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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • July 08, 1966

    Telegram from East German Deputy Foreign Minister Hegen to Ulbricht, Stoph, Honecker, and Axen

    Telegram from the GDR ambassador to China, Bierbach, assesses the Chinese position in the Vietnam conflict. He states that China aims to exacerbate the conflict for it's own gain; by pushing theDRV to action in the South, it focuses its efforts in the North, with minimal risk of conflict with US troops. Specifically, Bierbach believes China is attempting to instigate a conflict between the US and the USSR.

  • July 09, 1966

    Note on a Conversation with the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Comrade Sverev, on 8 July 1966 from 11:00 a.m. to 12:40 p.m. at the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi

    Conversation with First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Sverev, describing the Vietnamese attitude toward China as becoming colder. At the same time, printing of China's anti-Soviet propaganda has become more limited and the Vietnamese appear grateful for Soviet aid. Sverev also estimates that there are over 200,000 Chinese troops stationed in North Vietnam.

  • September, 1966

    Information on the Visit of a Czechoslovak Party and Government Delegation Headed by [Czechoslovak Prime Minister] Comrade Lenart in North Vietnam, 24-28 September 1966

    Information on a Czechoslovak delegation to the DRV. The Czechoslovak delegation assess the Vietnamese situation and determine that the Vietnamese successes are overestimated while American strength and fighting potential are underestimated. The Czechoslovak and Vietnamese groups disagree on China, with the Czechoslovak delegation saying the Vietnamese are simply unable to take a stance against China because it would jeopardize the aid they are receiving.

  • September, 1966

    Information from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee to the Polish United Workers’ Party Central Committee

    A record of a North Vietnamese delegation to Moscow, which affirmed their belief that they would be able to defeat the Americans. They raise a request for additional supplies in 1967, and it is noted that China has continued to refuse to unite with the other socialist countries, which has complicated matters.

  • November 10, 1966

    Note on a Talk with the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade [Ilya] Shcherbakov, on 28 October 1966 in the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi

    Soviet Ambassador Ilya Shcherbakov reported that Vietnamese officers lately seem defensive and not trusting, while emphasizing their autonomy. Also states that Ho Chi Minh was made to promise not to talk with the US or call for volunteers from socialist countries without first consulting the Chinese.

  • November 10, 1966

    Note of Comrade Bergold, East German Ambassador, with the Polish Ambassador in North Vietnam, Comrade Siedliecky

    A note on a conversation between Mao Zedong and Le Duan. Zedong confronts Le Duan with instances where he has spoken out against China. Le Duan states that Vietnam does not support the Cultural Revolution, but will do nothing to oppose it. He answers other questions about economic policy and Soviet revisionism.

  • March 07, 1967

    Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Record of Conversation with Secretary and Member of the Politboro of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolivia, Jorge Kolle, Prague

    PCB Politburo member Jorge Kolle Cueto asks on 7 March 1967 to inform the Czechoslovak Communist Party, "on behalf of the CC of the Bolivian CP," regarding "the situation in Bolivia… and his recent meeting with Fidel Castro." After four pages of discussion regarding the depressing internal political situation under 1964 coup leader, General René Barrientos, Kolle announced that "the party must necessarily prepare for the possibility of armed struggle in order to participate in the attempt to overthrow the current regime together with other leftist forces."

  • March 23, 1967

    Bulgarian State Security Chairman Angel Solakov’s Report at a Bulgarian Communist Party Plenum

    According to the State Security Committee chair, Angel Solakov, there has been a major shift in the policies of the West towards the Soviet bloc. While during the 1950s military face-off was often considered an option, in the late 1960s such possibility has been largely ruled out. Consequently the US and their allies in Western Europe are focusing their efforts on fighting socialism around the world through peaceful means, such as strengthening economic and cultural ties with the Soviet bloc countries. This calls for a change in the strategy of the State Security Committee intelligence operations. Solakov also reports on the anti-Soviet activities of the Chinese and Albanian intelligence services across Europe.

  • August 24, 1968

    Telegrams from Romanian Embassy, Beijing, to Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22-24 August 1968

    A series of three telegrams reporting on a reception held at the Romanian Embassy in Beijing on August 23, 1968. Premier Zhou Enlai attended the event and gave a speech condemning the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

  • September 03, 1968

    Note Number 291 from the Department of Asia-Oceania, 'China and the Events in Czechoslovakia'

    The Department of Asia-Oceania analyzes shifts in Chinese foreign policy toward Eastern Europe following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and connects the apparent changes in Beijing's diplomacy to the Sino-Soviet split and the Vietnam War.

