Jelen reports on several points of public opinion regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis situation.

Mello-Franco discusses a conversation he had with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov. According to Kuznetsov, the American insistence on the question of inspection is becoming moot [ociosa] since the United States has declared satisfaction with the removal of offensive material existing in Cuba, it is only a pretext to postpone indefinitely the commitment of non-invasion and suspension of the economic blockade against Cuba.

Van Roijen cables from Washington about a conversation he had with British Ambassador to the United States David Ormsby-Gore. Ormsby-Gore explains the possible reaction from Moscow to the defeat suffered in the crisis as twofold: Those who are of the opinion that Khrushchev will make a countermove, while those whose judgment is that Khrushchev has finally understood that the Americans in fact are willing to fight for their vital national interests has learned severe lessons for future Soviet policy in the Cold War. Both van Roijen and Ormsby-Gore that perhaps the most decisive moment of the whole crisis was the American blockade of Cuba herself. The cable concludes with Ormsby-Gore addressing the possibilities of hidden missiles in Cuba, to which he claims aerial reconnaissance has not produced any evidence to support this.

As the first journalist in Cuba since the outbreak of the Cuban crisis, Petersen is received by 1st Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Pelegria Torras, for an interview. They discuss the differences between socialism and capitalism; Cuban-Scandanavian relations; Cuban sovereignty; and Cuba's refusal to submit to international inspections.

The Soviet Ambassador Vasily Moskovsky reports on a cultural event in Pyongyang featuring the Aleksandrov Ensemble of the Soviet Army.

Coding cable number 725 from Raul Roa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. He discusses the inspections of the Soviet navy and the packing and return of missiles.

Cuban Foreign Minister, Raul Roa, sends a cable to Carlos Lechuga and the Cuban Mission to the UN discussing the "Yankee government" inspecting Soviet ships and instructing the Mission to await further instructions on the Brazil project.

Gromyko sends Mikoyan instructions on how to act toward Cuban and American officials, regarding the signing of the protocol after all weapons are removed from Cuba.

On the 31st of October, the chief editor of the Soviet weekly, Za Rubezhom delivered a report on current events in the Moscow Agriculture College. Regarding the Cuba problem and the Sino-Indian border problem.

Report on a private conversation in which Assistant on Latin American Affairs to the US Secretary of State Goodwin said that the US had originally planned to invade Cuba in January 1963, but then accelerated the preparation process during the Cuban Missile Crisis. He also stated that Kennedy wanted to take advantage of the Sino-Indian conflict because the group of neutral states including India would not be able to come out in Cuba's defense. Goodwin predicted that the US would not improve relations with Cuba until the Castro government was overthrown.

In conversation with a high officials from the State Department about the prospects of the Cuban situation, three hypotheses about the future Soviet comportment are discussed: 1) abandon entirely the government of Fidel Castro to its own fate; 2) limit itself to leave constituted in Cuba a socialist regime, based on a well-structured communist party and endowed with a repressive political machine, as a political base of propaganda and infiltration in Latin America and 3) to intensify Soviet technical and economic assistance in a manner to transform Cuba into a living demonstration of the efficacy of communism as an instrument of economic development in Latin America. The letter goes on to describe these three points in more detail.

A circulating telegram to French diplomats outlinging the origins and meaning of the Cuban crisis, the unfolding and events of the crisis, and the consequences of the crisis.

Summary of intelligence sources reporting that the US had been preparing for an invasion of Cuba and Kennedy only used the installation of missiles as a pretext to carry out aggressive actions. The US carried out the blockade also to warn the Soviet Union against signing a separate peace treaty with the GDR and to strengthen the position of the Democratic Party before the election. According to the report, other capitalist countries agreed that it was only the flexible policy of the USSR that prevented the outbreak of war.

Cable coding number 731 from Raul Roa to the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. He expresses that his government opposes inspection and would like to find a permanent solution instead.

Cable coded number 727 from Raul Roa to Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. Offers three amendments to Brazillian proposal: include Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal in the territorial region, guarantee that nuclear bombs won't be used against Latin America, and the suppression of certain military bases in Latin America or Africa with nuclear potential, including Guantanamo.

Cable coded number 730 from Raul Roa to Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. Roa discusses the editing and changes made to resolution document and includes conditions for approval.

A series of cables from the Cuban Foreign Minister, Roa, to Carlos Lechuga and the Cuban Mission to the UN. They discuss: a Cuban amendment to the Brazil proposal; U Thant’s idea of independent declaration in which each country would promise to uphold its corresponding part of the protocol; and opposition to inspections.

This telegram, written in Khrushchev's stream-of-consciousness style, outlines the rationale behind the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba that caused the crisis: It was much better to end the crisis by giving up planes that were already obsolete—to show that the Soviet Union and Cuba had fulfilled all the promises Khrushchev had given Kennedy—and consequently to expect, and demand, full compliance with the non-invasion pledge on the part of the United States, than to retain the planes and give the Americans a justification to violate their pledge. The telegram also spells out, in Khrushchev’s words, of the reasons why the weapons were deployed to Cuba in the first place.

A report of a conversation from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba detailing the situation different Latin American countries face in regards to US-Cuba relations, especially in terms of the US economic and naval blockade.

A description of how the American blockade against Cuba has hurt its production, shipping and foreign commerce capabilities. And according to this telegram, the damage that the Cuban economy is suffering is turning this country still more dependent on Soviet help in the immediate future.