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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • June 30, 1955

    Conversation of Mao Zedong and the Yugoslav Ambassador V. Popovic

    Conversation between Mao Zedong and Yugoslav Ambassador Popovic. Mao explains that the delay in China's recognition of Yugoslavia was because China was waiting for Yugoslavia and the USSR to mend their relations. Emphasizes the need for Communist unity and cooperation.

  • July 09, 1955

    Central Committee Plenum of the CPSU Ninth Session, Evening

    The situation in Yugoslavia is discussed, in terms of keeping Yugoslavia in close relations with the USSR and reducing its political and economic dependence on capitalist countries.

  • July 09, 1955

    Central Committee Plenum of the CPSU Ninth Session, N. A. Bulganin Address

    Discussion in the CPSU CC Plenum on Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Bulganin deplores the situation reached due to the Soviet-Yugoslav split and calls for a rapprochement with Tito. Other CPSU members including Nikita Khrushchev agree.

  • July 12, 1955

    Central Committee Plenum of the CPSU Ninth Session, Concluding Word by Com. N. S. Krushchev

    Khrushchev responds to the accusations raised by Cde. Molotov about the state of Soviet foreign policy. He discusses the Soviet relationship with the Yugoslav leadership, the Austrian treaty, Soviet-US relations.

  • August 07, 1956

    Agreed Policy Governing Radio Free Europe Operations

    CIA and Free Europe Committee (FEC) restate policy for Radio Free Europe in the context of the 1956 upheaval in the Communist world.

  • September, 1956

    Minutes, Mao’s Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, [undated]

    Mao apologizes to Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation for poor relations in the past, citing pressure from Stalin and the Soviet Union as the primary reason.

  • October 06, 1956

    Note from N. Khrushchev to the CPSU CC Presidium regarding conversations with Yugoslav leaders in Belgrade

    Khrushchev reports on his conversations with Tito and other Yugoslav leaders during his visit to Yugolsavia. The first conversation addressed the bread shortage in Yugoslavia, a trade agreement between the two countries and the structure of Yugoslav agriculture. The second conversation addressed Soviet-Yugoslav relations and the issues of building socialism, the international press, Marxist-Leninist policy, and Yugoslav relations with other European socialist countries.

  • October 08, 1956

    Note from N. Khrushchev to the CPSU CC Presidium regarding conversations with Yugoslav leaders in Yugoslavia

    Khrushchev describes his conversations with Josip Broz Tito during his visit to Yugoslavia. They discussed the issues of U.S. aid to Yugoslavia, the Turkish and Greek conflict over Cyprus, the expansion of contact between Soviet and Yugoslav workers and the path to socialism. Tito appeared uneasy and was dissatisfied with relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

  • October 08, 1956

    Note from N. Khrushchev to the CPSU CC Presidium regarding conversations with Yugoslav leaders in the Crimea

    Khrushchev describes his conversations with Josip Broz Tito regarding Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The leaders discussed Yugoslavia's need for economic and technological assistance from the Soviet Union; socialist methods and ideology; alignment on international issues; and amnesty for Communist fugitives returning to Yugoslavia. Khrushchev expresses concern about the behavior of Yugoslav diplomats and the Yugoslav press. He recommends to the CPSU CC that increasing contact with Yugoslav leaders will facilitate rapprochement between the Parties.

  • October 31, 1956

    Notes of a Telephone Message from F. N. Gryaznov, a Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Yugoslavia

    Tito, currently in Brioni, requests that a meeting with Khrushchev and Malenkov is relocated to Brioni, as Tito is forbidden to leave due to illness.

  • October 31, 1956

    Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee About the Situation in Hungary (Protocol 49)

    This resolution instructs the Soviet Ambassador to Belgrade to transmit a letter to Tito requesting a secret meeting on November 1 or 2 with Khrushchev and Malenkov. It also empowers certain members to conduct negotiations with the United Workers Party of Poland.

  • October 31, 1956

    Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 31 October 1956

    Khrushchev and members of the CPSU CC Presidium decide to not withdraw Soviet troops from Hungary. Negotiations with Tito and the situation in Yugoslavia are also mentioned.

