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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • October 31, 1962

    Cable no. 339 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Pavlicek relates to Prague how Fidel Castro is in a rage over the decision to dismantle the missile bases in Cuba, as he had not been informed. All efforts of the Cuban government are focused on having Castro's 5 Points fulfilled, while explanations from the Soviet Union that Cuba was not abandoned are spreading. The mood among the Soviets is one of crushing defeat, and some of the technicians have given in to drunkeness in a refuge of despair, refusing to cooperate. The situation in Havana appears grave according to Pavlicek.

  • October 31, 1962

    Cable no. 338 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Pavlicek reports to Prague that the public situation in Cuba is still uncertain and confused. Castro is expected to give a speech the coming Thursday which would resolve the situation and clarify the position of the Soviet Union. There is a lack of depth in evaluation, and much needs to be explained to the Cuban population by the Soviet Union, as all fear aggressive action by the United States.

  • November 01, 1962

    Cable no. 340 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Public opinion in Havana has soured after the actions of the Soviet Union to resolve the crisis. The press and radio are preparing the ground for Fidel Castro's speech that day, accompanied by a spike in Cuban nationalism. Castro visited a university where he expressed hope of a resolution to the crisis that would not negatively affect Cuba's security.

  • November 01, 1962

    Cable no. 347 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    The cable from Pavlicek, received a day late, confirms that Castro's wish to not have an international inspection and dismantling of the missile bases went ignored. This sparked a great outrage among the prominent party members in Cuba, including Ernesto "Che" Guevara, who was crushed with disbelief upon hearing the news. The situation is one of general confusion as everyone awaits Castro's appearance, and his 5 Points to be fulfilled.

  • November 01, 1962

    Cable no. 341 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Pavlicek relays to Prague the results of the meeting between Cuban foreign minister Raul Roa and UN Secretary General U Thant. Thant expressed sympathy for the Cuban people and acknowledged the right for Cuba to submit their considerations for the resolution to the crisis. The Cuban requests included lifting the American blockade, fulfilling Castro's 5 Points, and no UN inspection of the missile bases. Besides the meeting with the Secretary General, Pavlicek also recounts the meeting of a Latin American delegation including representatives from Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay and Mexico. All nations but Mexico refused to give in to U.S. pressures, and stood in support of Cuba. Pavlicek then moves on to cover the possible subjects of Castro's speech on 1 November, including the Cuban detention of anticommunist groups in country and the results of the negotiations with U Thant. In the meantime, the Cuban government is concerned with curtailing the actions of anti-Soviet groups which have sown confusion and discontent among the population.

  • November 02, 1962

    Cable no. 346 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Pavlicek's primary focus in this cable is the effect of the crisis on the national media. The Cuban media is stressing Castro's 5 Points, and some journalists are hesitant to report anything else. There is a slight thread of anticommunism and anti-Soviet sentiment breeding among the media, but these feelings are not widespread, according to Pavlicek. The press is holding off on coverage of all other events such as the Sino-Indian border conflict and Chinese support for Castro's 5 points until after his speech.

  • November 02, 1962

    Cable no. 348 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Fidel Castro's speech is the centerpiece of this cable from Pavlicek. Castro's rhetoric touched on the unity of the Cuban people, and their refusal to an "undignified agreement." Pavlicek predicts his speech will foster a great response both internally and externally. Castro also acknowledged the help provided by the Soviet Union and the anti-Soviet campaign mounted by counterrevolutionaries. Pavlicek's only complaint was a lack of emphasis on the "critical role" the Soviet Union has played in the negotiations to resolve the crisis. However, the reaction to Fidel's speech is one of calming the situation and a clear orientation for the Cubans.

  • November 06, 1962

    Cable no. 350 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Pavlicek communicates that Anastas Mikoyan's talk with the Cubans has suffered a personal setback with the loss of Mikoyan's wife. The results of the meeting between the Soviet and Cuban delegations remain unknown as of this cable. Pavlicek speaks of a proposal by Brazil to "Finlandize" Cuba, which would mean permanent Cuban neutrality and the end of the US base in Guantanamo Bay. Calm has taken over Cuba in the aftermath of Castro's speech on 1 November, although many still have reservations about the actions taken by the Soviet Union, and demand answers from Mikoyan.

  • November 06, 1962

    Report on Visit to Prague by Cuban Communist Party Leader Blas Roca Calderio

    Calderio's visit to Prague in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis served to solidify the ties between Cuba and Czechoslovakia, relations that would persist until the end of the Cold War. Among the activities of Calderio's visit included attendance of 12th Party Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, meeting with Cuban ambassadors to China, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and a promise to attend the meeting of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

  • November 07, 1962

    Cable no. 355 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    The cable reveals serious misgivings by the Cubans with regard to Soviet handling of the crisis. Roy Inchaustegui was criticized by Castro for discussing the question of document authenticity about the missile bases instead of discussing Cuba's right to defense at the UN Security Council. Pavlicek reports the Council asked on Czechoslovakia's stance towards Castro's 5 Points. While responding with support, he still asked for an official viewpoint from the Czechoslovak government in Prague.

