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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • October 20, 1947

    Ciphered Telegram, Molotov to Cde. Stalin

    Molotov relates how the Americans have rejected the Soviet position toward establishing a temporary all Korean assembly. While there is some overlap between both positions, this issue has now been exacerbated by Marshall's move to decide it in the UNGA. The Soviets should respond to this move by reiterating their commitment to a self-determined form of government for Korea, which requires the Soviets and Americans to withdraw their troops.

  • October 23, 1947

    Draft of Telegram to Vyshinsky on the Korean Question

    Vyshinsky is instructed that, because the Korean issue is already on the UNSC agenda, it should remain there. Vyshinsky should stake out a position that both American and Soviet troops withdraw simultaneously, allowing the Koreans to develop a unified government. Elected representatives from both Koreas should be invited to discussions. A time span for the troop withdrawals must be set. The draft includes some scrawled recommendations from Stalin.

  • October 29, 1947

    Telegram No. 293, V. Molotov to Cde. Stalin

    Molotov writes that Vyshinsky must insist on the Koreans being invited to any discussion on removing foreign troops from Korea. If opposition to such participation holds, the Soviets should abstain from voting on the matter out of principle.

  • October 29, 1947

    Telegram No. 418 from Vyshinsky

    Vyshinsky outlines the amendment that the US has introduced regarding the Korean question. Moreover, Vyshinsky asserts the plan to object to the amendment and express why the amendment is not compatible with the proposal of the Soviets.

  • October 29, 1947

    Telegram No. 423, Vyshinsky to Cde. Molotov

    Vyshinsky clarifies that in case there is a decision to form a commission in Korea, it is not advisable for the US and the Soviets to take part. Vyshinsky requests for an answer on this issue.

  • October 29, 1947

    Telegram, V. Molotov to Cde. Stalin

    V. Molotov states the importance that the Korean issue should be discussed with the Koreans. He also details that in the case of opposing proposals from the US, the Soviets should oppose and abstain rather than voting against them.

  • October 29, 1947

    Telegram Nos. 408-411, Vyshinsky to Molotov

    Vyshinsky outlines the proceedings at the UN, where discussion of the Korean question and the withdrawal of Foreign troops from Korea has led the Soviets to insist that the Koreans be invited to the discussions. He details counter proposals from the Americans, and Soviet responses to these resolutions.

  • October 30, 1947

    Telegram, V. Molotov to Cde. Stalin

    V. Molotov states the importance that the Korean issue should be discussed with the Koreans. He also details that in the case the amendments are approved, the Soviet Union will not take part in the work of the US proposed committee. He also details that in the case the amendments are approved, the Soviet Union will not take part in the work of the US proposed committee.

  • March 14, 1948

    Stenographic Record of a Speech by Comrade J. V. Stalin at a Special Session of the Politburo, March 14, 1948

    Speech by Stalin to a special session of the Politburo. He argues that because of differing ideologies between the USSR and the United States, hostilities are inevitable and, for that reason, the country's military should be enlarged. He praises the example set by the Chinese communist movement, and notes that India should be where the Soviet Union directs its attention to next. Brian Murray questions the validity of the document in CWIHP Working Paper No. 12, where the document was first published.

  • April 30, 1948

    George F. Kennan, 'The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare'

    State Department Policy Planning Director George Kennan outlines, in a document for the National Security Council, the idea of a public committee, working closely with the US government, to sponsor various émigré activities.

  • September 28, 1948

    Central Intelligence Agency Report, "Consequences of a Breakdown in Four-Power Negotiations on Germany"

    Summarizes Soviet objectives and strategies in entering into Four-Power discussions about Berlin and Germany.

  • November, 1948

    Draft Directive on the Establishment of a Quota System for Atomic Production

    A directive for the Soviet delegation, providing instructions and guidelines on handling a proposed quota system for atomic production. The Soviet position is that the quota is not useful unless a prohibition of atomic weapons occurs, in contrast to the Anglo-American opinion.

  • July 18, 1949

    Cable, Liu Shaoqi to Mao Zedong

    A committee to write up a preliminary draft for a loan from the USSR to China is created. Stalin meets with a delegation of the CCP and answers several of their questions, including: the CCP's policy towards the Chinese national bourgeoisie, the matter of people's democratic dictatorship, Chinese foreign policy issues, Sino-Soviet relations, Xinjiang, Dalian, a Chinese University in Moscow, a railway from outer Mongolia to Zhangjiakou, and a naval school. Stalin and the CCP delegation also discussed the possibility of a war breaking out between the USSR and the US.

  • April 14, 1950

    National Security Council Report, NSC 68, 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security'

    On US national security policy at the beginning of the Cold War. Includes an assessment of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as US and Soviet nuclear weapons capabilities.

  • September 23, 1950

    CPSU Politburo Decision to Adopt the Attached Draft Response

    Telegram telling Vyshinsky to inform Lancaster that Malik consented to a meeting with the assistant Ahesona or one of the American ambassadors, as suggested by Lancaster. Malik should listen to the State Department official and if it's evident that the Americans are taking a step forward towards a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, tell him that Malik should ponder the issues mentioned in the conversation.

  • September 27, 1950

    Incoming Cable No. 28116, Vyshinsky to Gromyko

    On the meeting that took place between Tsarapkin and an American intermediary named Lancaster. They talked about the Korean issue.

  • September 28, 1950

    Outgoing Cable No. 18249, Gromyko to Vyshinsky

    Gromyko asks Vyshinsky to get Tsarapkin to inform American intermediary Lancaster that Malik has agreed to the meeting. Malik must hear out the Americans and if it seems that they're willing to work towards a peaceful resolution, tell Lancaster that any questions that the Americans had during this discussion will be answered in the next meeting.

  • December 09, 1950

    Resolution of the CPSU Politburo with Approved Article Draft for Pravda

    It was decided that the article "Concerning the joint statement of Truman and Attlee" be published in the Russian newspaper"Pravda."

  • June 27, 1951

    Reception of Alan G. Kirk, US Ambassador to the Soviet Union

    Record of Gromyko's discussion with Alan G. Kirk on whether the Soviet government is willing to support a peaceful resolution to the Korean problem. Gromyko answered in the affirmative. The two discussed ways to achieve a resolution, and who should be represented at the peace talks.

  • November 21, 1951

    Ciphered Telegram No. 26044, Gromyko to Razuvaev

    Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev instructing him to explain to the Chinese and Koreans the reasoning behind Vyshinsky's demand that the demarcation line be established at the 38th parallel rather than at the present front line.