Search in
ADD SEARCH FILTER CANCEL SEARCH FILTER

Digital Archive International History Declassified

SEARCH RESULTS

  • November 09, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 9 November 1962

    Jelen reports on several points of public opinion regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis situation.

  • November 09, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly, New York, New York, 7:30 p.m., Friday

    Mello-Franco discusses a conversation he had with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov. According to Kuznetsov, the American insistence on the question of inspection is becoming moot [ociosa] since the United States has declared satisfaction with the removal of offensive material existing in Cuba, it is only a pretext to postpone indefinitely the commitment of non-invasion and suspension of the economic blockade against Cuba.

  • November 09, 1962

    Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 9 November 1962

    Van Roijen cables from Washington about a conversation he had with British Ambassador to the United States David Ormsby-Gore. Ormsby-Gore explains the possible reaction from Moscow to the defeat suffered in the crisis as twofold: Those who are of the opinion that Khrushchev will make a countermove, while those whose judgment is that Khrushchev has finally understood that the Americans in fact are willing to fight for their vital national interests has learned severe lessons for future Soviet policy in the Cold War. Both van Roijen and Ormsby-Gore that perhaps the most decisive moment of the whole crisis was the American blockade of Cuba herself. The cable concludes with Ormsby-Gore addressing the possibilities of hidden missiles in Cuba, to which he claims aerial reconnaissance has not produced any evidence to support this.

  • November 09, 1962

    Danish Newspaper Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Pelegria Torras

    As the first journalist in Cuba since the outbreak of the Cuban crisis, Petersen is received by 1st Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Pelegria Torras, for an interview. They discuss the differences between socialism and capitalism; Cuban-Scandanavian relations; Cuban sovereignty; and Cuba's refusal to submit to international inspections.

  • November 10, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and Kim Il Sung

    The Soviet Ambassador Vasily Moskovsky reports on a cultural event in Pyongyang featuring the Aleksandrov Ensemble of the Soviet Army.

  • November 10, 1962

    Message from Raul Roa to the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations Regarding Cuban Missile Crisis Resolution

    Coding cable number 725 from Raul Roa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. He discusses the inspections of the Soviet navy and the packing and return of missiles.

  • November 10, 1962

    Cable from Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa to Cuban Mission to the United Nations (Amb. Carlos M. Lechuga), New York

    Cuban Foreign Minister, Raul Roa, sends a cable to Carlos Lechuga and the Cuban Mission to the UN discussing the "Yankee government" inspecting Soviet ships and instructing the Mission to await further instructions on the Brazil project.

  • November 10, 1962

    Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister A. Gromyko to A.I. Mikoyan via the Soviet Embassy in Havana

    Gromyko sends Mikoyan instructions on how to act toward Cuban and American officials, regarding the signing of the protocol after all weapons are removed from Cuba.

  • November 10, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy to the Soviet Union, 'A Report of the Speech Given By the Chief Editor of the Soviet Weekly Za Rubezhom'

    On the 31st of October, the chief editor of the Soviet weekly, Za Rubezhom delivered a report on current events in the Moscow Agriculture College. Regarding the Cuba problem and the Sino-Indian border problem.

  • November 10, 1962

    Soviet Report on the Opinion of Assistant on Latin American Affairs to the US Secretary of State Goodwin on the US-Cuba Relation After the Crisis

    Report on a private conversation in which Assistant on Latin American Affairs to the US Secretary of State Goodwin said that the US had originally planned to invade Cuba in January 1963, but then accelerated the preparation process during the Cuban Missile Crisis. He also stated that Kennedy wanted to take advantage of the Sino-Indian conflict because the group of neutral states including India would not be able to come out in Cuba's defense. Goodwin predicted that the US would not improve relations with Cuba until the Castro government was overthrown.

  • November 10, 1962

    Telegram-Letter from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 10-13 November 1962

    In conversation with a high officials from the State Department about the prospects of the Cuban situation, three hypotheses about the future Soviet comportment are discussed: 1) abandon entirely the government of Fidel Castro to its own fate; 2) limit itself to leave constituted in Cuba a socialist regime, based on a well-structured communist party and endowed with a repressive political machine, as a political base of propaganda and infiltration in Latin America and 3) to intensify Soviet technical and economic assistance in a manner to transform Cuba into a living demonstration of the efficacy of communism as an instrument of economic development in Latin America. The letter goes on to describe these three points in more detail.

  • November 10, 1962

    M. Couve de Murville to French Diplomatic Posts, Circular Telegram No. 96

    A circulating telegram to French diplomats outlinging the origins and meaning of the Cuban crisis, the unfolding and events of the crisis, and the consequences of the crisis.

  • November 10, 1962

    Soviet Report on the Cuban Missile Crisis Based on Intelligence Materials

    Summary of intelligence sources reporting that the US had been preparing for an invasion of Cuba and Kennedy only used the installation of missiles as a pretext to carry out aggressive actions. The US carried out the blockade also to warn the Soviet Union against signing a separate peace treaty with the GDR and to strengthen the position of the Democratic Party before the election. According to the report, other capitalist countries agreed that it was only the flexible policy of the USSR that prevented the outbreak of war.

  • November 11, 1962

    Message from Raul Roa to the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations Regarding Inspections

    Cable coding number 731 from Raul Roa to the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. He expresses that his government opposes inspection and would like to find a permanent solution instead.

  • November 11, 1962

    Message from Raul Roa to Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations Regarding Brazillian Proposal

    Cable coded number 727 from Raul Roa to Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. Offers three amendments to Brazillian proposal: include Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal in the territorial region, guarantee that nuclear bombs won't be used against Latin America, and the suppression of certain military bases in Latin America or Africa with nuclear potential, including Guantanamo.

  • November 11, 1962

    Message from Raul Roa to Cuban Ambassador the the United Nations Regarding Resolution Agreement

    Cable coded number 730 from Raul Roa to Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. Roa discusses the editing and changes made to resolution document and includes conditions for approval.

  • November 11, 1962

    Cables from Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa to Cuban Mission to the United Nations (Lechuga), New York

    A series of cables from the Cuban Foreign Minister, Roa, to Carlos Lechuga and the Cuban Mission to the UN. They discuss: a Cuban amendment to the Brazil proposal; U Thant’s idea of independent declaration in which each country would promise to uphold its corresponding part of the protocol; and opposition to inspections.

  • November 11, 1962

    Telegram from Nikita Khrushchev to Anastas Mikoyan

    This telegram, written in Khrushchev's stream-of-consciousness style, outlines the rationale behind the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba that caused the crisis: It was much better to end the crisis by giving up planes that were already obsolete—to show that the Soviet Union and Cuba had fulfilled all the promises Khrushchev had given Kennedy—and consequently to expect, and demand, full compliance with the non-invasion pledge on the part of the United States, than to retain the planes and give the Americans a justification to violate their pledge. The telegram also spells out, in Khrushchev’s words, of the reasons why the weapons were deployed to Cuba in the first place.

  • November 12, 1962

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'A Report of the Conversation with the Deputy Editor of Noticias de Hoy, Raúl Valdes Vivo'

    A report of a conversation from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba detailing the situation different Latin American countries face in regards to US-Cuba relations, especially in terms of the US economic and naval blockade.

  • November 12, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:15 p.m., Monday

    A description of how the American blockade against Cuba has hurt its production, shipping and foreign commerce capabilities. And according to this telegram, the damage that the Cuban economy is suffering is turning this country still more dependent on Soviet help in the immediate future.