  • November 04, 1956

    Cable, N. Firiubin to Soviet Foreign Ministry

    In this coded telegram, the Soviet Ministry is informed of Imre Nagy’s location at the Yugolsav embassy in Budapest. Firiubin reports that the Yugoslavs are attempting to obtain a statement from Nagy in support of Kadar’s new government. Tito is noted as requesting that the Soviet government not repress communists who ‘did not immediately take the correct line’ during the uprising and that the Soviet government protect the Yugoslav embassy from potential attack.

  • November 04, 1956

    Stenographic record of a 4 November 1956 meeting of Party activists

    Khrushchev describes the events of the counterrevolution in Hungary and the crisis in Poland. He recounts the CPSU's consultations with other communist parties in the socialist camp to determine their attitude toward Soviet intervention, particularly in Hungary. Leaders from China, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia agreed with the Soviet position, but Polish leaders opposed the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary. Khrushchev reports that following these meetings, the CPSU CC Presidium decided to prepare for an attack on the counterrevolutionary forces in Hungary. He then reads aloud an open letter which declares the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Government. He gives details about the suppression of the counterrevolution by Soviet armed forces and the positive reaction of the socialist countries. He states that the lessons of the counterrevolution are to improve relations with the fraternal parties and the socialist countries and to treat them with respect; to improve political work among students and the masses so that they are not mislead by counterrevolutionaries; and to strengthen the Soviet Army.

  • November 07, 1956

    From the diary of D.T. Shepilov

    In his diary, Shepilov pledges to investigate the circumstances surrounding tank fire near the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. Promises are made to investigate the story and report back to Yugoslavian officials. Shepilov notes that Yugoslavian Ambassador Micunovic agrees with judgments made about Nagy. Shepilov expresses consternation at how Yugoslavia can provide refuge for Nagy and condemn him. References to a meeting in Brioni between Khrushchev, Malenkov and Tito detail the opinions of Yugoslav and Soviet officials concerning Nagy.

  • November 08, 1956

    Letter of the CC UCY to the CC CPSU with an exposition of the views of the leadership of the UCY on the events in Hungary

    In this letter, the Central Committee of Yugoslavia responds to the CC CPSU over questions concerning Yugoslavia’s decision to provide shelter to Nagy and his group at their embassy. The letter begins by expressing agreement on the weakness of Nagy’s government, the need to form a new government under Kadar, and the existence of “honest communists” in Nagy’s government that could assist Kadar. The letter relates that Yugoslavia cannot hand Nagy and his group over to authorities because of the domestic consequences of such an action. The correspondence ends with both the suggestion of amnesty for Nagy and Yugoslavia’s disavowal of any connection to Nagy or the uprising.

  • November 22, 1956

    Diary of Soviet Ambassador P.F. Yudin, Memorandum of Conversation with Liu Shaoqi of 30 October 1956

    Liu Shaoqi discusses the potential withdrawal of Soviet advisors from China. Although the Chinese government was considering sending back some specialist, they did not want the abrupt removal of all specialists as happened in Yugoslavia. Liu Shaoqi also brings up the 1956 uprisings in Hungary and Poland, saying that such events were a “useful lesson for the entire communist movement.”

  • November 27, 1956

    Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 27 November 1956 (Re: Protocol No. 60)

    These notes (part of the Malin Collection) describe Romanian leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej’s decision to negotiate with Yugoslavia regarding the fate of Imre Nagy after his arrest and transfer to Romania. The notes state that negotiations are inadvisable and remain the responsibility of Hungary. A second section of the document refers to instructions to the KGB for discrediting Nagy.

  • December 26, 1956

    Memorandum of Meeting with Khrushchev, Moscow

    After lightly rebuking Hoxha's choices to use public trials for the executions of political criminals, Khrushchev reassures Hoxha of the Soviet Union's support for Albania, and concludes with a summary of the Soviet Union's current standing in the international sphere.

  • April, 1957

    Khrushchev’s Speech at the Lunch Organized in Honor of the Albanian Government and Party Delegation, Moscow

    Khrushchev defends Enver Hoxha against personal attacks from Josip Broz Tito, but emphasizes cooperation between Yugoslavia and socialist camp. Khrushchev also suggests that Albania is a potential foothold for the spread of socialism to Asian, African, and Middle Eastern countries, and calls for "ideological war" in order to spread influence to these areas.