  • November 09, 1962

    Cable no. 358 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Mikoyan's talks with the Cubans appears to be stalling, according to Pavlicek. The Cuban delegation is adamant about Castro's 5 points, stubbornly refusing any inspection of the missile bases, especially by the UN. Pavlicek also reports on a reception held the previous day at the Soviet Embassy in Havana. It drew a large crowd, and was marked by "warm feelings and openness," but discussions of the Soviet Union's handling of the crisis remain in doubt.

  • November 16, 1962

    Cable no. 365 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    The cable relays an important development in regards to press coverage of the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. There are strict controls and reviews to be placed on news from the Soviet Union, and there is to be no publications by Presna Latina about peaceful coexistence or solidarity with the Soviet Union, about export of arms, etc. until a resolution has been reached. Khrushchev's name is not to be mentioned anywhere. There are also strict limitations placed on foreign correspondents and journalists.

  • November 21, 1962

    Cable no. 370 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Pavlicek, through Mikoyan, relays the results of the talks with the Cubans, despite Mikoyan being tightlipped about the nature of the talks in front of the Chinese. Mikoyan made the case that Soviet actions prevented a devastating nuclear war, while the USA provoked the situation and presented the danger of a nuclear war. The Cuban revolution will remain unchanged and instead grow stronger, with the blockade lifted and a guarantee of non-aggression on the part of the USA. In exchange, the missile sites will be dismantled and removed under supervision. Mikoyan concluded it was understandable that Cubans felt confused and rattled after the crisis, as in the Soviet Union the reactions were the same.

  • November 24, 1962

    Cable no. 384 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    Anastas Mikoyan awaits the results of the New York City meetings and is actively preparing for the UN Security Council meeting in this cable. While Mikoyan is waiting with anticipation, there are still signs of reservation among the Cuban people and the revolutionary government regarding the approach of the Soviet Union. Confidence in the Soviet Union as a reliable ally has waned, accompanied by a loss of prestige and trust. The doubts are marked by a belief the U.S. will not hold up its end of the agreements, Cuba's stubborn refusal of inspections, and the belief that the resolution was bought at too high a price at the expense of the Cuban revolution.

  • November 28, 1962

    Cable no. 388 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

    According to this cable by Pavlicek, the Czechoslovak government was covertly supplying the Cuban armed forces with ammunition a month after the crisis was resolved. It appears the delivery of ammunition was made to maintain the promised supply for the end of the yearly quarter.

  • November 29, 1962

    Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United States (Dr. Miloslav Ruzek), Report on Anastas Mikoyan’s Conversations in Washington

    The report details Mikoyan's talks with President John F. Kennedy in Washington D.C. Among the topics of discussion were questions of hemispheres of influence, whether the Soviet Union promoted a revolution against the USA in Cuba, and whether Castro was made an enemy of the USA or was one from the beginning. Conduct of both nations with regards to the Cuban question is discussed at length, ranging from whether U.S. was correct in acting against a perceived threat to security, the conduct of the Cuban people, the extent of Soviet involvement in Cuba, and what military hardware would be left in Cuba after the removal of the nuclear missile bases.

  • December 06, 1962

    Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Record of Visit of Bolivian Chargé d’Affaires Jorge Calvimontes with Comrade Pithart, Prague

    Bolivian chargé Calvimontes goes on at length regarding Bolivia's conflict with Chile, which was rooted in Bolivia's desire for access to the Pacific Ocean.

  • December 13, 1962

    Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz), Record of Conversation with Bolivian Delegation to the XII Congress of the CPCz, Secretary in the Politboro of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolivia, Raul Ruíz Gonzáles, Prague

    This meeting represents the unofficial side of Czechoslovak foreign policy toward Cold War Latin America: its relations with the region’s Communist parties. Ruíz asks for information on the growing rift between China and the Soviet Union. The meeting, which took place at Ruíz’s request, resulted in several Bolivian Communists being sheltered through Prague’s Operation Manuel on their way home from guerrilla training in Cuba.

  • May 16, 1963

    Memorandum of a Conversation with the USSR Ambassador to the DPRK c. V.P. Moskovskyi.

    Moravec and Moskovsky review North Korea's foreign policies, focusing on Kim Chang-man's critical remarks of the Soviet Union.

  • May 16, 1963

    Memorandum of a Conversation between the Czech Ambassador to the DPRK, Comrade Moravec, with the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade Moskovskii, and the GDR Ambassador, Comrade Becker, on 23.IV.1963.

    The Ambassadors of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and East Germany discuss North Korea's foreign relations, the reunification of Korea, and economic conditions in the DPRK.