  • May 13, 1969

    Telegram from Romanian Ambassador in Beijing Aurel Duma to Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu Regarding Conversations with Representatives of Chinese Ministries of Trade, Foreign Affairs, and Defense

    Telegram from Romanian Ambassador to China, Duma, to Romanian Foreign Minister, Manescu, focusing on Duma's talks with China's Deputy Foreign Minister, Guanhua. Guanhua sees the USSR's building of relations with Mongolia and the DPRK as an attempt to encircle China. He also believes that American and Soviet aid are what is keeping anti-Chinese propaganda in circulation in India, although the Kashmir issue means there is no need to fear an Indo-Pakistani alliance. Additionally, he notes the anti-Chinese sentiment apparent in the European socialist bloc countries, and asserts that, although it wishes no harm to the Israeli people, China does not recognize Israel as a legitimate state.

  • July 12, 1969

    Memorandum of conversation of the Ambassador of the USSR A.F. Dobrynin with Kissinger

    In this July 1969 report to the Politburo, Soviet ambassador to Washington Anatoly Dobrynin recounts a wide-ranging conversation with national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger a half-year into President Richard M. Nixon’s first term. Dobrynin also offers his candid personal evaluation of Kissinger and the secret White House “backchannel” established by Nixon to circumvent the State Department and communicate directly with the Soviet leadership.

  • July 18, 1969

    Telegram from Ion Dorobantu, Romanian Charge d’Affaires in Beijing to Corneliu Manescu Regarding the Reply of the Chinese Communist Party to the Invitation to Send a Delegation to the 10th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party

    Telegram from Ion Dorobantu to Corneliu Manescu transmitting the contents of the Chinese reply to the Romanian invitation to send a delegation to the 10th Congress of the RCP. The Chinese refuse, politely, on the grounds that there will be a Soviet delegation present as well.

  • August 23, 1969

    Telegram from Aurel Duma to Corneliu Manescu Concerning the Conversation with Zhou Enlai

    Telegram from Aurel Duma detailing his meeting with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai. Enlai remarks that China believes Soviet citizens to be unhappy with the anti-China stance taken by the USSR. He also discusses Soviet interventions in Chinese territory, specifically Xinjiang.

  • September 07, 1969

    Minutes of Conversation between Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Paul Niculescu Mizil, Zhou Enlai, and Li Xiannian on 7 September 1969

    Conversation between Romanian and Chinese representatives. Romanians note that Nixon seemed sincere in his desire to normalize relations with China, and that he believed the Vietnam issue could not be solved militarily. The Romanians believe that Vietnam should pursue the opportunity for talks. Zhou Enlai states that the widespread activity of the USSR proves that the Soviet leaders are "crazy." The Romanians affirm that they would encourage neither the USSR or China to heighten aggression with the other.

  • September 11, 1969

    Note of Conversation between Ion Gheorge Maurer and Zhou Enlai on 11 September 1969

    Zhou Enlai describes his his meeting with Aleksey Kosygin to Ion Gheorge Maurer. The Enlai and Kosygin agree that they will keep the status quo along the Sino-Soviet border, as to not let it come to violence. They also agreed verbally to rework the old border treaties, created in the imperial era. Enlai holds that there are too many differences between China and the USSR to work out easily, but Maurer states that it is a good start.

  • September 22, 1969

    Information Report Sent by Khabarovskiy Kray (Territory) Committee to CPSU CC

    Soviet Communist Party officials and activists in the regions bordering the People’s Republic of China respond to the news of Aleksei Kosygin’s 11 September 1969 meeting with Zhou Enlai in Beijing and efforts to defuse the growing rupture with China.

  • September 22, 1969

    Stenographic Record of Meeting of Khabarovsk Regional and City Party Officials

    Stenographic records of a meeting of Soviet Communist Party officials and activists in the regions bordering the People’s Republic of China. They respond to news of the meeting between Aleksei Kosygin and Zhou Enlai in Beijing on 11 September1969. Although they all applauded Kosygin’s meeting with Zhou, some speakers noted that little change in the border situation had been observed since their encounter eleven days before. Relations along the border remained tense with regular incursions from Chinese citizens into Soviet territory.

  • May, 1972

    Report on Fidel Castro’s Visit to Bulgaria and Bulgarian-Cuban relations

    The report details Bulgaria’s preparations for a Cuban delegation and the visit itself. The author offers both praise and criticism of Cuban leadership. There has been positive progress in Cuba in recent years, yet underlying problems remain (e.g. the economy lacks planning). The Bulgarian government devised the visit as an opportunity to teach the Cuban delegation about building state socialism. The report includes an overview of the Cuban delegations visit. Discussions during the visit involved Cuban economic growth and barriers, China, Romania’s non-interventionist policies, Nixon’s 1972 visit to Moscow, and economic and scientific cooperation (particularly between Bulgaria and Cuba).

  • September 20, 1972

    Bulgarian Politburo decision on Intelligence Activity Against China

    BCP CC Politburo approves the request of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Angel Tzanev, for an increase in the intelligence staff in response to the need for expanding intelligence operations in China, Albania, Romania, Yugoslavia and Vietnam – a move closely coordinated with the KGB.