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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • June 20, 1971

    Conversation of Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu and Cde. Zhou Enlai at the Embassy

    Notes regarding the conversation of Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu and Cde. Zhou Enlai at the dinner organized by the [Romanian] embassy in honor of the Chinese leadership.

  • January 16, 1973

    H. Daniel Brewster to Herman Pollack, 'Indian Nuclear Developments'

    The interagency group prepared a response to NSSM 156 on 1 September 1972 and it was sent to Kissinger. The summary of the study reproduced here includes the conclusion that an Indian test would be “a set-back to nonproliferation efforts” and that Washington should “do what [it] can to avert or delay” one. Thus, recommendations included a number of unilateral and multilateral actions that the United States government could take, noting that “given the poor state” of Indo-American relations, an “overly visible” U.S. effort would more likely speed up an Indian decision to test a device, Even non-US efforts were likely not to “be per se effective.”

  • August 02, 1973

    Rajya Sabha Report on Nuclear Conference in Ann Arbor, Michigan

    Transcript of questions and answers between members of the Rajya Sabha on the nuclear energy conference in the United States specifically research, educational reactors, technology, social impacts of nuclear power, and others.

  • March 19, 1974

    Record of conversation Between T.N. Kaul and Henry Kissinger, 'Indian Ocean'

    They discuss creating a "zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean.

  • October 24, 1977

    Telegram from K. V. Rajan, First Secretary (Pol), 'Agha Shahi’s meeting with [Cyrus] Vance'

    Reported comments by Agha Shahi’s on relations with the United States, India, and nuclear weapons.

  • May 17, 1978

    Telegram No. 115, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    Discussion with the chair of the Atomic Energy Commission of India, Homi Sethna. The United States is no longer supplying India with nuclear fuel or supporting its nuclear energy program, creating an opportunity for cooperation between Hungary and India.

  • November 14, 1978

    'Achieving USG Nonproliferation Objectives in Pakistan,' US Embassy Pakistan Cable 1119 to State Department

    U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan advises against informing the Indian government about U.S. concerns over Pakistan's nuclear program. It would have an "adverse impact" for the U.S. government to be seen colluding with India by Pakistan.

  • November 16, 1978

    'Achieving USG Nonproliferation Objectives in Pakistan,' State Department Cable 290844 to US Embassy Pakistan

    U.S. State Department reports that U.S. officials have instructions not to share U.S. "concerns" with India over Pakistan's nuclear program.

  • November 17, 1978

    'Achieving USG Nonproliferation Objectives in Pakistan,' US Embassy India Cable 17682

    U.S. Ambassador to India reports that the Indian government is aware that the U.S. believes Pakistan seeks nuclear weapons capability. An Indian diplomat informed him that Pakistan was two to three years away from nuclear capability.

  • December 22, 1980

    Information about Results of the Visit by L. I. Brezhnev in India (8 to 11 December 1980)

    Description of Brezhnev visit to India (1980 December), and summary of his discussions with Indira Gandhi and the Communist Party of India (ICP). With Gandhi, Brezhnev discusses a wide range of international issues, including increased US military presence in the Indian Ocean, the Iran-Iraq conflict, and Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Gandhi both expresses sympathy for Soviet situation in Afghanistan but also calls for withdrawal of troops. Both sides criticize Pakistan for taking action to destabilize region, and both sides criticize China for policy on sub-continent; Soviets accuse china of "direct support for imperialist policy."

  • April 09, 1981

    Special Assistant for NPI, NFAC, CIA, to Resource Management Staff, Office of Program Assessment et al, 'Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation'

    Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.

  • June 11, 1981

    Cable from Embassy Baghdad to Foreign Ministry in Delhi on United States-West Asia relations

    Indian diplomats speculated at the time that the suspension of the delivery of the F-16 jets was potentially a U.S. gesture of goodwill toward Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, aimed at appeasing him and keeping the embryonic peace process with Israel alive.

  • February 17, 1984

    Hugh Montgomery, director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, to Ambassador Ronald Spiers, Enclosing 'India-Pakistan: Pressures for Nuclear Proliferation,' Report 778-AR

    A memorandum from Hugh Montgomery, The Director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department to Ambassador Ronald Spiers discussing Indian and Pakistani nuclear proliferation. The Director details tensions between Pakistan and India, potential actions by India to stop a Pakistani nuclear program, and the influence of outside actors such as the USSR, China, and the United States.

  • December 10, 1995

    State Department Telegram 28705 to US Embassy in India, 'Arrange Wisner-Varma Meeting on Testing Issue'

    Telegram instructing the Charges d'Affairs to arrange an urgent meeting between the United States Ambassador to India and the Indian Prime Minister's Pricipal Secretary to discuss American concerns that India will launch a nuclear test. The State Department was ready for a demarche to the Indian government to express “grave concerns” about the possibility of a test.

  • December 11, 1995

    Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Memorandum by Robert S. Rochlin, 'Implications of an Indian Nuclear Weapons Test'

    Memo from senior scientist at the ACDA, Robert S. Rochlin, discussing the possible serious political and diplomatic consequences of India launching a nuclear test. In the event that Roa had made a decision to test, the United States did not have enough a“leverage” to encourage a policy reversal or to prevent a regional arms race; Washington would need to organize a “concerted intervention by all the major states.”

  • December 15, 1995

    Talking Points, State Department, South Asian Regional Affairs, 'Additional Testimony and Q’s and A’s for Congressional Briefing'

    State Department talking points for analyzing the issue of a potential Indian Nuclear Test. These talking points review the state of play after Ambassador Wisner’s demarche to the Indian Foreign Ministry. Recognizing Prime Minister Rao’s cautiousness, US government officials did not believe that he had made a decision to test, but they were aware that he was under great pressure to do so. Therefore, the U.S. government was working with allies, encouraging them “to urge India not to test.” Parallel discussions were taking place with the Pakistanis over the production of enriched uranium over above the 3 to five 5 percent level that could be used to fuel nuclear reactors. The Pakistanis were denying that they were producing highly enriched uranium but intelligence reports suggested that they were contemplating such action or had already begun the process.

  • August 12, 1996

    US Embassy in New Delhi Telegram 9250 to State Department, 'Ambassador’s Meeting with Opposition Leader'

    Report on US Ambassador to India Frank Wisner's meeting with Indian Opposition Leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and halting any nuclear test. The Ambassador found the meeting unproductive. The CTBT was central to the discussion but it was evident that Vajpayee was not interested and his “body language” indicated that he was inclined to favor a nuclear test. During one point in the discussion, Vajpayee asked, “What if we start underground tests?” According to the embassy’s message, “we interpret his question about testing as indicating that [he] and the BJP would favor a test” and would not be persuaded by U.S. arguments—“reason”—to forego one.