon of neutrality in order to discredit Moscow's line of peaceful coexistence and competition with the West, and avoiding general nuclear war. In fact, Nehru was said to declare, the Chinese threatened to embroil the entire world in war, and had divided the globe into two new camps: not East and West, but "one - for the continuation of the human species, the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against."

  • November 02, 1962

    Telegram from A.I. Mikoyan to CC CPSU re 1 November 1962 meeting with Stevenson

    Mikoyan discusses the results of a meeting with Stevenson. The two discussed the quarantine in Cuba, the dismantling of weapons, the possibility of the Soviets and Americans coming to agreements over the issues to be discussed by the UN Security Council and the possibility of normalization of relations with Cuba in the future.

  • November 02, 1962

    Ciphered Telegram from Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to the Central Committee for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

    The telegram bears on the circumstances surrounding Fidel Castro's controversial 27 October letter to Khrushchev. Alekseev describes Castro's demeanor as being irritated and paranoid at the time of writing the letter. He provides background on Castro's actions and attitudes at the peak of the crisis, and especially his nocturnal visit to the Soviet embassy and preparation of his letter to Khrushchev on the night of 26-27 October. He advises Moscow on how to handle the Cuban leader, and offers analysis into the emotions and overall mood of Castro and his associates at that moment in the crisis.

  • November 02, 1962

    Cable of V.V. Kuznetsov on 1 November 1962 conversation between CPSU CC Politburo Member A.I. Mikoyan and acting UN Secretary General U Thant

    Kuznetsov relays the results of a conversation between Mikoyan and U Thant. The bulk of the conversation between the two concerns U Thant’s recent visit to Cuba and his conversation with Castro. Mikoyan stresses lifting the quarantine around Cuba.

  • November 03, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Ministry to Yugoslav Embassies in Washington, Havana, Mexico, Caracas, and LaPaz, and Missions in Santiago de Chile, Montevideo, and New York City (United Nations)

    A message from the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry (originally, the embassy in Rio), saying that they are extremely satisfied with Tito’s message which contributed to Brazilian President João Goulart’s decisiveness on Cuban crisis.

  • November 03, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 3 November 1962

    Drozniak reports on the information from several sources on the Cuban Missile Crisis, particularly the White House and State Department's reactions to the agreement to dismantle the Soviet missiles in Cuba and the continued trouble they are having with Castro's refusal to allow UN inspections.

  • November 03, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 3 November 1962

    In a conversation between Drozniak and Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Walt Rostow, Rostow compares "the initial stages of the armed conflict in Cuba to the [Japanese attacks on] Pearl Harbor [on 7 December 1941]. [He said that President] Kennedy was ready for war. The most pressing issue at the moment is a quick removal of the [Soviet] missiles from Cuba."

  • November 03, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the UN V.A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry

    The number and location of U.S. ships, along with International Red Cross and UN observers, in and around Cuba.

  • November 03, 1962

    Notes of Conversation between A.I. Mikoyan and Fidel Castro

    Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Alexeev reports on the conversation between Mikoyan and Fidel Castro. The Cuban leader expresses his disappointment that the Cuban leadership was not consulted on the issue of withdrawing Soviet weapons from Cuba and on the Cuban Missile Crisis in general, and emphasizes the negative impact it has had and confusion it has caused on the Cuban people.

  • November 04, 1962

    Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko to Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the UN Zorin in New York

    Gromyko sends instructions to Kuznetsov and Zorin to relay to Stevenson concerning the definition of “offensive weaponry.”

  • November 04, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry

    Alekseev sends the results of a meeting with Cuban leadership, the Cubans were expressing discontent because of the fact that Soviet government had not consulted them on a number of issues.

  • November 04, 1962

    Soviet Report on Conversation with US Congressional Staff

    Report on the relief in Washington after the height of the crisis had passed and the possibility of the US pledging not to invade Cuba, provide ports and other government facilities to Cuban emigres or training Cuban emigres on US territory. The report also highlighted the American reluctance on the normalization of economic relations and the Guantanamo base.

  • November 04, 1962

    Record of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and North Korean Government Trade Delegation

    Premier Zhou Enlai and DPRK Government Trade Delegation discuss bilateral trade between China and North Korea. They emphasize the importance of exchanging requests for product types so as to improve quality of products produced from both sides. In addition, they are concerned about the trade imbalance between these two countries and with the Soviet Union. They emphasized the importance of self-reliance in economic development.

  • November 04, 1962

    Meeting of the Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba with Mikoyan in the Presidential Palace

    Minutes of the meeting between Anastas Mikoyan, Fidel Castro, and other members of the Secretariat of the ORI in the Old Presidential Palace. The purpose of this meeting is to resolve differences between the Cuban and Soviet governments in order to protect Marxist principles. Among other things, they discuss economic sanctions against Cuba, military intervention by other Latin American countries, the importance of the Cuban revolution to Marxism, and Cuba's relationship with the United States.

  • November 04, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation between Castro and Mikoyan

    Mikoyan discusses the Soviet decision to exclude the Cubans from negotiations with the US, regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis, with Cuban leadership.

  • November 05, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Alekssev to USSR Foreign Ministry

    Alekseev reports to the Foreign Ministry about Castro’s dissatisfaction about not being consulted regarding the question of dismantling. Alekseev shows him some letters that passed between Khrushchev and Kennedy.

  • November 05, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to USSR Foreign Ministry (1)

    Dobrynin discusses an article in the “Washington Post,” concerning the Soviet Union, that appears to have received information directly from Robert Kennedy.