Matusov and Altman report on Nagy's arrest on 4/5 March 1938 and subsequent release on 8 March, and describe some of his work.

Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, and Governor Sheng discuss Xinjiang's military, level of industrialization, and natural resources, as well as Governor Sheng's strong desire to join the Communist Party.

Governor Sheng Shicai expresses gratitude to Cdes. Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov for the opportunity to visit Moscow. After reporting critical remarks made by Fang Lin against the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, Sheng Shicai requests that the All-Union Communist Party dispatch a politically experienced person to Urumqi to discuss Party training and asks that the Comintern order the Chinese Communist Party in Xinjiang to liquidate the Party organization.

The Politburo transfers Soviet military units deployed in Xinjiang and supervision of the Xinjiang army to the control of the People's Commissariat of Defense.

The Politburo describes the work of the NKVD Special Departments, which are charged with fighting counterrevolution, espionage, and other anti-Soviet activity in the Red Army, Navy, and NKVD. To accomplish these tasks, the Special Departments organize an apparatus of informers and conduct searches and seizures.

In this letter the Soviet minister proposed to the Soviet government to concentrate the nuclear research in Ukrainian Institute of Physic and Technology (UIPhT) and to locate in Kharkov the nuclear scientists from Leningrad Institute of Physic and Technology because Kharkov institute had very good base for the nuclear studies. If this proposal was realized Kharkov could become more important Soviet nuclear center than Moscow or Sarov. In any case this letter of people’s commissar recognized the prominent role of the Ukrainian Institute of Physic and Technology (UIPhT) in the Soviet nuclear science.

Secret Texts of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact, 1939

The Politburo describes changes to its existing procedures for monitoring international communications, including requiring the NKVD to monitor all international conversations of foreign embassy officials and journalists, prohibiting private citizens from making international calls, and increasing the NKVD's work to identify illegal radio stations operating within foreign embassies.

This letter informed the Academy of Sciences that UIPhT asked the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to allocate 75 thousand rubles for designing of the cyclotron, and 1,5 million rubles for its building. The State Plan asked an advice on necessity to build the cyclotron.

This document is an answer to the letter from State Plan of Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Republic to Academy of Sciences of USSR “About Rationality to Construct Cyclotron in UIPhT” (22 Feb 1940). The answer of academician Petr Kapitsa to this letter was very critical. Kapitsa wrote that UIPhT “during the last several years built a number of research installation but did not finish them. However it started to build new installations. Such activities of UIPhT can’t be considered as normal”. So Petr Kapitsa discouraged building a cyclotron in UIPhT, and this was one of the reasons why this institute did not become the leading nuclear center in USSR.

The Politburo directs the NKVD to permit the division of the combined secret cipher unit of the USSR Consulate General and Trade Mission in Urumqi into independent secret cipher units.

In this letter two nuclear scientists from UIPhT described the construction of the nuclear bomb and proposed to start activities in producing of the nuclear arsenal and make these activities secret. Two Ukrainian physicists were first Soviet scientists who revealed the way of producing the nuclear weapon (of course they did not know about the similar inventions of the western scientists which were made at the same time because of secrecy regime).

Memorandum to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on Troop strength orders for the Red Army, May 9, 1940. Proposals for strengthening of Soviet armed forces.

The Soviet Politburo directs the NKO to approve over 9 million rubles in hard currency expenses for the 5th Directorate of the Red Army for 1940.

Kharkov Institute scientists proposed in this document the concrete steps to build a nuclear weapon. The document demonstrates that Ukrainian physicists understood how to receive weapons grade uranium and elaborated concrete technical proposals to achieve this goal through uranium enrichment in centrifuge.

In this letter two nuclear scientists from UIPhT described the construction of the nuclear bomb and proposed to start activities in producing of the nuclear arsenal and make these activities secret. Two Ukrainian physicists were first Soviet scientists who revealed the method of producing a nuclear weapon (of course they did not know about the similar inventions of western scientists which were made at the same time under great secrecy).

The Soviet Politburo charges Narkomtsvetmet with concluding a 50 year concession agreement for the right to explore and exploit mineral deposits in Xinjiang and establishes a Directorate of Concessions for Exploration, Prospecting, and Exploitation of the Deposits of Tin in Xinjiang.

This document’s proposal about centrifuge received positive assessments from the leading Soviet academicians in Moscow.

Notes from L.A. Leont’ev's January 1941 meeting with Stalin, regarding drafts of two commissioned textbooks on political economy. Stalin gives his views on "planning", "wages", "fascism", and other issues.

In this document, leading Soviet scientists criticize the idea of Kharkov physicists to use Uranium in military goals, because they do not believe it is possible to realize nuclear fission in the current practical conditions faced. The Soviet National Committee of Defence received these skeptical assessments in 1941 and decided not to develop the military nuclear program.