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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • November 10, 1962

    Message from Raul Roa to the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations Regarding Cuban Missile Crisis Resolution

    Coding cable number 725 from Raul Roa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. He discusses the inspections of the Soviet navy and the packing and return of missiles.

  • November 10, 1962

    Cable from Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa to Cuban Mission to the United Nations (Amb. Carlos M. Lechuga), New York

    Cuban Foreign Minister, Raul Roa, sends a cable to Carlos Lechuga and the Cuban Mission to the UN discussing the "Yankee government" inspecting Soviet ships and instructing the Mission to await further instructions on the Brazil project.

  • November 10, 1962

    Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister A. Gromyko to A.I. Mikoyan via the Soviet Embassy in Havana

    Gromyko sends Mikoyan instructions on how to act toward Cuban and American officials, regarding the signing of the protocol after all weapons are removed from Cuba.

  • November 10, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy to the Soviet Union, 'A Report of the Speech Given By the Chief Editor of the Soviet Weekly Za Rubezhom'

    On the 31st of October, the chief editor of the Soviet weekly, Za Rubezhom delivered a report on current events in the Moscow Agriculture College. Regarding the Cuba problem and the Sino-Indian border problem.

  • November 10, 1962

    Soviet Report on the Opinion of Assistant on Latin American Affairs to the US Secretary of State Goodwin on the US-Cuba Relation After the Crisis

    Report on a private conversation in which Assistant on Latin American Affairs to the US Secretary of State Goodwin said that the US had originally planned to invade Cuba in January 1963, but then accelerated the preparation process during the Cuban Missile Crisis. He also stated that Kennedy wanted to take advantage of the Sino-Indian conflict because the group of neutral states including India would not be able to come out in Cuba's defense. Goodwin predicted that the US would not improve relations with Cuba until the Castro government was overthrown.

  • November 10, 1962

    Telegram-Letter from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 10-13 November 1962

    In conversation with a high officials from the State Department about the prospects of the Cuban situation, three hypotheses about the future Soviet comportment are discussed: 1) abandon entirely the government of Fidel Castro to its own fate; 2) limit itself to leave constituted in Cuba a socialist regime, based on a well-structured communist party and endowed with a repressive political machine, as a political base of propaganda and infiltration in Latin America and 3) to intensify Soviet technical and economic assistance in a manner to transform Cuba into a living demonstration of the efficacy of communism as an instrument of economic development in Latin America. The letter goes on to describe these three points in more detail.

  • November 10, 1962

    M. Couve de Murville to French Diplomatic Posts, Circular Telegram No. 96

    A circulating telegram to French diplomats outlinging the origins and meaning of the Cuban crisis, the unfolding and events of the crisis, and the consequences of the crisis.

  • November 10, 1962

    Soviet Report on the Cuban Missile Crisis Based on Intelligence Materials

    Summary of intelligence sources reporting that the US had been preparing for an invasion of Cuba and Kennedy only used the installation of missiles as a pretext to carry out aggressive actions. The US carried out the blockade also to warn the Soviet Union against signing a separate peace treaty with the GDR and to strengthen the position of the Democratic Party before the election. According to the report, other capitalist countries agreed that it was only the flexible policy of the USSR that prevented the outbreak of war.

  • November 11, 1962

    Message from Raul Roa to the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations Regarding Inspections

    Cable coding number 731 from Raul Roa to the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. He expresses that his government opposes inspection and would like to find a permanent solution instead.

  • November 11, 1962

    Message from Raul Roa to Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations Regarding Brazillian Proposal

    Cable coded number 727 from Raul Roa to Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. Offers three amendments to Brazillian proposal: include Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal in the territorial region, guarantee that nuclear bombs won't be used against Latin America, and the suppression of certain military bases in Latin America or Africa with nuclear potential, including Guantanamo.

  • November 11, 1962

    Message from Raul Roa to Cuban Ambassador the the United Nations Regarding Resolution Agreement

    Cable coded number 730 from Raul Roa to Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. Roa discusses the editing and changes made to resolution document and includes conditions for approval.

  • November 11, 1962

    Cables from Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa to Cuban Mission to the United Nations (Lechuga), New York

    A series of cables from the Cuban Foreign Minister, Roa, to Carlos Lechuga and the Cuban Mission to the UN. They discuss: a Cuban amendment to the Brazil proposal; U Thant’s idea of independent declaration in which each country would promise to uphold its corresponding part of the protocol; and opposition to inspections.

  • November 11, 1962

    Telegram from Nikita Khrushchev to Anastas Mikoyan

    This telegram, written in Khrushchev's stream-of-consciousness style, outlines the rationale behind the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba that caused the crisis: It was much better to end the crisis by giving up planes that were already obsolete—to show that the Soviet Union and Cuba had fulfilled all the promises Khrushchev had given Kennedy—and consequently to expect, and demand, full compliance with the non-invasion pledge on the part of the United States, than to retain the planes and give the Americans a justification to violate their pledge. The telegram also spells out, in Khrushchev’s words, of the reasons why the weapons were deployed to Cuba in the first place.

  • November 12, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:15 p.m., Monday

    A description of how the American blockade against Cuba has hurt its production, shipping and foreign commerce capabilities. And according to this telegram, the damage that the Cuban economy is suffering is turning this country still more dependent on Soviet help in the immediate future.

  • November 12, 1962

    Bulgarian Embassy, Havana (Hubenov), to Bulgarian Foreign Ministry

    In a letter from the Bulgarian Embassy to Cuba to the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Chief of Mission Hubenov writes that confidential archives of the embassy were destroyed at the order of Ambassador Konstantin Michev. Two protocols and a list of demolished materials are referenced in the letter, but not included.

  • November 12, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'A Report of the Conversation with the Deputy Editor of Noticias de Hoy, Raúl Valdes Vivo'

    A report of a conversation from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba detailing the situation different Latin American countries face in regards to US-Cuba relations, especially in terms of the US economic and naval blockade.

  • November 12, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 12 November 1962

    Jelen reports on his conversation with Raul Valdes Vivo, who is the editor-in-chief of Hoy [Today] during the absence of Blas Roca.

  • November 12, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 7 p.m., Monday

    A description of Brazil's resolution to the United Nations General Assembly regarding Cuba and the denuclearization of Latin America, as well as where the resolution stands in the Assembly thus far.

  • November 12, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA A. F. Dobrynin to USSR Foreign Ministry

    Dobrynin sends the results of a meeting with Robert Kennedy where the two discuss the removal of IL-28 bombers in Cuba and the lifting of the American quarantine.

  • November 12, 1962

    Hungarian Socialist Workers Party First Secretary János Kádár’s Account of His Visit to Moscow to the HSWP Central Committee

    János Kádár presents on his diplomatic trip to Moscow to the Hungarian Central Committee. Kádár first places the Cuban Missile Crisis in context. This includes describing the success of the Cuban revolution, US aggression towards Cuba, and the Cuban-Soviet military and defense agreement, which ultimately spawned the US’s unilateral military mobilization. Kádár then describes the Soviet Union’s strategy to achieve two goals: protect the Cuban revolution and preserve peace. He notes that Cuba and the Soviet Union disagree about how the crisis was resolved, but asks the congress of workers to show complete support of Soviet actions and successes.